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HEALTH PLAN INNOVATIONS AND HEALTH CARE COSTS IN THE 
COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET  
WENJIA ZHU 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2017 
Major Professor: Randall P. Ellis, Professor of Economics 
 
ABSTRACT 
 The US has been increasingly seeking solutions in health insurance designs to 
control health care costs. Despite an ongoing debate about whether demand-side cost 
sharing or supply-side restrictive provider choice is more effective at reducing costs, 
there is little work to guide this debate due to challenges in causal inference, estimation, 
and measurement. This dissertation aims to: (1) understand the role of health plan designs 
in health care cost containment using a large, multiple-employer, multiple-insurer panel 
dataset; (2) develop a new estimation algorithm for models with multiple high-
dimensional fixed effects; and (3) design a new statistical method for inferring consumer 
choice of providers using claims level data.  
Chapter 1 examines the effects of health plan designs at a high level, by looking at 
variations in health care treatment across plan types that differ in their cost sharing and 
choice of providers. It finds that narrow provider choice may be more effective than high 
cost sharing at reducing health care utilization. This chapter speaks to insurance benefit 
design, and contributes to the literature by developing a new “treatment spells” approach 
that improves on episode or calendar interval analyses. Chapter 2 deals with challenges in 
estimating causal inference models. We present a new estimation algorithm for models 
		 viii 
that entail multiple high-dimensional fixed effects, large unbalanced panels, instrumental 
variables, and clustered standard error corrections. Applying the algorithm to a sample of 
over 1.4 million patients using more than 150,000 distinct primary care doctors over a 47-
month period, we find that provider network breadth dominates cost sharing in 
influencing consumers’ monthly utilization of care. Chapter 3 examines the consequences 
of narrow provider plans, namely how the breadth of consumer choice of providers 
affects individual health care utilization and spending. Since providers are not observed 
when their services are unused, I select plans with high enrollment/low provider density 
where provider network breadth can be more reliably inferred. Using an instrumental 
variable strategy, I find that narrow provider plans redirect patients from in-network to 
out-of-network services but only modestly lower expected health care costs.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE: HEALTH PLAN TYPE VARIATIONS IN SPELLS OF 
HEALTH-CARE TREATMENT 
Randall P. Ellis and Wenjia Zhu 
Department of Economics, Boston University 
Abstract 
 This paper analyzes 30-day “treatment spells”—fixed-length periods that 
commence with a service after a gap in provider contact—to examine how health-care 
utilization and spending of insured employees at large firms are influenced by health plan 
types. We focus on differences between preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and two 
recent innovations: plans that feature a narrow panel of providers, and plans that allow 
free choice of providers but increase demand-side cost sharing: consumer-driven/high-
deductible health plans. Health plan effect estimates change dramatically after controlling 
for endogenous plan type choice, and individual fixed effects. With these controls, 
narrow-panel plans reduce the probability of new treatment spells relative to PPOs by 34 
percent with little effect on chronic, repeat visit spells. Visit reductions are more 
concentrated in less severe conditions in narrow-network plans, hence diagnostic coding 
on the remaining patients increases. We find no evidence that either narrow panel or 
higher-cost-sharing plans pay lower prices per procedure or have less intensive treatment 
given initiation of treatment. With controls, consumer-driven/high-deductible health 
plans are associated with higher total spending on procedures than PPO plans. 
Keywords: health-care spending, treatment spells, risk adjustment, exclusive provider 
organizations, consumer-driven health plans
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I. Introduction 
Understanding how to control health-care costs is perhaps the central challenge 
facing all health-care systems, and hence explaining how health-care costs are influenced 
by health plan design features is of particular policy interest. In the United States, both 
public and private insurers are experimenting with diverse new health plan designs, and 
the new Health Insurance Marketplace established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
promotes plan design variation on both demand-side cost sharing and supply-side 
provider networks in the individual and small group markets. Of particular interest are 
two new health plan types that are growing in market share: (1) plans with narrow panels 
of providers that rely on careful supply-side selection of providers by health plans, and 
(2) plans with little or no restrictions on provider choice that rely on high demand-side 
cost sharing to encourage consumers to shop around for low-cost providers. The broad 
question this paper addresses is which of these plan type innovations is more effective at 
reducing health-care expenditures in the well-insured, large employer private insurance 
market. 
Comparisons of US health-care spending with Europe and Canada find that US 
expenditures are high because prices per service are high, and because the US health-care 
system uses more services for a given health condition (i.e., higher “treatment intensity”) 
(Anderson et al. 2003; Lorenzoni, Belloni, and Sassi 2014). Recent studies also find that 
price variation and treatment intensity variation contribute significantly to the large 
geographic variation in costs within the United States (Chernew et al. 2010; Romley et al. 
2015). A third contributing factor is that US health-care providers, incentivized by 
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generous fees, frequent patient contacts, and abundant test results, identify and treat more 
health conditions than in other countries, which shows up as increased diagnostic “coding 
intensity” on insurance claims (Wennberg et al. 2014). Routine breast and colon cancer 
exams, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and increased laboratory testing are all 
examples of potentially greater disease identification in the United States.1 
A popular view in the United States is that competition should be used to control 
costs. But it remains unclear whether demand-side incentives such as cost sharing that 
encourage consumers to be cost sensitive are more or less effective at reducing costs than 
supply-side incentives such as selective provider contracting that relies on competing 
health plans to find low price, low treatment intensity, or less aggressive providers. Also 
important is how demand-side cost sharing and supply-side incentives reduce spending. 
The general finding in the literature on the demand side is that cost sharing 
reduces health-care utilization with heterogeneous effects depending on types of services 
(Duarte 2012), stages of treatment (Manning et al. 1987), and one's location in the 
expenditure distribution (Kowalski 2016). If consumers are not well informed about their 
health, demand-side cost sharing may motivate consumers to skip important services 
(Galbraith et al. 2012). A different concern is that well-informed consumers seeking 
high-cost services may well reach their deductibles and stop-loss amounts so that 
																																																								
1 Hospitals’ strategic diagnostic coding, often called “Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) creep,” is one 
example of what we term increased “coding intensity,” in which hospitals increase the number of coded 
diagnoses to make their patients look sicker in order to increase revenue subsequent to the introduction of 
hospital DRGs in 1983 by the US Medicare program, and subsequently by most payers (Steinwald and 
Dummit 1989). Such record-keeping practices may affect all types of providers and services, not just 
hospitals. Note that the coding intensity of a plan type will also increase if consumers with low-severity 
problems are more likely to reduce their visits because of demand or supply incentives than consumers with 
more severe problems. 
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demand-side incentives have little influence on the health-care utilization of these people 
(Kowalski 2016). On balance, it is the entire cost share structure, not just a single price, 
that matters in consumers’ health-care decisions (Ellis 1986; Einav, Finkelstein, and 
Schrimpf 2015; Aron-Dine et al. 2015). The effects of supply-side incentives, in 
particular narrow provider networks, are less well studied than demand-side incentives. 
While Gruber and McKnight's (2016) study of narrow provider networks in 
Massachusetts suggests that cost savings can be significant using a limited network, 
Peters and Holahan's (2014) study of the ACA Health Insurance Marketplace in six cities 
reports that narrower provider networks usually but do not always lower premiums. Few 
previous studies attempt to explain the variations in health spending in a uniform 
framework where both consumer and provider incentives are considered, with the notable 
exceptions being Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser (2003) and Cutler et al. (2015).2 Our 
paper extends the literature by studying plan type effects on both the consumer and 
provider incentives in a large, multiple-employer, multiple-insurer panel data set where 
diverse supply- and demand-side incentives are present. 
Ultimately, we are interested in whether and how savings on health-care spending 
can be achieved by plan designs through their impacts on consumer and provider 
incentives. Our paper centers around this issue by answering three types of questions. 
First, we evaluate the overall effect of different health plan types on consumers’ 
incentives to seek care. We then turn to studying what types of care are most affected: are 
consumers deterred from making initial visits, follow-up visits, or repeated visits over 																																																								
2 Cutler et al. (2015) use survey results to decompose variations in health-care spending according to 
demand-side and supply-side incentives. 
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three or more months? The final area we explore is whether and how savings are 
achieved conditional on consumers deciding to seek care. Are savings achieved via lower 
prices, lower treatment intensity, or a lower provider effort at identifying diseases to treat 
(or code) for a given symptom? Section III lays out a conceptual framework underlying 
our approach. 
Three innovations distinguish our conceptual framework from the existing 
literature. First, we focus on a unit of analysis called treatment spells as an alternative to 
episode and calendar interval analyses. As discussed in Section II, treatment spells are 
more attractive for analyzing health-care treatment decisions than annual or monthly 
periods for clinical and statistical reasons and simpler than episodes. Second, we 
separately estimate models of subsets of treatment spells, based on whether each spell is a 
new visit spell (following 30 days with no treatment), a continuation visit spell (following 
a new spell), or what we call a chronic visit spell (which follows a continuation or 
previous chronic visit spell), enabling us to distinguish whether plan types are 
disproportionately affecting new, continuation, or chronic visit spells of treatment. Third, 
we decompose spending in a spell month into five multiplicative components: the 
probability of a visit, the level of prices, treatment intensity, an original measure we call 
coding intensity, and a term capturing patient severity of illness at the time of seeking 
care. This payment decomposition, discussed in more detail in Section III, enables us to 
better identify how cost savings are achieved by different health plan types. 
We understand that our analysis of only three spell types is highly simplified 
(although many other studies focus only on total annual spending). A natural extension of 
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our spell approach would be to classify spells more finely, such as by the presence or first 
onset of a specific disease, the occurrence of certain procedures or events (such as knee 
transplants, cancer biopsy, or emergency department visits), or to assign spells to a 
specific provider. We leave these extensions to future papers, focusing on a broad 
overview here. 
Our estimation methods accommodate a number of econometric challenges. All 
of our models carefully incorporate risk-adjustment measures that use diagnoses, age, and 
gender to reflect the consumers’ information about their health at each stage of the 
decision-making processes: plan choice, the decision to seek care, prices, treatment 
intensity, and coding intensity. Individual, county, time, and employer fixed effects 
further control for demand- and supply-side variation so that plan type effects are 
identified solely by consumers’ movement between health plan types within our sample 
periods. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates are used to control for endogeneity of 
health plan type choices: plan type dummies are instrumented by fitted probabilities of 
choosing each plan type that incorporates household variables on employee age and 
gender, family size, the presence of a baby or spouse, health risk, and the list of plan 
types offered by the employer in that year. We use two methods to correct standard errors 
for clustered errors. Our primary approach is to calculate cluster-robust corrected 
standard error at the level of employer, year, and family versus individual coverage types 
to avoid overstating model precision. Alternatively, we use bootstrapping methods to 
reestimate our full models on 100 random samples of our data and generate confidence 
intervals from the empirical distribution of the estimates. Details about econometric 
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issues are provided in Section IV. 
To give a preview, our results in Section VI suggest that narrow-panel health 
plans do better at reducing costs and utilization than high-cost-sharing plans, relative to 
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which are the most widespread health plan type 
in the United States.3 Although narrow-panel plans and high-cost-sharing plans appear to 
save money relative to PPOs when comparing sample means or using simple OLS 
models, most of these savings disappear once we control for endogenous plan type 
choice, individual fixed effects, and patient severity of illness. Narrow provider panel 
plans significantly reduce the probability of new treatment, with little effect on repeat 
visits for chronic conditions. Decomposition of total spending suggests that none of the 
plan types is successful at reducing prices relative to PPOs, with some evidence that 
prices are higher in high-deductible plans. Providers’ treatment intensity explains little of 
the variation in health spending across different plan types. We find more statistically 
significant differences across plan types in our new measure of coding intensity 
conditional on a disease than in prices or treatment intensity. In particular, narrow-panel 
plans code patients more aggressively than high-cost-sharing plans, likely a result of 
disproportional reduction in less severe spells of treatment in narrow-network plans than 
in high-deductible plans. Overall, high-cost-sharing plans are found to have higher total 
spending on procedures once we control for endogenous plan type choice, individual 
																																																								
3 For readers unfamiliar with the organization forms of health plans in the United States, Section III.A 
provides a brief introduction of the institutional background and evolution of health plan types in the 
United States. 
		
8 
fixed effects, and patient severity of illness. We return to discuss these findings more 
after presenting our methods, data, and results. 
II. Spells of Treatment Approach 
A. Rationale 
While a year is a convenient unit of observation for studying how broad patient 
characteristics affect spending and utilization, a year is too coarse for examining most 
consumer and provider decisions: a patient will often see many providers and have 
multiple spells of treatment in a given year. Keeler and colleagues at the RAND 
Corporation were the first to provide a careful and comprehensive study of health-care 
spending and utilization patterns using an episode approach (Keeler et al. 1982; Keeler 
et al. 1986; Keeler and Rolph 1988). Episodes of treatment begin with a clinical 
assessment of a new condition, continue while that condition is being treated, and end 
once no further visits are observed for a period of time. While attractive conceptually, 
remarkably few published academic studies have used episodes to study outpatient 
treatment patterns.4 This mostly reflects practical issues of distinguishing multiple, 
overlapping episodes, deciding when information becomes known and when continuation 
decisions are made, dealing with incomplete episodes at the start and end of the sample 
period, and incorporating chronic illnesses that may persist indefinitely. 
A second and related approach is to use monthly spending and utilization 																																																								
4 For discussion of this issue, see MaCurdy et al. (2008) and Rosen et al. (2012). Both papers apply two 
most commercially available episode groupers, Episode Treatment Groups (ETGs) and Medical Episode 
Groups (MEGs), to form episodes from claims and assign costs to episode. MaCurdy et al. (2008) focus on 
using Medicare claims as inputs, while Rosen et al. (2012) use commercial claims data. Both discuss 
challenges associated with matching and comparing results from different groupers. 
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measures. Ellis (1986) and Manning et al. (1987) were early users of this approach, with 
more recent examples being Eichner (1998), Einav et al. (2013), and Einav, Finkelstein, 
and Schrimpf (2015). In order to model the effect of deductibles and stop-losses, which 
change consumer out-of-pocket costs during the calendar year, all of these studies use a 
month as the unit of observation, and use variations in health-care cost sharing within a 
year to study demand effects. Similar to episodes, monthly models are challenged in 
capturing multiple conditions and dealing with beginning- and end-of-sample truncations. 
A further weakness of fixed calendar months is that they artificially split up diseases and 
associated treatment patterns when treatment spans multiple months. 
The treatment spell approach used here lies between episodes and monthly 
analysis, and has its origins in the early work of Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) in 
modeling demand patterns of mental health treatment. Treatment spells also underlie the 
Medicare payment system for paying for home health (CMS 2013) and many studies of 
care following an inpatient admission. Similarly to episodes, a “new visit” spell starts 
with an office visit or the beginning of a service after a period of time with no 
visit/treatment, and lasts for a fixed time interval of 30 (or 31) days, with the last day of 
this period marked as the ending of the treatment spell.5 This is different from the episode 
approach, where typically the completion of a treatment marks the ending of an episode. 
In our framework, following each treatment spell is either a “no visit” spell or another 
treatment spell. Since treatment spells need not start on the first day of the calendar 
month, then neither do “no visit” spells: if no visit/treatment is observed within a 30-day 																																																								
5 We alternate between assigning each treatment spell month 30 or 31 days, and assigning spell month 12, 
30, or 31 days according to whether it is a leap year. 
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period, then we have “no visit” spell(s) until the presence of a new visit that marks the 
beginning of a new treatment spell. The treatment spell approach facilitates modeling 
decisions of the initialization and continuation of health-care treatment over fixed 30-day 
periods that is missed by using fixed monthly periods, while also allowing multiple 
decision points that are often missed when creating episodes.6 
Unlike Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) and most episode groupers, we do not 
attempt to uniquely assign utilization and spending variables to distinct illnesses, but 
instead view treatment as generally related to many conditions. For example, we do not 
classify a treatment spell as a diabetic, hypertensive, or mental health spell, but instead 
use a risk-adjustment framework to capture any number of conditions within the spell.7 
For this paper, we do, however, distinguish between three categories of treatment spells 
(Figure 1-1). Following a period of at least 30 days with no visits, we have “new visit” 
spells, which may or may not be followed by a “continuation visit” spell. If a 
“continuation visit” spell is followed by a third (or more) spell of treatment, we classify 
such spells as “chronic visit” spells. Fitting around our fixed-length treatment spells are 
																																																								
6 Consider a hypothetical patient who receives a colonoscopy that identifies a polyp in the colon that is 
found to be malignant in mid-November. The patient ultimately undergoes 120 days of radiation and 
chemotherapy treatment. Using an annual observation, this episode of treatment would be divided up into 
two years, both of which would be lower cost than if the cancer had been identified in July. Using a fixed 
calendar month unit of observation, this patient would have half a month of initial cancer treatment and 
three and a half further months of high costs and utilization. Using an episode approach, all of the four 
months of treatment decisions would be collapsed into a single episode observation, as if there was only 
one treatment decision made by patients and doctors. Finally, in a spell of treatment approach, one would 
look at resource use in the first 30 days of new treatment and in the second, third, and fourth continuation 
months of treatment. If one believes that new information is obtained during an episode or year and that 
new decisions are made based on that information, then spells of treatment may be more useful than fixed 
time periods or episodes. 
7 A treatment spell approach can be easily extended to keep track of treatment patterns associated with 
specific conditions or illnesses, the use of specific services or drugs, or other triggering events. We use the 
onset of treatment after at least 30 days with no visits as our triggering event. 
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“no visit” spells of variable length, which are simple to model since by construction there 
are no visits or spending in them. Figure 1-1 illustrates how office visits (denoted as 
“V”), hospital stays (denoted as “H”), and emergency department visits (denoted as 
“ER”) by one person can be grouped into new, continuation, and chronic spells of 
treatment, as well as into “no visit” spells that lie in between them. 
B. Why are Spells Better?  
We employ a treatment spell approach for both clinical and statistical reasons. 
The main argument in favor of treatment spells over months and quarters is clinical 
validity. On the one hand, fixed monthly calendar intervals inherently split many spells of 
treatment across multiple periods, and do not usually correspond to clinical decision-
making units. For example, follow-up visits at 7, 14, and 28 days are common, and will 
all tend to belong to a single treatment spell month, but they do not necessarily fit into a 
single calendar month. On the other hand, longer periods such as a calendar year or 
quarter, while easier to model than months and less likely to split up treatment decisions, 
aggregate new information and diverse decisions into a single unit.8 
The second argument in favor of treatment spells is statistical. To explore this, we 
plot the distributions of health spending under three time periods (calendar year, calendar 
month, and spell month) in Figure 1-2, with summary statistics shown in the box. Each 
point in the figure is the percentage of total observations that falls into each of the fixed-
dollar windows ($50 in our experiment) along the distribution. We drop observations 
																																																								
8 Although we do not explore this use here, shorter treatment spells are also easier to assign to a single 
primary care provider than longer periods of time, whether a year or a long episode. 
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with negative payments and focus on “new visit” spells, namely spells following a period 
of at least 30 days with no visits. We report both the natural and the top-coded spending 
at $250,000 annually and $50,000 monthly, both values of which correspond to the 
99.99th percentiles of spending. Figure 1-2 shows that spending is less dispersed at the 
treatment spell than at the calendar month level, and the variation in spending at the spell 
month level is closer to that under the annual framework when spending is top coded (the 
last row in the box). 
 
III. Conceptual Framework  
A. Choice of Health Plans  
Each year an employer chooses a set of health plans offered to employees. 
Employees in turn choose from among the available health plans, with choices reflecting 
plan characteristics, employee demographics, employer, and household health status. We 
assume that choice of health plans is determined at the beginning of each year, and is 
fixed throughout the year.9 
The analysis of plan choice and plan types presented here is best understood in the 
context of the evolution of health plan types in the United States. Fifty years ago, almost 
all large firms offered a single health plan, which in today's terminology would be 
comprehensive plans (abbreviated here as COMPs), with modest cost sharing, no 
restrictions on provider choice, and little effort to manage care. The first major plan type 																																																								
9 Among the 7 percent of our employees who switch plan types each year in our continuously eligible 
sample, over 90 percent of the switches happened on January 1. Switches can occur because of births, 
marriage, divorces, sabbaticals, or moving, and need not mean that the plan year differed from the calendar 
year. We did not find any plans where the majority of switches occurred at a month other than January. 
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innovations were health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which contracted with a 
limited set of providers, negotiated reduced fees, and typically “managed care” in the 
sense that providers often would have the plan or its agents oversee the services provided. 
In the 1990s, there was a backlash against HMOs’ form of managed care, despite the 
evidence that HMOs are successful at reducing costs (Dugan 2015; Newhouse and 
McGuire 2014). 
The next popular plan type to emerge was preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs), which negotiated reduced fees and typically included a somewhat limited set of 
providers but with less tight management. PPOs range widely in their cost-sharing 
features, and are now the most popular plan type among large employers. In order to 
motivate enrollees to use higher-quality or lower-price providers, point-of-service plans 
(POS) emerged in the 1990s that introduced the concept of tiers of providers, with some 
“in-network” providers given lower consumer cost shares than out-of-network providers, 
with the latter still eligible for some coverage.10 These four plan types—COMP, HMO, 
PPO, and POS plans—represented more than 99 percent of all health plan enrollments in 
large employers in 2004 when other, newer plan types began to emerge (Ash and Ellis 
2012, Online Appendix Table A3). 
Since 2004, two new plan types have become popular. One plan type is exclusive 
provider organizations (EPOs) that greatly restrict consumer choice of providers while 
deemphasizing demand-side cost sharing. It is subjective where the boundary is between 																																																								
10 Some HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans pay some providers using capitation (monthly payments) rather than 
fee-for-service reimbursement. These types of payments also dominate spells of treatment in a “point of 
service with capitation” plan type. Altogether, spell months involving capitation payments amount to about 
3 percent of all the spells in our initial sample. As described in our Appendix B2, we have omitted all such 
spells from our analysis since prices and costs of individual services cannot be reliably measured. 
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EPOs and HMOs: we rely on our data vendor's assessment of this distinction (Truven 
Health Analytics). Some EPOs are as narrow as the providers employed at a single 
hospital or medical school, while others are statewide networks of carefully chosen 
providers. The second new plan type is consumer-driven/high-deductible health plans 
(CDHDs) that promote wider consumer choice but raise consumer cost sharing.11 As with 
EPOs, there are subjective boundary issues between PPOs and CDHD plans, but we rely 
on the classification system of the data vendor to identify plan types in our analysis (see 
more discussion of our data source in Section IV.A and Appendix B). 
Our study focuses on spending and utilization differences among six plan types. 
These include four traditional plan types—COMP, PPOs, HMOs, and POS—which still 
represent the majority of all the health plan enrollment in the United States. We use the 
PPO plan as the comparison group since it has the largest number of enrollees and is the 
most commonly offered plan type. The two new plan types of great interest are CDHDs, 
which we classify as the increased demand-side cost-sharing plan, and EPOs that rely 
primarily on supply-side choices made by health plans. Table 1-1 provides details about 
each plan type, sorting plan types according to their extent of consumer choice of 
providers. The last column of this table shows the average cost sharing of different plan 
types in the analysis sample (see more details about sample creation in Section V.A and 
																																																								
11 As Bonafede et al. (2013) and Arondekar et al. (2015) have done on the same data set, we choose to 
combine consumer-driven health plans (CDHP) and high-deductible health plans (HDHP). The two plan 
types share similar properties: both generally do not restrict choices to a specific panel of providers, involve 
high deductibles and significant cost sharing, and set aside money earmarked to the consumer that can be 
used to pay the consumer's cost share using pretax dollars. Where they differ is that HDHP plans use a 
flexible spending account that cannot be rolled over from one year to the next, often called a “use it or lose 
it” account, while CDHPs use a health-care savings account that can be saved across multiple years to pay 
for future health-care costs. 
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Appendix B). We find that the empirical cost sharing is consistent with the general 
perception of these plan types. We also find that higher-cost-sharing plan types are in 
general less restrictive on choice of provider panels, which highlights the trade-off that 
dominates most US health plans. Figure 1-3 summarizes enrollment trends in the six plan 
types being studied here. 
 
B. Decomposition of Health-Care Spending  
We decompose total spending on each monthly spell of treatment into five 
components in order to understand the underlying factors that contribute to plan type 
variation in spending. Using total spending during a spell month as our measure (which 
includes both consumer paid and plan paid spending), we use the following equation in 
which the variables i, j, s, and t index patient, provider, service, and spell month, 
respectively.  	"#$%&'%(	')'*+	ℎ%*+'ℎ	-$%.(/.0	)1	$*'/%.'	/	2/'ℎ	$3)4/(%3	5	/.	'3%*'6%.'	-$%++	', 89:;= "[89:;] = ?PrB89:; > 0EFB89:;|89:; > 0E= ?PrB89:; > 0EF H∑ J9:K;L9:K;K 	∑ J9.K;L9:K;K N H∑ J9.K;L9:K;K1BO9:.;E N H 1BO9:.;E0(O9..;QR	)N [0(O9..;QR)]= (4/-/'	(%&/-/).)($3/&%	/.(%#)('3%*'6%.'	/.'%.-/'T)(&)(/.0	/.'%.-/'T)(-%4%3/'T)  
(1) 
Equation 1 is an identity and each component in brackets can be calculated 
empirically. The first term in brackets is the visit decision, which is the probability of 
starting or continuing a spell of treatment in a given month, and thereby incurring 
positive spending. The second term is a conventional price index with weights being the 
spell's actual quantities, using the provider's actual prices in the numerator and national 
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average prices in the denominator. Both provider actual prices and national average 
prices are adjusted to account for inflation and geographic variation in provider costs. 
The third term is a measure of treatment intensity. The numerator uses national average 
prices of each service to weight actual quantities provided during the spell. The 
denominator 1BO9:.;E, is a measure of predicted spending given the diseases concurrently 
assigned by the patient i's own provider j for that month of treatment t. Overall this third 
expression reflects the amount of services provided to patient i during the spell given 
condition diagnosed by provider j in that spell. Intuitively, this term is the quantity of 
services, as measured using the national procedure price average, relative to how sick the 
patients are as measured by coding by providers for that spell of treatment, which we 
discuss further below. 
The fourth term in brackets is our measure of coding intensity. It is the ratio of 
two risk-adjustment predictions. The numerator of this term, matching the preceding 
denominator, is the expected cost given the provider's own concurrently assigned 
diagnoses during the current spell month of treatment. The denominator, as well as the 
final term in brackets, 0BO9..;QR,E, is a different measure of expected spending, capturing 
the consumer's expected spending (or patient severity) at the time of making the decision 
to seek treatment. At a minimum, it should include the diseases known to the consumer 
from the prior 12 months, but the consumer may also know something about the nature of 
their current spell (e.g., an injured shoulder, sore throat, feeling of sadness). We interpret 
the fourth term in brackets as a measure of coding severity in that the broad body system 
used in the final severity adjustment (skin problem, heart problem, mental health 
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disorder, etc.) is something mostly observable by the patient at the time that a visit is 
initialized, while the detailed diagnoses of this condition is something that requires a 
clinician.12 We posit that this measure partly captures how much effort providers put into 
identifying and writing down more detailed, specific diagnoses, a decision that is 
potentially influenced by the health plan type. The fifth term in brackets is a conventional 
risk score measure of patient severity, using lagged information and coarse information 
about conditions diagnosed during the current spell month. 
All five components in our decomposition 1 are potentially subject to demand- 
and supply-side incentives induced by plan design features. The final term—severity—
has been included in the decomposition to form an identity, so part of its association with 
either consumer or provider incentives will be captured in the coding intensity measure. 
If severity varies by plan type, it is a signal of adverse selection. Below we discuss 
further the hypothesized health plan type effects on probability of visits (Section III.D), 
prices, treatment, and coding intensities (Section III.F). 
C. Subsets of Treatment Spells Examined 
We use our treatment spell modeling approach to examine the overall probability 
of a visit and then distinguish between different spell types. Using N, V, and C to denote 
no visit, new visit, and continuation spells, we model the probability of a visit conditional 
on the previous spell month information, namely the three probabilities Pr(V|N−1), 																																																								
12 The detailed diagnoses of conditions are also potentially influenced by the patient, as patients sometimes 
know more about their health than providers. In those cases, patients may help providers to find more 
problems depending on how conversations go between the two parties (e.g., patients self-report previous 
diagnoses that facilitate future diagnoses by providers). We provide further justifications for our measure of 
coding intensity in Section III.E. 
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Pr(C|V−1), and Pr(C|C−1), where the negative one denotes the treatment spell of the 
consumer in the prior spell month. (Appendix Table 1-6 describes the spell transition 
matrix underling this approach.) 
D. Health Plan Types and Incentives to Seek Care  
It is theoretically ambiguous whether demand-side cost sharing that encourages 
consumers to be cost sensitive is more or less effective at reducing care seeking than 
supply-side incentives such as selective provider contracting. On the one hand, higher 
cost sharing reduces a consumer's incentive to initiate treatment while having little 
influence on the incentive to supply care provided that payments to providers remain 
stable. Since new treatment spells are mostly initiated by consumers, while continuation 
visits are more likely to be initiated by provider recommendations, we would expect 
demand-side cost sharing to have a greater impact on new than on continuation spells. On 
the other hand, supply-side incentives may potentially have a greater impact than 
demand-side incentives on consumers’ care-seeking behaviors. It is possible that narrow 
provider panels make new care seeking less attractive: consumers in supply-side 
constrained plans, such as HMOs and EPOs, may internalize the less aggressive disease 
identification and treatment, and may be less inclined to seek care than consumers in 
plans less constrained on provider networks. It is also possible that a narrow network 
creates an expectation of higher effort by health plans to choose high-quality, low-cost 
providers to manage care, generating a greater incentive for consumers to seek care. 
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E. Coding Intensity 
Coding intensity variation and strategic diagnostic coding have recently received 
considerable attention, perhaps because of the increased use of risk adjustment in the 
ACA. Wennberg et al. (2013, 2014) have challenged the Medicare risk-adjustment 
formula by arguing that the Medicare formula unduly reflects variation in coding 
intensity as well as variation in severity (for a contrary view, see Newhouse et al. 2013). 
Geruso and Layton (2015) find evidence of statistically significant coding intensity 
increases on the order of 7 percent in response to risk-adjusted payments in private 
Medicare Advantage plans. Further evidence of strategic coding is provided by Kronick 
and Welch (2014). To explore this issue, we develop a novel method for calculating 
coding intensity and use it to examine whether coding intensity appears to be responsive 
to plan types within our sample. 
The rationale for our coding intensity measure is as follows. For most health 
conditions, the consumer will know what broad body system is ill even before seeing a 
doctor, and hence a relatively crude diagnosis classification system captures reasonably 
well the consumer's information at the time that care is sought. In contrast, only a 
physician can distinguish among the thousands of more specific diagnoses, particularly 
those associated with the highest cost and greatest severity. We therefore decompose the 
conventional risk score measure of health status into two components. The first 
component predicts health-care spending using only broad categories of health 
conditions, while the second model uses more refined diagnostic categories concurrently 
assigned by providers in the current spell month of treatment. Both are calibrated to have 
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means equal to the overall average spending, but the ratio of the second to the first 
measure is an indication of whether the physician spent extra time noting the specific, 
more refined diagnoses among the broad categories. We use this ratio as a measure of 
coding intensity. 
F. Hypothesized Health Plan Type Effects on Components of Spending  
First of all, we expect an incentive to upcode diagnoses under a narrow network 
of providers if the goal is to control costs. It is possible that providers upcode conditions 
to make patients look sicker in order to justify (or protect themselves against) high costs. 
Besides providers’ upcoding incentives, variations in coding intensity across plan types 
can also arise from mechanical reasons. For example, if narrow networks or cost sharing 
primarily reduces provider contacts of less severe conditions, then average coding 
intensity would increase for the remaining patients. 
Given diagnoses, providers in a managed care with narrow networks will have 
incentives to treat patients less aggressively than if they were in a plan with less of a need 
to manage care. Otherwise costs will look higher with more treatment done on patients. 
However, these plans may also put a lot of emphasis on prevention, which can involve 
more regular contact with patients. 
Finally, although higher cost sharing should tend to encourage consumers to shop 
around for lower-cost providers, it also reduces the incentive for health plans to negotiate 
reduced prices. The impact of narrow networks on prices is also unclear. On the one 
hand, plans with narrow networks have more power to negotiate reduced prices from 
providers. On the other hand, narrow-network plans give consumers less ability to shop 
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around and may reduce provider-level competition to attract patients through lower 
prices. 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategies  
A. Data 
Our data come from the Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® Research 
Databases from 2007 to 2011 that contain detailed claims information for individuals 
insured by large employers in the United States. We construct a sample of 5.1 million 
commercially insured adults continuously eligible for five years, and use this sample of 
over 300 million treatment spells to calibrate various risk-adjustment models. We use a 
smaller subset for our core analysis containing 2.5 million individuals with over 100 
million treatment spells for which we can assign an employer, and a plan type. (More 
details about file construction are provided in Section V.A and in Appendix B.) 
B. Empirical Specification  
Health Plan Choice  
It is well understood that health plan choices are endogenous, and reflect expected 
health-care spending (Meer and Rosen 2004; Busch and Duchovny 2005; Deb and 
Trivedi 2006). Estimates of response to insurance plans that do not control for this 
endogeneity can be seriously biased. We control for this endogeneity by using a 2SLS 
estimation in which plan types are instrumented by the fitted values from multinomial 
logit models that predict probabilities of selecting a given plan in a given year. We 
estimate plan choice at the contract (i.e., household) level rather than at the individual 
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level, since large employers generally require all members of a household to be in the 
same health plan (Eichner 1998). 
Specifically, as shown in equation 2, a household h's choice of plan p depends on 
whether the head-of-household's employer offers the plan in year t, health status, and 
demographic information about the household. Without the precise plan identifiers being 
available, we focus our analysis on the choice of plan types rather than the choice of 
specific plans.13 Unless otherwise noted, hereafter health plans in this paper denote plan 
types. Since we do not have plan-specific premiums, benefits, or coverage features, we 
capture these plan features with a plan-specific dummy for each plan type offered by each 
employer in each year with or without family coverage. We then estimate household 
choice of health plans by applying a multinomial logit model separately for each 
employer-year-family coverage type combination. Employees with only one insured 
enrollee were modeled as single plans, and those with multiple enrollees were modeled as 
family plans. Fitted plan type choices for the household are then used as instruments for 
each individual in the household in our 2SLS models of subsequent treatment decisions. 
For a specific employer in year t who offers family or single coverage plan(s),  UVW;(XV;) = 1	/1	'ℎ%	ℎ)Z-%ℎ)+(	ℎ	&ℎ))-%-	$+*.		$	/.	T%*3	'                                    (2) 
where  XV; = {%6$+)T%%	*0%V;, %6$+)T%%	0%.(%3V;, 1*6/+T	-/\%V;, -$)Z-%V;,	  																																																								
13 We acknowledge that our approach abstracts from any within plan type variation that may also be 
significant. Dranove (2000) studies distinct physician contractual arrangement between different HMOs for 
their cost containment. Without details on plan benefit design, we are unable to address this variation, but 
focus instead on the impact of two new relatively distinct plan types: EPOs and CDHDs. Although not 
ideal, dozens of previous researchers have studied aggregate effects of HMO and PPO plan types without 
distinguishing heterogeneous plan benefits and premiums (Glied 2000). 
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													.%2	]*]T	1+*0V;, *.(	^^_V,;QR}  
Note that household choice of plan type includes household-level, not individual-
level, variables, including the head-of-household age (%6$+)T%%	*0%V;) and gender 
(%6$+)T%%	0%.(%3V;), family size (1*6/+T	-/\%V;), whether a spouse is present 
(-$)Z-%V;), and whether the household added a new baby in the previous 12 months 
(.%2	]*]T	1+*0V;), and the ^^_V,;QR is the prospective model risk score summed up for 
adults in the household predicting total spending using the prior 12 months of 
diagnoses.14,15,16 
Plan Type Effect on Visit Decisions and Health-Care Spending (A General Estimating 
Equation)  
Other than estimating our health plan choice equation at the household level, our 
remaining models, which are at the individual level, can be written in the following linear 
specification:  
	89Wa; = bJcdeW + gh9,;QR + i9 + ja + k; + lmno	 + 	p9Wa;                                           (3) 
																																																								
14 We controlled for number of family members, but children's illness was not captured in the model of 
household choice of health plans. If we were redoing the plan choice analysis, we would include children in 
the sample. Note that we model plan choice here solely to obtain fitted probabilities to use as instruments. 
For instruments we only need exogeneity and correlation with actual plan choices, not unbiased estimates 
of demand functions. 
15 We used diagnoses for a calendar year in our model of plan choice despite the fact that most employers 
require employees to choose their health plan in November or December, not on January 1. If we were 
redoing the plan choice analysis, using diagnoses as of the end of November would be a better choice. Our 
instrument is still valid in that the diagnoses used are all from the previous year and do not include 
diagnoses coded during the treatment spell month being predicted. 
16 We top coded the risk score at the 95th percentile (RRS = 4.824) to reduce the influence of extremely 
high-risk-score individuals in predicting health plan choice, hypothesizing that changes in risk score 
differences above this level (predicting household spending over $20,000 per year) do not differentiate plan 
choices well. The top-coded risk scores were consistently superior to the un-top-coded scores in predicting 
plan choices. 
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In this model, the dependent variable, 	89Wa;, is the dependent variable for 
consumer i with plan type p in county c in spell month t. Four alternative dependent 
variables denote each of the four measures from our decomposition in equation 1.17 Five 
plan dummies, PLANp, are included, one for each plan type {EPO, HMO, POS, COMP, 
CDHD}, which we instrument by the array of fitted probabilities of each plan type choice 
from the first stage as discussed in the previous section. The omitted plan type is PPO, 
and hence the estimated coefficients give the plan type effects as a difference from 
PPOs. We control for a measure that captures the enrollee's health status, h9,;QR, enrollee 
fixed effects, i9, employee county fixed effects, ja , and spell month fixed effects k;. The 
random error term p9Wa; captures unobserved terms. We discuss the need to control for 
cluster correlations of errors in Section IV.C. 
The specification for each model that uses one of the four measures as the 
dependent variable is the same, with the exception of the risk-adjustment variable used as 
a control variable included in h9,;QR. For modeling the probability of a visit, we use a 
prospective model risk score predicting total spending estimated from the prior 12 
months of diagnoses to capture the patient's overall health status. Here we only use 
preexisting diagnoses since there is no possibility of observing any diagnoses in the 
absence of a visit. For all of the other models we use a risk-adjustment relative risk score 
that captures patient severity at the time of seeking treatment.18 Fundamentally, the 
measure is a monthly expected spending based on a coarse category of diseases from the 																																																								
17 The last term of our decomposition is included to form an identity and is not modeled here. 
18 All risk scores and condition categories were generated using Verisk Health/DxCG Risk Solutions 
Version 4.21 software. 
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prior 12 spell months and the current month of treatment.19 
Employers do not randomly decide on which health plans to offer. Instead, 
choices of plan offerings may reflect the preferences of their employees. Bundorf (2002) 
examined this employer choice of plans to offer and its relationship with employee 
characteristics, and found it to be quantitatively small. Still, it seems plausible that firms 
with healthier and higher-income enrollees are more likely to innovate and offer EPOs 
and CDHDs than firms with sicker or lower-income employees. To deal with this 
concern, we include employer-year-family coverage fixed effects, lmno , in our 2SLS 
models to absorb the underlying employer characteristics that may make them more or 
less likely to offer innovative plan types. 
These employer fixed effects, together with the estimation of multinomial logit 
models separately for each employer, also absorb differences due to plan type–specific 
premiums, cost sharing, and other plan features. Our fitted probabilities and hence health 
plan type choice instruments capture why individual i1 in household h1 is more or less 
likely than individual i2 in household h2 to be in plan type p at employer E in year Y in 
family coverage type F. Our analysis relies on household-level variation in choices made, 
not employer variation in plan types offered or their premiums and benefits. We identify 
the effects of plan innovations by the change in coverage for continuously eligible 
households. Individuals who do not change plan types in our sample are uninformative 
about the effects of plan type on decisions. 
																																																								
19 For details about the different risk-adjustment measures used, see Appendix B4. 
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C. Clustered Standard Errors 
Although we include employer-year-family coverage fixed effects in our 2SLS 
models to account for the fact that the underlying employer characteristics may make 
them more or less likely to offer each plan type, these fixed effects do not control for all 
the within-cluster correlation of the errors, since individuals are likely to have similar risk 
factors (and thus spending) within each employer-year-family coverage cell (“cluster”). 
Estimation without further correction will generally underestimate the variance estimates 
(Cameron and Miller 2015).20 We use two approaches to correct standard errors for this 
clustering. Our primary method is to use the cluster-robust variance estimate of Cameron 
and Miller (2015) to correct standard errors and avoid this bias.21 Our second approach is 
to use bootstrap estimation of standard errors in 100 random samples of our data, with 
random draws done at the employer-year-family coverage type level. Details about our 
bootstrapping method are provided in Section VI.C and Appendix C. 
V. Sample and Descriptive Analysis  
A. File Creation  
We started by collapsing inpatient and outpatient service claims into spells of 
treatment. We excluded pharmacy claims in the analysis to simplify our analysis. 																																																								
20 Cameron and Miller (2015) show that the cluster-robust variance is bigger when (1) regressors within the 
cluster are correlated, (2) errors within the cluster are correlated, (3) the within-cluster regressor and the 
error correlations are of the same sign, and (4) the cluster sizes are large. 
21 We estimate all results using the three-step estimation algorithm of Brachet (2007) to compute cluster-
robust standard errors using two-stage least squares, modified to accommodate the very large number of 
fixed effects. Luo, Zhu, and Ellis (2016) propose an iterative approach in which multiple high-dimensional 
fixed effects are absorbed sequentially and the process is repeated until convergence, which is shown to be 
more efficient than our current algorithm. We tested our main model on a 20 percent random sample of our 
analysis data using this approach and found that results based on 100 iterations were very similar to those 
without iterations. 
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Diagnoses and spending are assigned to spell months based on the “from date” of service 
for each procedure, not using through (or ending) dates of service (as is done with 
Medicare Advantage risk adjustment), and not assigning services to the beginning of an 
episode, as was done by Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988), or the date of discharge (as 
is implicitly done by DRGs). Since most claims for procedures are for a single service 
date, we feel that the service date best reflects the timing when a patient and doctor are 
likely to know of an illness or condition. 
The next task was to assign the key explanatory variables. A significant challenge 
was dealing with missing values on key variables, namely employer, health plan IDs, and 
provider county (used for deflating prices with county deflators). For missing employer 
information, we assigned consumers to the same employer as observed during a previous 
or subsequent year since the only reason they are in the database is because they are with 
a particular employer. For providers with a missing provider county, we use the 
provider's state rather than the provider's county. More details on file creation and dealing 
with missing information are provided in Appendix B. 
B. Summary Statistics 
There have been sharp changes in enrollments in different health plan types even 
over the four years being studied here (Figure 1-3). PPOs grew by 5 percentage points 
from 2008 to 2009 before declining by the almost same amount in 2011. CDHDs 
increased their market share by 8 percent. Declines were experienced by HMOs and their 
closely related POS plans. Two plan types, EPOs and comprehensive plans (COMPs), 
held their enrollments at nearly constant market shares throughout the period. 
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Table 1-2 provides summary statistics on the analysis sample and by plan type. 
This table shows the rich set of plan types offered by the 66 employers in our analysis 
sample. HMOs and PPOs remain the two most common plan types, together accounting 
for more than 77 percent of the person spell months in our sample.22 Enrollee age, 
relative risk score (RRS), and monthly spending all signal significant risk differences 
across plan types. COMPs have an average age that is six years older than EPOs, which 
have the youngest adult enrollees.23 
 Figure 1-4 provides an alternative way to understand the risk differences across 
plan types. For each plan type, we standardize the average RRS, probability of any visit, 
and the total and procedure payments using each of their corresponding means across all 
plan types (normalized to 1 shown as the vertical line in the graph) as the benchmark. We 
see that COMPs have the highest average risk along all the four dimensions, while HMOs 
have the healthiest adult enrollees. EPOs, HMOs, POS, and CDHDs have below-average 
risk scores, suggesting that individuals in these plans are healthier than average given 
their ages. These are consistent with the findings in the literature that health plans with 
restrictive choice of providers enjoy favorable selection (Hellinger 1995; Mello et al. 
2003; Landon et al. 2012; Bajari et al. 2014). Similar to previous studies, Table 1-2 and 
Figure 1-4 show that narrow-network plans tend to enroll younger, healthier people who 
																																																								
22 Among the total of 66 employers and 255 employer years in our sample, 7 employers offered EPOs and 
there are altogether 15 employer years in which EPOs were offered in our sample. The corresponding 
numbers are 37 and 119 for CDHD plans. 
23 A comparison of key statistics on the full sample with the sample used for our core analyses is shown in 
the Appendix Table 1-7. The two samples share similar distributions of age and gender. Enrollees in the 
analysis sample are somewhat healthier than the original sample, which is a consequence of dropping spells 
associated with pregnancy claims and capitated payments (mostly PPO and POS plans) and excluding 
enrollees without any identified employers. 
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consume lower levels of health resources. Note that here we only show simple summary 
statistics of individual spells in our analysis sample. We do not distinguish ex ante 
selection bias (Hellinger 1995; Bajari et al. 2014) from post-enrollment differences in 
health-care utilization (Landon et al. 2012; Bajari et al. 2014). Neither do we distinguish 
among the types of enrollees—such as those switching in versus those switching out of a 
given plan type (Hellinger 1995).24 Strikingly, although EPO plans have the healthiest 
group of adults, people in these plans on average are associated with more provider 
contacts and higher spending than the relatively sicker people in POS or CDHD plans. 
Also notice that the two standardized measures of real spending—total and procedure 
spending—are highly correlated in that plans with relatively higher spending on all 
services are also those with higher procedure expenditures, and vice versa. 
VI. Results  
A. Household Plan Choice and First-Stage Regression Results  
Altogether, 510 separate logit models were estimated of household choice of 
health plan types from among the plan types offered by their employer in a given year for 
a household's family or individual class. Given the number of different choice models 
estimated and parameters involved, we do not present any results from this plan choice 
analysis here. Our purpose is to use the health plan type probabilities calculated from the 
plan choice models as instruments for the actual plan type choices in the 2SLS models of 
plan type effects on health-care utilization and spending. F-tests on first-stage regressions 																																																								
24 As noted by Mello et al. (2003), conclusions about favorable selection depend on choice of health status 
measures. In particular, using only prior utilization as criteria to gauge selection may overestimate the true 
selection bias due to “regression to the mean.” 
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of actual plan type choices on these predicted probabilities show that the fitted 
probabilities are extremely strong instruments.25 
B. Plan Type Effect on Visit Decisions  
Table 1-3 shows 2SLS regression results from linear probability models of the 
probability of any visit, and the probabilities of three types of spells: new visits, 
continuation visits, and chronic (repeated) visits.26 The table shows that HMOs and POS 
plans reduce the overall number of visits relative to PPOs, and COMP plans increase 
them significantly. Looking across the three visit types, we see that the effects of plan 
types show up mostly in new visits for EPOs, POS, and COMP plans, while HMOs 
mainly affect continuation visits. None of the plan types differ statistically from PPOs in 
influencing decisions to seek chronic visits. Results on EPO and POS plans suggest 
adverse selection in response to narrow provider networks since less severely ill patients 
are more likely to have reduced their visits. 
 For the two new plan types of greatest interest here, we see that EPOs appear to 
reduce visits (results are of borderline statistical significance though), particularly new 
visits. Also, once we control for individual characteristics using risk adjustment and 
individual fixed effects, we cannot reject that CDHD plans have no effect on visits 
relative to PPOs. 
																																																								
25 See Appendix Tables 1-11 and 1-12 for details on the first-stage regression results. 
26 OLS results in Appendix Table 1-8 show that compared with PPOs, all other plans tend to discourage 
patients from making visits, regardless of whether these other plans feature a relatively higher cost sharing 
(like CDHDs) or more restrictive provider networks (like EPOs and HMOs) or even higher generosity (like 
COMPs). 
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C. Plan Type Effect on (Total and Decomposed) Health-Care Spending  
We now examine how health plan types are associated with levels of health-care 
spending and three intensity measures conditional on a patient deciding to make a visit.27 
The 2SLS results are shown in Table 1-4.28 All regressions control for risk adjustment, 
spell time dummies, employer-year-family coverage fixed effects, and employee county 
and individual fixed effects.29 Results show that conditional on a visit, HMOs and 
COMPs are more expensive than PPOs. Neither EPOs nor CDHD plans are statistically 
significantly different from PPOs. The point estimate on CDHD plans is positive and 
suggests that costs are 12.2 percent higher than PPOs after controls, although not quite 
statistically significant (p = 0.101). 
 The decomposed regression results show that none of the plans particularly 
promote using lower-price providers relative to PPOs. HMOs on average have 4.9 
percent higher prices, and consumers among CDHDs face statistically 11.0 percent 
higher prices (p = 0.03) than in PPOs. In addition, none of the plan types show 
statistically significant effects on treatment intensity. The final column in Table 1-4 
																																																								
27 Our spending includes both patient out-of-pocket spending and plan payments. Although we estimated 
models of both total spending and spending on procedures, we prefer and focus our attention on the latter 
because facility payments are much harder to price and to predict, particularly when trying to calculate a 
national average price to use for generating normalized prices. Further justifications for using procedure 
payments can be found in Appendix B3. 
28 In an earlier version of this paper, we included provider fixed effects in our model, which we now drop 
here. We made this change because (1) provider IDs are subject to serious missing values, forcing us to 
drop a sizable fraction of our sample, and (2) there is reason to believe that the provider fixed effects may 
absorb some of the impact of plan incentives: one impact of changing plans and responding to higher cost 
sharing or restricted provider choice could be to switch to a lower-cost provider. 
29 For comparison, results with only employee county fixed effects or individual fixed effects are shown in 
Appendix Table 1-9. We see that regressions with and without individual effects give very different 
predictions about plan type effects on the spending and intensity measures. Once individual fixed effects 
are controlled for, geographic variation does not explain much of the plan type effects on the total and 
decomposed procedure-related payments. 
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shows that all of the plan types code patients more intensively than PPOs (although the 
difference is not statistically significant for POS plans). Overall, about 15 percent (36 
percent, 34 percent) of the 11.4 percent (12.2 percent, 12.2 percent) increase in 
procedure-related payments among HMOs (COMPs, CDHDs) relative to PPOs is 
contributed by differences in coding intensities. 
Finally, we estimate the overall health plan type effects on health-care spending 
(with a focus on procedure payments) by calculating expected total health spending as the 
product of visit rate (Pr(visit)) and total spending conditional on receiving care (Y|Y > 0). 
To do this, we adopt a bootstrap approach that takes into account the empirical 
correlations between visit decisions and determination of spending conditional on 
receiving care (for example, consumers who are more likely to visit doctors are likely to 
pay more conditional on receiving care). Specifically, we reestimate our full models on 
100 random samples of our data drawn at employer-year-family coverage type (EYF) 
levels and generate confidence intervals from the empirical distribution of the predicted 
levels of treatment spells and spending in our sample using the sample mean for all PPO 
enrollees (our base plan type).30 
Table 1-5 shows the bootstrapped means and 95 percent confidence intervals of 
probability of visit, procedure payments per spell (conditional and unconditional on a 
visit), and predicted total savings of each plan type relative to PPOs from our two-part 
models.31,32 Results imply that all three narrow-network plans (EPOs, HMOs, and POS 
																																																								
30 Further details about this method are described in Appendix C. 
31 In Appendix Table 1-13, we present results from conducting three different bootstrapping estimates of 
the results in Table 5. All of these predictions use the sample means of all control variables for PPO 
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plans) statistically significantly predict a reduced probability of a visit relative to PPOs.33 
None of these three plan types achieve lower payments on procedures conditional on 
patients seeking care. Overall, none of these three plan types is successful in reducing 
overall health-care expenditures relative to PPOs (final column). The bootstrapped 
estimates confirm that CDHDs do not differ statistically in their probability of any visit, 
and also suggest that they have higher spending conditional on a visit spell.34 Overall, 
both COMPs and CDHDs are predicted to increase total monthly spending on procedures 
relative to PPOs. The point estimate is that spending on procedures is $75 higher for 
COMPs and $36 higher for CDHDs. These reflect spending on procedures that is 34 
percent higher for COMPs and 16 percent higher for CDHDs.35 
																																																																																																																																																																					
enrollees, and predictions are presented by plan type. The first set of bootstrap estimates uses the EYF 
clustering from the base case of our analysis, in which we randomly select 100 draws of enrollees by EYF. 
The second simulation uses random draws of individuals but not EYF clusters, while the third set uses 100 
two-stage random sampling of both EYFs and individuals. These simulations show that estimated mean 
effects are robust to how bootstrapped samples are drawn, and that standard errors are only modestly higher 
when both EYF and individual-level observation correlations are controlled for. Simulations while only 
correcting for individual error correlations underestimate standard errors relative to those allowing EYF 
error correlations. Results using two-stage bootstrapping lead to similar conclusions about statistical 
significance as those used in our base case as presented here. 
32 Unlike previous estimation results, these bootstrapped results reflect an alternative way of calculating 
standard errors that are robust to clustered errors, and also permit calculations of predicted means in levels 
using all of the structural parameters in the model. Because bootstrapped estimates are calculated in a 
different manner, the statistical significance in Table 5 differs from that in the corresponding results in 
Table 3, column 1, and Table 4, column 1. This is both because bootstrapping uses empirical sampling 
distributions rather than analytical expressions for cluster-robust standard errors, and because the 
confidence intervals used here are not symmetrical around the point estimate, as they are when using a 
normal distribution approximation for standard errors. We briefly mention differences in the text and 
discuss this issue further in Appendix C. 
33 Note that in Table 3, EPOs were not statistically significantly different from PPOs in the probability of 
visit model. 
34 Table 4 finds no significant effect of CDHDs on procedure spending. 
35 In the Appendix, we take a different approach and directly estimate the health plan type effects on both 
total payments and spending on procedures using the full analysis sample including spell months with zero 
payments. Results are shown in Table 1-10. See a description of the alternative methodology used there. 
According to the table, EPO plans seem to achieve the most cost savings, whereas comprehensive 
insurance has a consistently higher spending than PPOs. Table 1-10 also shows that total spending that 
includes facility payments is more sensitive to outliers (e.g., column 3 versus 6) than procedure payments, 
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 VII. Discussion and Conclusions  
This paper examines variation in health-care utilization and spending for a 
monthly spell of treatment. Our results confirm the widely held finding that 
comprehensive insurance plans—which do not manage care, require gatekeepers, or 
restrict provider choices on the supply side and tend to have minimal cost sharing—have 
the highest procedure costs, enroll sicker patients, induce a higher probability of seeking 
care, and have higher costs conditional on making a visit. Narrow networks seem 
effective in reducing probability of visits, particularly new visits. Similar to all other plan 
types, narrow-network plan types do not differ meaningfully from PPOs in influencing 
decisions to seek continuing or chronic care.36 Using our decomposition framework to 
explain total spending on procedures, we find no effect of EPOs on prices or treatment 
intensity, but a statistically significant increase in coding intensity relative to PPOs. In 
terms of total spending on procedures, EPOs appear to be the lowest-cost plan type, but 
the difference from PPOs is not statistically significantly different from zero (p = 0.26). 
Among the limited evidence from previous studies, Gruber and McKnight (2016) 
examine insurance offerings to Massachusetts state employees, which changed its health 
insurance. They found an overall 4.2 percent decline in total spending after the state 
provided incentives for enrolling in limited-network plans. They report a 36 percent 
decline among enrollees who chose to switch to a limited-network plan, but acknowledge 
that this is a self-selected group. A business study from the McKinsey Center for US 																																																																																																																																																																					
where top coding does not change the qualitative implications about plan types’ relative savings (e.g., 
column 9 versus 12). 
36 The only exception is HMO plans that are shown to reduce continuation visits relative to PPOs by 13 
percent. 
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Health System Reform (2013) reports even larger premium savings of 21 percent from 
narrow- relative to broad-panel plans, although they do not mention controlling for 
selection effects. We do not know of any studies that examine the underlying reasons for 
cost savings in narrow-panel plans such as EPOs. 
Our most surprising result is that CDHDs are associated with 16 percent higher 
total spending on procedures relative to PPO plans (Table 1-5). The apparent cost savings 
of CDHDs relative to PPOs from comparing sample means and using OLS disappear 
once we control for endogenous plan type choice, patient severity of illness, and 
individual fixed effects, with the last adjustment making the biggest contribution. Note 
that we model spending that includes both health plan and out-of-pocket payments for 
procedures. Our decomposition of spending shows that this reflects a combination of no 
significant effect on rates of visits, 11 percent higher average prices, and 4 percent higher 
coding intensity conditional on a visit. Since CDHDs do not negotiate prices like PPOs, 
the plan type that has the greatest market share which may increase its bargaining power, 
it is not entirely surprising that people in CDHDs face higher prices relative to PPOs. 
Information available to consumers to enable them to shop around is improving, and may 
eventually introduce lower prices as market share and experience with CDHD plans 
grow. The current enthusiasm about CDHD plans saving money may arise because they 
shift expenses away from employers onto enrollees, and may serve to deter high-risk 
enrollees. We are not aware of any previous studies of CDHDs that had panel data on 37 
employers offering CDHDs, used risk adjustment and individual fixed effects, and 
controlled for endogenous plan choice when calculating cost savings. Future studies will 
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hopefully apply similar careful control methods on alternative samples and aggregates of 
spending to validate or refine our findings. 
Previous studies on consumer-driven and high-deductible health plans offer 
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of these plans in reducing utilization and spending 
because of selection bias, the short study period, and the modest sample of firms offering 
these plans.37 Parente and Feldman (2008) found lower health-care costs for enrollees in 
CDHPs than in PPOs in initial enrollment years, but CDHPs rose to become the most 
expensive option in the follow-up year. Some of the most recent studies show evidence of 
more significant savings from CDHPs (Lo Sasso, Shah, and Frogner 2010; Fronstin, 
Sepúlveda, and Roebuck 2013; Haviland et al. 2016).38 
Perhaps the most directly comparable study to ours is one by Haviland et al. 
(2016), who, using the same data source as ours, compare the health-care cost of 
enrollees in firms that first offer CDHPs alongside traditional plans with firms offering 
only traditional plans. They show that firms offering a CDHP had lower annual spending 
in the first three years after their offering, but that savings declined over the three-year 
study period (6.6 percent, 4.3 percent, 3.4 percent). Our study is different from their study 
in several important ways. First, we use individual data rather than group means for our 
analysis, which enables us to control for individual characteristics, including both 
individual fixed effects and risk scores. Second, we examine costs of each plan type 																																																								
37 Baker et al. (2007) and Buchmueller (2009) summarize earlier studies that lend little support for the 
claim that consumer-directed health plans save money. 
38 Lo Sasso, Shah, and Frogner (2010) study a sample of 76,310 enrollees in 709 firms that switched from 
offering only traditional plans to offering an HSA-eligible plan exclusively or along with previously 
offered traditional plans, and compare enrollees who switch to an HSA-eligible plan with non-switchers. 
Fronstin, Sepúlveda, and Roebuck (2013) study one large firm that switched to offering a CDHP 
exclusively, replacing a PPO. 
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relative to PPOs, while Haviland et al. (2016) compare firms offering mixtures of 
different traditional plan types, including not only PPOs but also HMOs, comprehensive 
plans, and POS plans. Third, we study only health spending related to procedures, and we 
do not include drug spending in our analysis. 
Our results shed light on the complexity of designing policies to reduce health-
care spending through affecting demand- and supply-side incentives in several ways. 
First, supply-side plan designs such as selective provider contracting may be more 
effective in containing procedure-related costs than demand-side cost sharing. Second, 
although policies designed to either limit provider networks or emphasize demand-side 
cost sharing may be effective in deterring new treatment where decisions are often 
dominated by patients, these policies are much less effective in influencing longer-term, 
repeated treatment where providers arguably play a bigger role. Third, because of 
potential interactions between various components of total spending (as in our 
decomposition), policies that are narrowly targeted may be counterproductive in reducing 
total costs if incentives to control one aspect of the spending create compensating 
effects/incentives in other aspects. For example, we show evidence that narrow-network 
plans provide incentives to reduce provider contacts, but do so mostly for the less 
severely ill. Not only would this adverse selection increase average sickness of the 
remaining patients, it may also create an upcoding incentive for providers in these plans. 
Our study is subject to several limitations. By using a continuous enrollee sample, 
we exclude decedents and individuals of partial-year eligibility. Since we have no 
information in this data set on death or other reasons why people drop out of the sample, 
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we chose to restrict to a sample of population where nonrandom attrition is less of a 
concern. This paper studies only adults, excludes children and adults age 65 and over, 
and uses only age, gender, and diagnostic information for risk adjustment. Pharmacy 
information, and ideally consumer socioeconomic variables that affect access and 
information, may also be important. We use “off-the-shelf” risk-adjustment models, but a 
more general approach would be to broaden the information available and fully 
recalibrate models that predict each of our diverse outcomes. 
Another limitation is that we do not observe premiums, benefit features, or how 
narrow plan networks are, or more generally measure heterogeneity of plan coverage 
within a plan type. Since we use employer-year-family coverage plan type choice 
probabilities of instruments that capture this variation in plan type dummies, we do not 
believe that this approach introduces bias into our estimates of cost savings at the plan 
type level. But it does prevent us from measuring separately the cost-saving impact of 
these specific plan feature dimensions. 
A final limitation of our work is that by modeling aggregate spending, we end up 
aggregating diverse treatment decisions, diseases, and providers. Many other studies also 
examine the effects of individual, provider, and plan characteristics on aggregates such as 
total spending, inpatient treatment, and plan choice using even more aggregated 
approaches than ours, such as annual or county-level spending (Glied 2000), but big data 
are making finer-level analyses possible. Examination of disaggregated procedures, 
disease patterns, and treatment decisions, for which treatment spells are well suited, 
awaits further research. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1-1. Example of treatment spell assignment 
 
 
Figure 1-2. Frequency of total health spending of spells following no visit for three 
time periods 
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Figure 1-3. Market shares of six health plan types in the analysis sample 
Notes: Market shares are calculated at the patient level. Plan acronyms are defined in 
Table 1-1. 
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 Figure 1-4. Comparison of four standardized measures by plan type 
Notes: For each plan type, the sample mean was divided by the overall sample mean in 
order to express it as a standardized measure, which by construction has a grand mean of 
one. Relative risk scores are the prospective un-recalibrated DxCG risk scores predicting 
total health-care spending in one month using only information from the prior 12 months 
(top coded at $250,000). Plan acronyms are defined in Table 1-1. 
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Table 1-1. Health plan type definitions and degrees of cost sharing and provider 
network generosity 
 
Plan type Acronym Description 
Provider 
networks 
Cost 
share 
(%) 
Exclusive provider 
organization EPO 
Patients must get care from 
in-network providers; 
gatekeeper; no capitation 
Increasing 
choice of 
providers 
6.2 
Health maintenance 
organization HMO 
Same as EPO, but at least 
some services are paid on 
capitated basis  
8.0 
Point-of-service, 
noncapitated POS 
Patients have financial 
incentives to use in-network 
providers; gatekeeper  
11.0 
Preferred provider 
organization PPO 
Patients have financial 
incentives to use in-network 
providers; no gatekeeper ↓ 11.6 
Comprehensive COMP No limitations on patient use of any particular providers  9.6 
Consumer-
driven/high-
deductible health 
plan 
CDHD 
High-deductible health plans 
with either a Health 
Reimbursement or Health 
Savings Account; no 
gatekeeper  
16.1 
Notes: Plan type descriptions (the first four columns) are based on Truven Health 
MarketScan® Research Databases, Commercial Claims and Encounters Medicare 
Supplemental User Guide, Data Year 2011 Edition. Cost share in the last column is 
the authors’ calculation using the core analysis sample (N = 108,896,981) detailed in 
Section V.A and Appendix B. The measure captures the amount of total payments 
paid by consumers. It is calculated by taking the ratio of patient out-of-pocket 
payments (i.e., sum of copay, coinsurance, and deductible payments) to total 
spending that includes both patient out-of-pocket spending and plan payments. 
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Table 1-2. Descriptive statistics on analysis sample 
Plan type Acronym N (person spell months) 
% of 
all plan 
types 
Age Male (%) 
Relative 
risk score 
(RRS) 
Any visit 
indicator 
Total real 
payments, top 
coded ($) 
Total real 
procedure 
payments, top 
coded ($) 
Exclusive provider 
organization EPO 670,243 0.6 46.0 48.1 1.089 0.334 344 227 
Health 
maintenance 
organization 
HMO 26,099,610 24.0 46.2 45.8 1.074 0.187 191 116 
Point-of-service POS 10,743,325 9.9 46.4 43.7 1.098 0.308 330 185 
Preferred provider 
organizations PPO 58,295,126 53.5 47.0 48.0 1.177 0.348 357 223 
Comprehensive COMP 2,734,967 2.5 52.4 40.5 1.431 0.354 445 260 
Consumer-
directed health 
plan or 
CDHD 10,353,710 9.5 46.8 45.2 1.100 0.320 334 185 
high-deductible 
health plan          
All plan types  108,896,981 100 46.9 46.6 1.143 0.303 $315 $191 
Notes: Data are from the Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® Research Databases, Commercial Claims and Encounters Data. 
The sample includes continuous enrollees over five years during 2007–11, aged 21–64, having at least one month of plan type 
information available during at least one month each year, and to whom we assign an employer (employers). The analysis 
sample drops 2007 data because they are used to predict risk scores using diagnoses and/or demographics in the prior 12 
months. Sample size is 108,896,981 person spell months. Relative risk scores are calculated by prospective risk-adjustment 
models predicting health-care spending for 12 months (top coded at $250,000) prior to the current month. Any visit indicator 
equals one if total spending in a spell month is positive. Both total and procedure payments are top coded at $50,000 per spell 
month. Refer to Appendix B for details on sample creation. 
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Table 1-3. 2SLS results showing health plan effects on probability of seeking 
unconditional visits and three types of conditional visits 
  Pr(visits) Pr(V|N−1) New visits 
Pr(C|V−1) 
Continuation visits 
Pr(C|C−1) 
Chronic visits 
N 108,896,981 73,474,976 15,195,461 20,226,544 
Dependent 
mean 0.303 0.186 0.372 0.675 
EPO −0.075 −0.064b 0.022 −0.018 
  (0.046) (0.031) (0.044) (0.030) 
HMO −0.041a −0.013 −0.050a −0.027 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.021) 
POS −0.024a −0.019b −0.012 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) 
COMP 0.057b 0.075a 0.085a 0.004 
  (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.034) 
CDHD 0.011 0.020 0.014 0.022 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) 
Notes: Table shows the two-stage least squares results from regressions at the individual-
spell month level. Results show the effects of health plan on probability of seeking any 
care and conditional on three previous spell types. All regressions control for employer-
year-family coverage dummies, spell month time dummies, a prospective model risk 
score predicting total spending using the prior 12 spell months of diagnoses, and 
employee county and individual fixed effects. Column 1 shows the probability of any 
visit regardless of the type of visit in prior month. Column 2 corresponds to the 
probability of a new visit conditional on no visit in the previous month (“new visit” 
spells). Column 3 is the probability of a continuing visit conditional on a new visit in the 
previous month (“continuation visit” spells). Column 4 denotes the probability of a 
continuing visit conditional on a previous continuation spell month of visit (“chronic 
visit” spells). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the employer-year-
family coverage level using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section IV of the 
text. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Table 1-4. 2SLS results showing health plan effects on real payments and intensity 
measures, conditional on positive treatment in spell 
  
log(real payments 
for procedures| > 0) 
log(pricing 
intensity) 
log(treatment 
intensity) 
log(coding 
intensity) 
N 32,674,441 32,674,441 32,674,441 32,674,441 
Dependent 
mean 
5.506 −0.051 −0.732 0.065 
EPO −0.013 −0.009 −0.093 0.089a 
  (0.097) (0.037) (0.083) (0.022) 
HMO 0.114c 0.049c 0.048 0.017b 
  (0.059) (0.027) (0.041) (0.008) 
POS 0.030 −0.008 0.033 0.005 
  (0.027) (0.018) (0.022) (0.010) 
COMP 0.122c 0.009 0.069 0.044a 
  (0.067) (0.049) (0.060) (0.014) 
CDHD 0.122 0.110b −0.030 0.042b 
  (0.074) (0.051) (0.038) (0.018) 
County fixed 
effects 
X X X X 
Individual 
fixed effects 
X X X X 
Notes: Table shows the two-stage least squares regression results of health plan effects on 
payment and intensity measures on individual spells in which payments for procedures 
are positive. All models control for employer-year-family coverage dummies, spell 
month time dummies, and a patient severity measure that is a monthly expected spending 
based on a coarse category of diseases from the prior 12 spell months and the current 
month of treatment. The four dependent variables as shown from column 1 to column 4 
are defined as follows: log(real payments for procedures| > 0) = log of actual payments 
deflated by Medicare's Geographic Price Cost Index (practice costs) and year; log(pricing 
intensity) = log(spending using actual prices/spending using US average prices); 
log(treatment intensity) = log(spending using US average prices/expected spending| 
concurrent RRS); log(coding intensity) = log((expected spending| concurrent 
RRS)/(expected spending| prior period RRS and coarse concurrent diagnoses)). (For 
Medicare's Graphic Price Cost Index, see 
www.dol.gov/owcp/regs/feeschedule/fee/fee11/fs11_gpci_by_msa-zip.xls.) All 
regressions control for employee county and individual fixed effects. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and are clustered at the level of employer-year-family or individual 
coverage type using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section IV of the text. ap 
< 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Table 1-5. Bootstrapped (100 replications) 95 percent confidence intervals for any visit indicator, monthly spending, 
expected spending, and expected savings relative to PPO plans by plan type 
  Any visit indicator 
Monthly real procedure 
payments| > 0 ($) 
Predicted monthly real 
procedure payments ($) 
Monthly savings relative to 
PPOs ($) 
  Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI 
EPO 0.269b (0.152, 0.342) 629 (511, 718) 172 (81, 241) −51 (−142, 18) 
HMO 0.307a (0.285, 0.328) 724 (627, 826) 223 (187, 267) −1 (−36, 44) 
POS 0.324a (0.312, 0.341) 664 (632, 700) 215 (201, 237) −8 (−22, 14) 
PPO 0.348 - 647 - 223 - 0 - 
COMP 0.408a (0.375, 0.459) 731b (649, 846) 298a (258, 353) 75a (35, 130) 
CDHD 0.357 (0.342, 0.372) 727b (649, 798) 259a (230, 289) 36a (7, 66) 
Notes: Table shows the bootstrapped means and 95% confidence intervals of the visits and monthly real procedure payments 
conditional on a visit from our two-part models in Tables 1-3 (first column) and 1-4 (first column). Results shown summarize 
the means and confidence intervals from estimating both models 100 times on random samples of 108.9 million person spells 
with 510 employer-year-family coverage type combinations drawn with replacement from the original sample. After first 
absorbing individual- and county-level fixed effects, for each random sample we reestimate our full 2SLS models, to generate 
point estimates of the effects of health plan types on the probability of a visit and spending conditional on a visit. Regression 
results from each sample are then used to predict spending at the sample means of those who actually choose PPO plans. 
Means for PPOs are calculated from the original sample. The 95% confidence interval corresponds to the 2.5 and 97.5 
percentiles among the 100 simulated predictions. Estimates for monthly savings (the final two columns) are obtained from the 
overall predictions in the earlier pair of columns by subtracting the predicted values for PPOs from the other plan predictions. 
Significance letters show whether plan type predictions are statistically significantly different from the PPO means based on 
the empirical bootstrapped distributions using two-sided tests: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table 1-6. Spell transition probabilities 
  Period t spell types 
Period t-1 spell types No Visit (N) New Visit (V) Continuation (C) 
No Visit (N-1) 1 - Pr(V|N-1) Pr(V|N-1) 0 
New Visit (V-1) 1 - Pr(C|V-1) 0 Pr(C|V-1) 
Continuation (C-1) 1 - Pr(C|C-1) 0 Pr(C|C-1) 
All Pr(N) Pr(V) Pr(C) 
Notes: Lagged information is indicated by subscript -1, with N, V, and C denoting no 
visit, new visit, and continuation spells, respectively. 
 
 
Table 1-7. Descriptive statistics on two estimation samples 
  Full 5M sample Analysis sample 
  Mean (Std Dev) Mean (Std Dev) 
Age 46.9 (9.7) 46.9 (9.5) 
Male (%) 46.6 (49.9) 46.6 (49.9) 
Relative risk score (RRS) 1.208 (1.311) 1.143 (1.219) 
Total real payments, topcoded $354 ($2,182) $315 ($2,032) 
Total real procedure payments, topcoded $226 ($1,153) $191 ($1,006) 
N (person spell-months) 245,824,416  108,896,981  
Notes: Samples are from the MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounter Data. The 
full 5M sample selects people who are: adults age 21 to 64, enrolled for 60 months during 
2007 to 2011, non-missing age, gender, region, and have at least one month of plan type 
information in any year over the sample period. The analysis sample further selects spell 
months to which we can assign an employer and health plan type, with additional sample 
selection criteria imposed as detailed in Appendix B. In both samples, data from 2007 are 
dropped to calculate relative risk score (RRS) predicting spending from 12 months prior 
to the current month. Variables are defined the same way as in Table 1-2. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 1-8. OLS results showing health plan effects on probability of seeking unconditional visits and three types of conditional visits 
  Pr(visits) 
Pr(V|N-1)  Pr(C|V-1)  Pr(C|C-1)  
 
New visits Continuation visits Chronic visits 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
N 108,896,981  73,474,976  15,195,461  20,226,544  
Dependent Mean 0.303  0.186  0.372  0.675  
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 EPO -0.008a 
 
-0.008a 
 
-0.003c 
 
-0.003c 
 
-0.007b 
 
-0.007b 
 
-0.005b 
 
-0.006b 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 HMO -0.034a 
 
-0.034a 
 
-0.026a 
 
-0.026a 
 
-0.035a 
 
-0.035a 
 
-0.037a 
 
-0.037a 
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 POS -0.018a 
 
-0.017a 
 
-0.015a 
 
-0.015a 
 
-0.012a 
 
-0.011a 
 
-0.008b 
 
-0.008b 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 COMP -0.015b 
 
-0.015b 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.017a 
 
-0.017a 
 
-0.015b 
 
-0.015b 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 CDHD -0.015a 
 
-0.015a 
 
-0.012a 
 
-0.012a 
 
-0.012a 
 
-0.012a 
 
-0.008b 
 
-0.008b 
 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
                 Risk Adjustment NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
YES   
Notes: Table shows the OLS results from regressions at the individual-spell month level. Results show the effects of health plan on probability of 
seeking any care and conditional on three previous spell types. All the models control for employer*year*family coverage dummies and spell month 
time dummies, and employee county and individual fixed effects. Column (1) and (2) model the probability of any visit regardless of the types of visit in 
prior spell month. Column (3) through (4) correspond to the probability of new visit conditional on no visit in previous month ("new visit" spells). 
Column (5) to (6) are the probability of continuing visit conditional on a new visit in previous month ("continuation visit" spells). Column (7) to (8) 
denote the probability of continuing visit conditional on a previous continuation spell month of visit ("chronic visit" spells). Within each type of visit 
(conditional or unconditional), the second column differs from the first column in that it additionally controls for a prospective model risk score 
predicting total spending using the prior 12 spell months of diagnoses ("Risk Adjustment"). Standard errors are clustered at the employer-year-family 
type coverage level using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section 4 of the text. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Table 1-9. 2SLS results showing health plan effects on real payments and intensity measures, conditional on positive treatment in 
spell 
    Log(real payments for procedures| > 0) Log(pricing intensity) Log(treatment intensity) Log(coding intensity) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   
N  32,674,441  32,674,441  32,674,441  32,674,441  
Dependent Mean 5.506 -0.051 -0.732 0.065 
    Coef   Coef   Coef   Coef   Coef   Coef   Coef   Coef   
  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  
EPO  0.473
c 
 -0.017  0.024  -0.011  0.668
b 
 -0.095  -0.220  0.090
a 
 
  (0.249)  (0.102)  (0.064)  (0.039)  (0.321)  (0.086)  (0.187)  (0.023)  
HMO  0.271
a 
 0.114
c 
 0.046  0.052
c 
 0.661
a 
 0.043  -0.436
a 
 0.019
b 
 
  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.095)  (0.042)  (0.062)  (0.009)  
POS  -0.040  0.030  -0.058  -0.009  0.153
a 
 0.034  -0.135
a 
 0.006  
  (0.044)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.018)  (0.039)  (0.023)  (0.033)  (0.011)  
COMP  0.070  0.120
c 
 -0.007  0.011  -0.100
b 
 0.067  0.177
a 
 0.042
a 
 
  (0.045)  (0.071)  (0.026)  (0.051)  (0.045)  (0.063)  (0.036)  (0.014)  
CDHD  -0.030  0.129
c 
 -0.004  0.113
b 
 0.042  -0.025  -0.068  0.042
b 
 
  (0.024)  (0.077)  (0.014)  (0.053)  (0.092)  (0.040)  (0.085)  (0.019)  
                  County Fixed Effects X    X    X    X    
Individual Fixed Effects     X       X       X       X   
Notes: Table shows the two stage least squares regression results of health plan effects on payment and intensity measures on individual-spells in 
which payments for procedures are positive. All models control for employer*year*family coverage dummies, spell month time dummies, and a 
patient severity measure that is a monthly expected spending based on a coarse category of diseases from the prior twelve spell months and the current 
month of treatment. The four dependent variables are defined as follows: Log(real payments for procedures| > 0) = Log of actual payments deflated by 
a Medicare's Geographic Price Cost Index (practice costs) and year; Log(pricing intensity) = Log(Spending using actual prices/Spending using US 
average prices); Log(treatment  intensity) = Log(Spending using US average prices/Expected spending | concurrent RRS); Log(coding  intensity) = 
Log((Expected spending | concurrent RRS)/(Expected spending |prior period RRS and coarse concurrent diagnoses)). The odd columns control for 
employee county fixed effects, and the even columns control for enrollee fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of employer-year-
family or individual coverage type using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section 4 of the text. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Table 1-10. Alternative models of unconditional spending 
  OLS no RA   OLS w. RA   2SLS w. RA   OLS no RA   OLS w. RA   2SLS w. RA 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
 Real payments   Real payments topcoded at $50,000/mo  
N                  108,896,981                       108,896,981     
Dependent Mean     337.78           314.56      
 Coef  Coef  Coef   Coef  Coef  Coef  
 (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)   (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  
EPO -1.64  -3.98  48.24   -0.57  -2.77  5.40  
 (7.18)  (7.08)  (97.41)   (5.80)  (5.60)  (64.35)  
HMO -44.24a  -42.60a  127.46a   -41.37a  -39.83a  57.14  
 (8.76)  (8.06)  (49.28)   (7.55)  (6.97)  (36.09)  
POS -11.59  -7.96  -77.17a   -12.83c  -9.40  -75.16a  
 (7.17)  (6.36)  (28.68)   (6.42)  (5.72)  (20.82)  
COMP 22.69  21.80  337.74a   12.14  11.30  197.59b  
 (16.43)  (15.02)  (106.59)   (13.40)  (12.10)  (77.48)  
CDHD 0.27  1.71  -52.10   0.35  1.71  -25.77  
 (6.91)  (6.01)  (56.58)   (5.52)  (4.79)  (38.93)  
              
County Fixed Effects X  X  X   X  X  X  
Individual Fixed Effects X   X   X     X   X   X   
 (7)  (8)  (9)   (10)  (11)  (12) 
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 Real payments for procedures   Real payments for procedures topcoded at 
$50,000/mo 
 
N                  108,896,981                       108,896,981     
Dependent Mean     192.00           191.01      
 Coef  Coef  Coef   Coef  Coef  Coef  
 (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)   (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  
EPO 28.14a  26.91a  -93.04   27.99a  26.79a  -88.28  
 (9.28)  (9.39)  (100.41)   (9.39)  (9.50)  (96.75)  
HMO -19.78a  -18.92a  34.13   -19.31a  -18.47a  31.89  
 (5.08)  (4.72)  (31.89)   (5.02)  (4.67)  (29.87)  
POS -28.64a  -26.73a  -21.94   -28.03a  -26.17a  -18.81  
 (10.04)  (10.13)  (16.71)   (10.05)  (10.14)  (16.68)  
COMP 1.67  1.20  123.97a   1.34  0.88  113.02a  
 (6.94)  (6.57)  (40.73)   (6.94)  (6.57)  (38.88)  
CDHD -2.15  -1.39  -8.57   -2.00  -1.26  -4.42  
 (3.65)  (3.12)  (18.05)   (3.56)  (3.06)  (16.95)  
              County Fixed Effects X  X  X   X  X  X  
Individual Fixed Effects X   X   X     X   X   X   
Notes: Table shows the regression results of health plan effects on the four measures of real payments at the level of person spell-
months, using the full analysis sample with spells of zero payments included. The four dependent variables are: Real payments = Actual 
payments deflated by a Medicare's Geographic Price Cost Index (practice costs) and year; Real payments topcoded at $50,000/month; 
Procedure-related (non-facility) real payments; Procedure-related (non-facility) real payments topcoded at $50,000/month. The three 
columns of each dependent variable correspond to the models of (1) OLS without risk adjustment, (2) OLS with risk adjustment, and (3) 
2SLS with risk adjustment. The risk adjustment uses a risk score generated for each person spell-month based on a prospective model 
predicting total spending using the prior 12 spell months of diagnoses. All models control for employer*year*family coverage dummies, 
spell month time dummies, and employee county and individual fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the employer-year-family 
coverage level using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section 4 of the text. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Table 1-11. First stage results of the 2SLS models showing health plan effects on probability of seeking any visit and three types of 
visits 
  EPO HMO POS COMP CDHD PPO 
             Panel A: All visits Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 N=108,896,981 (Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err)  
             EPOprob 1.010a 
 
-0.162a 
 
-0.388a 
 
-0.056a 
 
-0.313a 
 
-0.090a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
 HMOprob 0.004 
 
0.611a 
 
-0.400a 
 
0.001 
 
-0.201a 
 
-0.015 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.012) 
 POSprob 0.001 
 
-0.068a 
 
0.536a 
 
-0.048a 
 
-0.302a 
 
-0.119a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.012) 
 COMPprob 0.000 
 
-0.071a 
 
-0.389a 
 
0.486a 
 
-0.251a 
 
0.224a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.012) 
 CDHprob 0.001 
 
-0.048a 
 
-0.419a 
 
-0.035a 
 
0.289a 
 
0.211a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.012) 
 HDHprob 0.017a 
 
-0.088a 
 
-0.401a 
 
-0.121a 
 
0.515a 
 
0.079a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.012) 
 PPOprob 0.002 
 
-0.095a 
 
-0.409a 
 
-0.019a 
 
-0.266a 
 
0.786a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.012) 
 F-statistics 21432.1   76247.3   233259.0   22296.8   69814.5   148013.0   
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Panel B: New visits Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 N=73,474,976 (Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
             EPOprob 1.027a 
 
-0.146a 
 
-0.289a 
 
-0.035a 
 
-0.405a 
 
-0.152a 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.015) 
 HMOprob 0.002 
 
0.602a 
 
-0.285a 
 
0.016a 
 
-0.270a 
 
-0.066a 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.015) 
 POSprob 0.001 
 
-0.088a 
 
0.616a 
 
-0.027a 
 
-0.366a 
 
-0.136a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.014) 
 COMPprob -0.001 
 
-0.076a 
 
-0.273a 
 
0.482a 
 
-0.338a 
 
0.207a 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.015) 
 CDHprob 0.000 
 
-0.059a 
 
-0.302a 
 
-0.018a 
 
0.196a 
 
0.183a 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.015) 
 HDHprob 0.013a 
 
-0.095a 
 
-0.285a 
 
-0.111a 
 
0.424a 
 
0.053a 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.015) 
 PPOprob 0.001 
 
-0.105a 
 
-0.291a 
 
0.004 
 
-0.328a 
 
0.720a 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.015) 
 F-statistics 14815.5   51554.0   165296.0   16357.5   47997.2   102472.0   
             Panel C: Continuation visits Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 N=15,195,461 (Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
             EPOprob 0.992a 
 
-0.166a 
 
-0.485a 
 
-0.044a 
 
-0.372a 
 
0.075b 
 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.035) 
 HMOprob 0.008 
 
0.651a 
 
-0.514a 
 
0.009 
 
-0.243a 
 
0.089a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.033) 
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POSprob 0.001 
 
-0.042 
 
0.447a 
 
-0.045a 
 
-0.352a 
 
-0.009 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.033) 
 COMPprob 0.002 
 
-0.047c 
 
-0.504a 
 
0.517a 
 
-0.298a 
 
0.330a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.033) 
 CDHprob 0.002 
 
-0.023 
 
-0.531a 
 
-0.027a 
 
0.240a 
 
0.340a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.033) 
 HDHprob 0.021b 
 
-0.073a 
 
-0.510a 
 
-0.093a 
 
0.463a 
 
0.192a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.024) 
 
(0.034) 
 PPOprob 0.003 
 
-0.072a 
 
-0.519a 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.314a 
 
0.916a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.033) 
 F-statistics 2959.7   10888.3   34524.3   3051.0   10023.5   22005.4   
             Panel D: Chronic visits Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 
Coef 
 N=20,226,544 (Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
(Std Err) 
 
             EPOprob 0.914a 
 
-0.217a 
 
-0.669a 
 
-0.081a 
 
-0.040c 
 
0.092a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.033) 
 HMOprob 0.009 
 
0.563a 
 
-0.713a 
 
-0.012 
 
0.022 
 
0.130a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
 POSprob 0.002 
 
-0.035 
 
0.282a 
 
-0.070a 
 
-0.102a 
 
-0.077b 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
 COMPprob 0.002 
 
-0.080a 
 
-0.708a 
 
0.519a 
 
-0.015 
 
0.283a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
 CDHprob 0.004 
 
-0.043c 
 
-0.738a 
 
-0.035a 
 
0.611a 
 
0.200a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
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HDHprob 0.024b 
 
-0.084a 
 
-0.725a 
 
-0.097a 
 
0.706a 
 
0.176a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.032) 
 PPOprob 0.006 
 
-0.090a 
 
-0.735a 
 
-0.045a 
 
-0.083a 
 
0.946a 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.032) 
 F-statistics 3779.5   14339.0   37815.7   3631.2   12462.9   25459.3   
Notes: Table reports the first stage regressions of the 2SLS models showing health plan effects on probability of visits, with one regression 
for each of the six endogenous plan types shown as separate columns. The instruments are probabilities of choosing plan types (shown in 
rows) predicted from multinomial logit models at the household-year level. The probabilities of two consumer-driven health plan types - 
consumer-driven health plan (CDH) and high-deductible health plan (HDH) - were predicted separately in multinomial logit models, and 
thus both were used as instruments. Other exogenous control variables include a prospective model risk score in household predicting total 
spending using the prior 12 spell months of diagnoses, employee county and individual fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage fixed 
effects, and spell month fixed effects. Panel A reports the regression results using all spells of treatment ("All visits"). Panel B through D 
run regressions on subsets of samples. Specifically, Panel B is based on regressions using only spells following no prior visits ("New 
visits"). Panel C focuses on spells of treatment that follow a new visit in the previous spell ("Continuation visits"). Panel D corresponds to 
models using all the spells preceded by a continuation visit ("Chronic visits"). ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
 
			
63 
Table 1-12. First stage results of the 2SLS models showing health plan effects on real payments and intensity measures, 
conditional on a visit in spell 
  EPO HMO POS COMP CDHD PPO 
 Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef  Coef 
  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)  (Std Err)               EPOprob 0.946a  -0.204a  -0.574a  -0.057a  -0.189a  0.078a 
  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.024) 
 HMOprob 0.006  0.616a  -0.614a  0.003  -0.097a  0.086a 
  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.024) 
 POSprob 0.001  -0.046b  0.379a  -0.054a  -0.221a  -0.058b 
  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.023) 
 COMPprob 0.001  -0.069a  -0.608a  0.523a  -0.140a  0.292a 
  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.024) 
 CDHprob 0.002  -0.043b  -0.637a  -0.027a  0.433a  0.271a 
  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.024) 
 HDHprob 0.023a  -0.087a  -0.617a  -0.090a  0.597a  0.174a 
  (0.007)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.024) 
 PPOprob 0.003  -0.090a  -0.629a  -0.026a  -0.191a  0.933a 
  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.023) 
             
 F-statistics 6276.9   23907.2   67413.6   6003.3   20877.2   45257.2  
 N    32,674,441       32,674,441       32,674,441       32,674,441       32,674,441       32,674,441    
Notes: Table reports the first stage regressions of the 2SLS models showing health plan effects on real payments and intensity measures, with 
one regression for each of the six endogenous plan types shown as separate columns. The instruments are probabilities of choosing plan types 
(shown in rows) predicted from multinomial logit models at the household-year level. The probabilities of two consumer-driven health plan types 
- consumer-driven health plan (CDH) and high-deductible health plan (HDH) - were predicted separately in multinomial logit models, and thus 
both were used as instruments. Other exogenous control variables include a patient severity measure that is a monthly expected spending based 
on a coarse category of diseases from the prior twelve spell months and the current month of treatment, employee county and individual fixed 
effects, employer-year-family coverage fixed effects, and spell month fixed effects. Sample size is 32,674,441 including all spells in which 
individuals are treated and incur positive payments on medical services. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Table 1-13. 95% confidence intervals from three bootstrap models (100 replications) for any visit indicator, monthly spending, 
expected spending, and expected savings relative to PPO plans by plan type 
 
Any visit indicator  
Monthly real 
procedure 
payments| > 0 ($)  
Predicted monthly 
real procedure 
payments ($)  
Monthly savings 
relative to PPOs ($) 
 
               
Model A: Random sampling of EYFs 
 
mean 
 
95% C.I  mean 
 
95% C.I  Mean 
 
95% C.I  mean 
 
95% C.I 
EPO 0.269b 
 
(0.152, 0.342) 
 
629 
 
(511, 718) 
 
172 
 
(81, 241) 
 
-51 
 
(-142, 18) 
HMO 0.307a 
 
(0.285, 0.328) 
 
724 
 
(627, 826) 
 
223 
 
(187, 267) 
 
-1 
 
(-36, 44) 
POS 0.324a 
 
(0.312, 0.341) 
 
664 
 
(632, 700) 
 
215 
 
(201, 237) 
 
-8 
 
(-22, 14) 
PPO 0.348 
 
- 
 
647 
 
- 
 
223 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
COMP 0.408a 
 
(0.375, 0.459) 
 
731b 
 
(649, 846) 
 
298a 
 
(258, 353) 
 
75a 
 
(35, 130) 
CDHD 0.357   (0.342, 0.372)   727b 
 
(649, 798)   259a 
 
(230, 289)   36a 
 
(7, 66) 
 
               Model B: Random sampling of individuals 
 
mean 
 
95% C.I  mean 
 
95% C.I  Mean 
 
95% C.I  mean 
 
95% C.I 
EPO 0.270a 
 
(0.247, 0.291) 
 
637 
 
(574, 703) 
 
172a 
 
(149, 195) 
 
-51a 
 
(-74, -28) 
HMO 0.306a 
 
(0.296, 0.314) 
 
726a 
 
(695, 755) 
 
222 
 
(208, 234) 
 
-1 
 
(-15, 11) 
POS 0.324a 
 
(0.317, 0.331) 
 
668b 
 
(650, 692) 
 
216 
 
(208, 225) 
 
-7 
 
(-15, 2) 
PPO 0.348 
 
- 
 
647 
 
- 
 
223 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
COMP 0.405a 
 
(0.389, 0.421) 
 
734a 
 
(692, 783) 
 
297a 
 
(273, 323) 
 
74a 
 
(50, 100) 
CDHD 0.360a 
 
(0.350, 0.369)   732a 
 
(703, 758)   263a 
 
(250, 274)   40a 
 
(27, 51) 
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Model C: Random sampling of EYFs and individuals 
 
mean 
 
95% C.I  mean 
 
95% C.I  Mean 
 
95% C.I  mean 
 
95% C.I 
EPO 0.268c 
 
(0.149, 0.359) 
 
629 
 
(511, 718) 
 
171 
 
(84, 263) 
 
-52 
 
(-139, 40) 
HMO 0.306a 
 
(0.285, 0.332) 
 
725 
 
(628, 840) 
 
222 
 
(183, 270) 
 
-1 
 
(-40, 47) 
POS 0.324b 
 
(0.307, 0.347) 
 
665 
 
(618, 711) 
 
215 
 
(199, 241) 
 
-8 
 
(-24, 18) 
PPO 0.348 
 
- 
 
647 
 
- 
 
223 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
COMP 0.407a 
 
(0.364, 0.457) 
 
730 
 
(617, 858) 
 
297a 
 
(249, 371) 
 
74a 
 
(26, 148) 
CDHD 0.358 
 
(0.339, 0.376) 
 
727b 
 
(656, 813) 
 
260a 
 
(230, 289) 
 
37a 
 
(7, 66) 
Notes: Table shows results from conducting three different bootstrapping estimates of the results in Table 1-5. The first set of bootstrap 
estimates (Model A) uses the EYF clustering in which we randomly conducted 100 draws of EYFs and include in sample all enrollee-
spells within each selected EYF. This replicates the results presented in Table 1-5. The second simulation (Model B) uses random draws 
of individuals but not EYF clusters, while the third set of estimates (Model C) uses 100 two stage random sampling of both EYFs and 
individuals. All of these predictions are presented by plan type and use the sample means of all control variables for PPO enrollees. Means 
for PPOs are calculated from the original sample. The 95% confidence interval corresponds to the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles among the 100 
simulated predictions. Estimates for monthly savings (the final two columns) are obtained from the overall predictions in the earlier pair of 
columns by subtracting the predicted values for PPOs from the other plan predictions. Significance letters show whether plan type 
predictions are statistically significantly different from the PPO means based on the empirical bootstrapped distributions using two-sided 
tests: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.10. 
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Appendix B: Data Processing 
B.1. Dealing with Missing Information 
B.1.1. Missing Employers 
The Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® (MS) Commercial Claims and 
Encounter data has two kinds of claims, those originating from employers and those 
originating from health plans. Health plan identifiers (“plan key”), which also identify 
employers, are only provided on a subset of the employer sample, and only for a subset of 
each employer’s years. Since a key feature of the MS employer data is that when an 
enrollee changes employers, his enrollee ID will change, we can reliably infer that if a 
person is in the sample for all five years, then that household is almost always associated 
with the same employer (or affiliate if there is a merger or breakup). Hence for each 
household in the employer sample we assigned the employer from a previous or 
subsequent year. This roughly quadrupled our sample with an employer assigned.  
B.1.2. Missing Plan Keys 
As summarized in the Table 1-1, the MS data contains a diverse set of different 
health plan types that we wish to include. Health plan identifiers (“plan key”) that index a 
specific plan are missing on 75.9% percent of the eligibility records, and are only present 
for all five years on 5.3% of all enrollees. However, health plan type is provided for over 
98% of all enrollees, and is present for all five years on 97% of the records. We 
conducted an analysis of plan IDs and plan types and determined that where plankey is 
present, employers on average offer 2.03 plankey ID for each given plan type offered that 
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year. Employers are more likely to offer multiple PPOs, HMOs and POS, the three most 
common plan types, and less likely to offer multiple EPO, CDHD plans if they offer 
these plan types at all. We conduct our analysis at the employer*year*family 
coverage*plan type level instead of the unique plan key level. While this blurs the 
distinction among distinct HMO, PPO, POS plans of the same plan type, it preserves a 
large sample size, and the distortion on the two newest plan types, EPOs and CDHDs, is 
small.  
B.1.3. Missing Employee Counties 
Beginning in 2011, MS no longer includes employee county in their data. After 
determining that the annual migration rates during 2007 to 2010 in our 5.1 million 
continuously eligible sample are less than 3%, we impute the missing county information 
in 2011 by corresponding values in 2010, the last year such information is available. This 
imputation intrudes some measurement error but only affects the results where county 
fixed effects are used.  
B.2. Sample Selection Details 
Our 5.1 million sample includes individuals aged 21-64, enrolled continuously for 
60 months during 2007-2011, and having at least one month of plan type information 
available during at least one month of each year. Records with missing enrollee IDs, age, 
or sex were excluded.  
To construct analysis sample, we excluded all spells in which we detect any 
payments based on capitation where payments are likely understated. This includes all 
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spells associated with a plan type called “Point of Service with Capitation”, and spells 
involving capitation payments (mostly in PPO and POS plans).  
Since primary care during pregnancies will differ from care at other times, we 
excluded all spells in which there was a pregnancy diagnosis, both concurrently or during 
the prior twelve month base period in which diagnoses are recognized for each spell.  
The first 12 spell months (from 2007) are dropped because they are used to 
predict risk scores using diagnoses and/or demographics in the prior twelve months. We 
also dropped the last spell in our sample (i.e. spell index = 60) because it will be 
truncated from continuation into 2012.  Analysis sample for analyzing procedure-related 
payments and intensities further restricts our sample to spells with positive sum of 
procedure payments (in both nominal and real terms). 
B.3. Price Deflation 
In order to distinguish price variation that is explained by provider choice from 
price variation due to time trends and cost of living, prices on each claim were first 
deflated by an inflation adjustment (using 2011 dollars) which normalized the average 
price to be constant in all years, and then normalized prices by dividing by the county or 
state prices as captured by the Medicare programs Geographic Practice Cost Index 
(GPCI) as used in the physician time component of the Medicare Part B payments. The 
practice expense GPCI reflects regional differences in the wages of employees in 
physician practices, such as nurses and office staff, and differences in median residential 
rents, which serve as a proxy for office rent. Quantities of services on each claim were 
multiplied by these real prices to calculate the value of real payments. This means that 
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our real health expenditures control for both time and geographic price variation. 
In addition to deflating all expenditures to be in real, time and county adjusted 
prices, we also calculate national average prices separately for each procedure code, and 
also for classes of non-procedure claim (e.g. facility payments) so that the national 
average prices could be multiplied by actual quantities to generate a measure of what 
prices would have been if the US average payments were used. The pricing intensity of a 
spell is the real price for the set of services provided, divided by what the payment would 
have been if the US average prices instead of the providers own prices are used. Both 
payments are calculated using the actual quantities of services received. Since the 
measuring units of facility services (hospital days, DRGs, time receiving tests, days of 
care, hours in an ICU, etc.) are not as readily captured as counts of procedures, there is 
reason to believe the US average payments for procedures are a more accurate payment 
measure than US average payments that include facility payments. Hence our preferred 
dependent variable focuses on real payments for procedures, rather than total real 
payments including both procedures and facility payments. 
B.4. Risk Adjustment 
Risk adjustment models have gained increasing attention in the US in the past 
fifteen years with their expanded use for paying Medicare Advantage, Medicaid managed 
care plans, Medicare Part D, and the ACA’s new Health Insurance Marketplace. The age, 
gender and diagnoses of an individual over any base period have been shown to be 
important predictors of many outcomes, notably including both concurrent models in 
which diagnoses are used to predict spending in the same base period as the diagnoses are 
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observed, and prospective models in which spending and utilization are predicted using 
diagnoses from a previous base period (Ash et al. 2000).  
We use diagnosis-based risk adjustment models in four ways in this paper: to 
capture patient illness burdens when modeling employee choice of health plans; to 
capture illness burdens when consumers decide to make a visit; to control for patient 
severity in treatment decisions; and to quantify coding intensity variation. Spell month 
treatment decisions are modeled as depending on various combinations of concurrent and 
prior period diagnoses.  
We use used DxCG models to generate predictions using eligibility, age, sex and 
diagnostic information which enabled us to estimate separate models using both coarse 
(simplified) and fine (rich) diagnostic detail. For modeling health plan choice and visit 
decisions, we use diagnoses from the prior year to generate a prospective, rich 
Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) classification system that expands upon the 
system used for the Medicare Advantage and Marketplace programs and distinguishes 
between 384 HCCs. For overall severity entering the denominator of the coding intensity 
measure and treatment decisions, we use DxCG’s relatively coarse Related Condition 
Categories (RCCs) for prediction. The 117 RCCs approximate the level of details that 
most consumers will have, and are similar to conditions appearing on household surveys 
such as the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) administered. Finally, we 
measure provider coding intensity as the ratio of the HCC-based concurrent prediction 
(recalibrated via a new regression to predict monthly spending) to the coarser RCC-based 
prediction, the idea being that this coarser system is less sensitive to coding intensity 
			
71 
variation than the richer HCC system. As just one illustration, the RCCs would 
distinguish Type I from Type II Diabetes, HCCs would distinguish whether the Type II 
diabetic has major or minor complications. 
The risk scores used in modeling visit and treatment decisions are calculated 
using a “point-in-time” prediction strategy. Specifically, diagnostic information from the 
twelve months prior to the start of the treatment spell is used to predict resource 
utilization and costs in that month. For example, the consumer’s severity (and thus 
expected spending) in month 1 of 2008 is predicted using the array of RCCs from 2007:1 
to 2007:12 as well as the array of RCCs specifically for 2008:1. Information from 2007:2 
through 2008:2 is then used to predict spending in 2008:2, and so on. We use a 
combination of prospective and concurrent risk models and use different information sets 
to try to disentangle ex ante from ex post diagnostic coding for a treatment spell as a way 
of quantifying provider coding intensity. 
Our choice of the DxCG classification for our analysis is driven primarily by 
convenience and familiarity. A similar analysis could be done using either the coarser 
HCC classification currently used by the Marketplace, or other classification systems 
such as the Elixhauser Comorbidity Scores or The John’s Hopkins Adjusted Clinical 
Group System. However, these alternative systems do not generate concurrent and 
prospective RRS already calibrated to predict a single month of spending using a single 
month of diagnoses, which we use to capture provider coding decisions. 
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Appendix C: Bootstrapping Confidence Intervals 
In order to calculate the predicted monthly real procedure payments 
(unconditional on a visit) while accounting for correlations between visit decisions and 
health care spending conditional on a visit, we estimated standard errors and the whole 
distribution of unconditional spending per spell by applying a bootstrapping method. In 
this section, we describe how we used three different bootstrap models to calculate 95% 
confidence intervals of the four measures in Table 1-5 and Appendix Table 1-13 on our 
sample of 108.9 million person spells.  
The first step of our bootstrap method is to create bootstrap samples by re-
sampling from our data. All three bootstrap models draw 100 random samples (with 
replacement) of the same expected size from the original 108.9 million person spells. The 
first bootstrap model (Table 1-5; Model A in Appendix Table 1-13) is our base case. It 
uses the employer-year-family coverage type (EYF) clustering in which we randomly 
select 100 draws of enrollees by EYF. Specifically, each random draw selects EYFs and 
we include all enrollee spells within selected EYFs in the bootstrap sample. The process 
is repeated for 100 times. The second model (Model B in Appendix Table 1-13) uses 
random draws of individuals but not EYF clusters. The third model (Model C in 
Appendix Table 1-13) uses 100 two stage random sampling of both EYFs and 
individuals. Specifically in the first stage, we randomly draw EYFs (with replacement) 
from all available EYFs in the original sample. In the second stage, we subsample 
individuals (with replacement) from each of the selected EYFs, and include in the sample 
all the spells of selected individuals. Each pair of random draws gives a random sample 
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of the same expected size from the original data, and we repeat the process for 100 times. 
In all three sampling methods, due to variation in number of enrollee spells in each EYF 
cell and number of spells associated with each enrollee, each random draw has the same 
expected sample size, but does not exactly match the original sample size. 
Next, using each of these random samples, we reestimate our two-part models 
described in Section 4.2. In each of the three bootstrap models, we first absorb individual 
and employee county fixed effects on the original sample. Then for each random sample 
drawn, we re-estimate the health plan effects of the probability of a visit and spending per 
spell conditional a visit. Regression results from each sample are then used to predict 
probability of any visit, levels of spending (conditional and unconditional on a visit) and 
predicted savings relative to PPOs. All of these predictions use the sample means of all 
control variables for PPO enrollees. 
Finally, we construct the 95% confidence intervals of each of the above measures 
using the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles of the empirical distribution estimated by the 100 
simulated predictions. Whether plan type predictions are statistically significantly 
different from the PPO means (at 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels) is determined 
based on the empirical bootstrapped distributions using two-sided tests. 
Note that bootstrapped standard deviations, confidence intervals, and statistical 
significance measures will generally differ from those generated using corresponding 
analytical formulas for cluster-robust standard errors. One reason is simply sampling 
error: different bootstrap simulations will give slightly different answers. Another is that 
these bootstrapped confidence intervals are asymmetric around the parameter point 
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estimate, since the underlying data from which samples are drawn include many, highly 
skewed variables. A third reason is that we use bootstrap methods here to make estimates 
of nonlinear transformations of parameters (here predictions in levels, not logs), so it is 
natural that the bootstrapped significance of differences from PPOs will differ when 
calculated in levels rather than logs. Despite these differences, we find bootstrapping 
superior in its ability to accommodate multiple, alternative complex error correlation 
structures.  
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2. CHAPTER TWO: AN ITERATIVE APPROACH TO ESTIMATION WITH 
MULTIPLE HIGH-DIMENSIONAL FIXED EFFECTS 
Siyi Luo, Wenjia Zhu, Randall P. Ellis 
Department of Economics, Boston University 
Abstract 
Controlling for multiple high-dimensional fixed effects while estimating the 
effects of specific policy or treatment variables is common in linear models of health care 
utilization. Traditional estimation approaches are often infeasible with multiple very high 
dimension fixed effects. Additional challenges arise if sample sizes are large, data are 
unbalanced, and when instrumental variables and clustered standard error corrections are 
also needed. We develop a new estimation algorithm, implemented in SAS, that 
accommodates all of these practical estimation challenges. 
In contrast with most existing algorithms that absorb multiple fixed effects 
simultaneously, our algorithm sequentially absorbs fixed effects and repeats iterating 
until fixed effects are asymptotically eliminated. Written in SAS, the main advantage of 
our approach is that it is easy to use and able to accommodate extremely large datasets 
without requiring that data be actively stored in memory. The main disadvantage is that 
our algorithm does not generate parameter estimates of each fixed effect, but only of the 
parameters of interest. 
Monte Carlo simulations confirm that our approach exactly matches Stata’s 
reghdfe estimation results in all the models, which is itself identical to estimating linear 
models with fixed effect dummies. We then apply our algorithm to extend Ellis and Zhu 
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(2016) using US employer-based health insurance market data. From a sample of 63 
million individual-months we remove fixed effects for 1.4 million individuals, 150,000 
distinct primary care physicians (PCPs), 3,000 counties, 465 employer-year-single/family 
and 47 monthly dummies, and find that narrow network plans (exclusive provider 
organizations, health maintenance organizations and point-of-service plans) reduce the 
probabilities of monthly provider contacts (by 11.1%, 5.7%, 3.6%, respectively) relative 
to preferred provider organization plans (PPOs), while consumer-driven/high-deductible 
plans are statistically insignificantly different (95% CI: -3.6% to 4.6%). 
Keywords: multiple high-dimensional fixed effects, big data, iterative algorithm, Monte 
Carlo simulations, health care utilization 
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I. Introduction 
The simplest way to estimate a two-way fixed effect model is to include fixed 
effects as dummy variables and obtain the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimator. When the numbers of levels for both fixed effects are small, using the LSDV 
model makes sense and is straightforward. When only one of the fixed effects has a large 
number of levels (i.e., the fixed effect is high dimensional), it is often feasible to include 
the other fixed effect as dummies. This leaves one high-dimensional fixed effect to 
absorb and we can apply the usual method of one-way fixed effect models. In both cases, 
the LSDV approach will work well regardless of whether data are balanced or not. 
The LSDV method, however, can become computationally infeasible as sample 
sizes and the numbers of high-dimensional fixed effects increase, necessitating the 
absorption of two or more high-dimensional fixed effects. Although SAS has the 
capability of handling large sample size estimation, there are challenges in the practical 
implementation. For example, SAS’s built-in program for estimating OLS fixed effects 
models is limited in the number of fixed effects levels that it can include in the model due 
to memory constraint and the ability to internally index variable levels.39 
																																																								
39 Two commonly used SAS procedures for fixed effects are PROC GLM and PROC HPMIXED. Sample 
code for PROC GLM is:  
PROC GLM DATA=TEST; 
 ABSORB FE1;  
CLASS FE2;  
MODEL Y = X FE2 / SOLUTION; 
RUN; 
Although one high dimensional FE1 can be absorbed, except in special cases a second cannot.  Attempting 
to estimate FE2 as a high dimensional fixed effect results in the following error message:   
ERROR: Number of levels for some effects > 32767. 
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One alternative is to estimate a transformed version of the model in which fixed 
effects are eliminated. One commonly used method is Within transformation. Note that 
there can be multiple ways of Within transforming the model, but the one that gives the 
same parameter estimates as LSDV is the optimal transformation (Balázsi, Mátyás, and 
Wansbeek 2014). But Balázsi, Mátyás, and Wansbeek (2014) show that in a simple 
model with two fixed effects and balanced data, the Within transformation has a 
straightforward formula. For models with more than two fixed effects and under common 
data issues such as unbalanced data, transformation can become intractable.40 
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to transform models featuring 
large sample sizes and high-dimensional fixed effects. As opposed to the Within 
transformation which absorbs fixed effects in one step, our proposed method demeans 
variables with respect to each one of the fixed effects sequentially and clears up fixed 
effects by iterations. One advantage of our method is that it is easy to implement. Also, 																																																																																																																																																																					
For more information about this error, see SAS’s online documentation 
http://support.sas.com/documentation/cdl/en/statug/63033/HTML/default/viewer.htm#statug_glm_sect039.
htm/.   
Sample code for PROC HPMIXED is:  
PROC HPMIXED DATA=TEST; 
CLASS FE1 FE2; 
MODEL Y = X FE1 FE2 / SOLUTION; 
RUN; 
Note that PROC HPMIXED does not allow ABOSORB statement for including fixed effects. For a model of 
over 100 million observations and two fixed effects of about 3000 and 2 million levels respectively, 
running the above codes gives the following error message. 
ERROR: The HPMIXED procedure stopped because of the insufficient memory. 
40 In terms of implementation, although SAS builds in a convenient program, PROC GLM, to absorb high-
dimensional fixed effects, the current version of the program does not allow absorption of multiple fixed 
effects that would provide the equivalent results of the LSDV estimator. For example, the following 
procedure estimates the model Y = X + FE1*FE2 + error, which is not equivalent to the model of 
interest Y = X + FE1 + FE2 + error. 
PROC GLM DATA=TEST; 
ABSORB FE1 FE2; 
MODEL: Y = X / SOLUTION; 
RUN;  
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this method can be generalized to more complicated models such as those containing 
more than two high-dimensional fixed effects and instrumental variables without 
increasing the complexity of the algorithm. Finally, we implement this method in SAS 
that is particularly capable of handling large data sets. A disadvantage of our approach is 
that we do not recover the estimated fixed effects, but only of the policy variables of 
interest. 
Our approach is motivated by the Guimaraes and Portugal (2010) algorithm, 
labeled the GP algorithm that is commonly used to deal with multiple high-dimensional 
fixed effects. This algorithm is attractive because it uses the iteration and convergence 
implementation of Least Squared estimation instead of the explicit calculation of the 
inverse of matrices. Another valuable innovation is that it stores and retrieves each fixed 
effect as a column vector, which compresses the dimensions of fixed effects to ones. 
Hence in each iteration, the estimation of each fixed effect merely involves taking simple 
average of residuals by groups, after which the OLS regression is then run for other 
regressors along with the updated fixed effect vector as a variable. After convergence of 
the estimates, the fixed effects remain identifiable. 
An efficient GP algorithm has been programmed as a user build-in function in 
Stata written by Sergio Correia (2015)41 called reghdfe, which we use as a benchmark for 
this paper. The Correia (2015) algorithm represents a significant enhancement in the GP 
algorithm in that it is designed to converge more quickly, is flexible about the number of 
fixed effects, allows for interactions between fixed effects as well as interactions between 																																																								
41 Sergio Correia built and released a Stata user written package reghdfe in July 2014, and has continually 
updated it. The last update was on June 19th, 2015. 
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fixed effects and other categorical variables, and is integrated with IV/2SLS regression.42 
The reghdfe also allows cluster-robust variance estimation (CRVE) (Cameron and Miller 
2015), which is a nontrivial enhancement. 
As shown in Table 2-1, in terms of functionality, Stata’s reghdfe combines 
ivregress that allows clustered standard error correction and instruments, and a2reg that 
accommodates two or more high-dimensional fixed effects. While easy to use and fast, 
reghdfe is unable to handle extremely large datasets since it relies upon retaining all 
working data in memory during execution and tends to fail due to a lack of memory on 
very large datasets on most computers.43 SAS is an attractive language for manipulating 
very large datasets, whether that be large sample sizes N, large numbers of parameters K 
or large numbers of fixed effects. While not as efficient as some other programming 
environments, SAS is an important and convenient environment since SAS is designed to 
process essentially infinite size datasets without attempting to retain the full dataset in 
memory while performing calculations.44 
Like reghdfe, our ultimate goal is to develop an estimation algorithm that can be 
used to estimate linear regression models with two or more high-dimensional fixed 
effects, as well as 2SLS, and CRVE in very large samples. Even though SAS currently 
provides convenient programs for estimating models with large numbers of fixed effects 
																																																								
42 An example of using this command is: 
reghdfe outcome x (y=z), absorb (fe1=i.FE1 fe2=i.FE2) vce (cluster 
cluster)  
43 Note that memory is needed by Stata and most packages not only for holding data, but also for 
workspace for manipulating matrices and storing interim results. 
44 SAS was developed at a time when memory was expensive, but tapes could store essentially infinite 
length datasets. It still relies on sequential data processing more than most statistical packages, and hence 
can deal with very large N and K samples reasonably well. 
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(PROC GLM), performing 2SLS (PROC SYSLIN), or generating standard errors that 
correct for clustered errors (PROC SURVEYREG), it does not yet have procedures that 
allow for all three problems to be corrected simultaneously (Table 2-1). Moreover, 
convenient programs for fixed effects, 2SLS estimation, and the correction for clustered 
errors each involve creating very large temporary files that are a multiple of the size of 
the original datasets, and can often create storage problems during estimation. Our 
iterative algorithm (TSLSFECLUS), implemented in SAS, attempts to capture all these 
various features, and its computation and estimation performance is compared with that 
of reghdfe to justify the validity of our algorithm (Table 2-1). 
The implementation of our algorithm involves three steps: (1) Absorb fixed 
effects sequentially from all dependent and explanatory (including instrumental) 
variables; (2) estimate the model using the standardized variables; (3) repeat and 
calculate the maximum absolute value of the percentage difference between adjacent 
iterations among parameters of interest, and report estimates when the percentage 
difference falls below a pre-specified threshold. 
We perform Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the performance of our 
algorithm. A variety of datasets are considered with 95,000 to 100,000 observations and 
variations in the number of fixed effects, sample balance, correlations between fixed 
effects and control variables, extent of endogeneity, and interdependence between fixed 
effects. In some of the models, we feasibly allow standard error corrections to adjust for 
clustering, by applying the analytical formula described in Section 2.2.  
The proposed algorithm is applied to US employer-based health insurance market 
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data to examine how health plan types affect health care utilization. Our analysis sample 
contains about 63 million observations from which we remove fixed effects for 1.4 
million individuals, 3,000 counties, 150,000 primary care doctors, 465 
employer*year*single/family coverage, and 47 monthly time dummies to predict plan 
type effects on monthly health care utilization. By simultaneously controlling for 
individual, doctor, county, time, and employer*year*single/family fixed effects, our 
identification comes from consumers’ movement between health plan types. Our iterative 
algorithm not only controls for these multiple high-dimensional fixed effects, but also 
uses instrumental variables to control for endogenous plan choice and standard error 
corrections to adjust for clustering at the employer level. Our estimates show that the 
breadth of provider networks dominates cost sharing in influencing consumers’ decision 
to seek care. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our iterative 
algorithm in a two-way fixed effect model framework, and proves a theorem that under 
two specific assumptions (Quasi-Balance and Strict Exogeneity), our algorithm 
converges to the simple least square model with true policy variable parameter values 
that is equivalent to the original specification with two types of fixed effects. In Section 
3, we conduct Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the validity of our algorithm. We then 
show in Section 4 that our algorithm is feasible to estimate a model of health care 
utilization on a real data set that requires controlling simultaneously for patients, 
providers and counties, each of high dimension. Finally, Section 5 concludes and 
discusses the next steps.  
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II. An Iterative Estimation Algorithm 
A. Model Setup 
In this section, we present our iterative algorithm for a simple linear two-way 
fixed effect model. We show (in progress) that under certain assumptions, remaining 
fixed effects are asymptotically eliminated, generating converged values which are 
unbiased and consistent estimates of the LSDV estimator of the parameter of interest. 
Consider a two-way fixed effect model: 
                                                 !"# = %&'"# + )" + *# + +"#                                             (1) , ∈ .# ⊆ 0 = {1, 2,… , .} 7 ∈ 8" ⊆ 9 = {1,2,… , 8} 
Remark: 
When .# ≡ 0, ∀7 and 8" ≡ 9, ∀,, the data is a balanced panel. Otherwise, there 
are missing observations and the panel is unbalanced. Without any loss in generality, 
assume that 0 ≥ 9, so that the higher dimensionality fixed effect is always absorbed 
first. 
The idea of our algorithm is to sequentially absorb fixed effects and repeats 
iterating until fixed effects are asymptotically eliminated. Specifically, we employ the 
following three-step procedure. 
Step 1: Demean all dependent and independent variables by each one of the fixed effects 
sequentially, and estimate the demeaned model. 
Step 2: Repeat Step 1 until fixed effects converge to a constant. 
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Step 3: Model parameters (coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors) are then 
estimated by least squares regression on the final demeaned model. 
Using Model (1), our algorithm can be laid out as the following.   
1st iteration: 
1) Demean !"#  and '"# over i !"⋅ = %&'"⋅ + )" + 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A + +"⋅ !B"# ≡ !"# − !"∙ = %&'B"# + *# − 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A + +B"# 
2) Demean the resulting !B"#  and 'B"# over t !B⋅# = %&'B⋅# + *# − 1‖.#‖? 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A"∈EF + +B⋅# !B"#(H) ≡ !B"# − !B⋅# = %&'B"#(H) − 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A + 1‖.#‖? 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A"∈EF + +B"#(H)= %&'B"#(H) + )"(H) + *#(H) + +B"#(H) 
where *#(H) and )"(H) are the remaining fixed effects after 1st iteration defined as: 
⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧*#(H) ≡ 1‖.#‖? 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A"∈EF)"(H) ≡ − 1‖8"‖? *##∈@A  
Similarly, the regression model after (k+1)th iteration can be written as: !B"#(NOH) ≡ !B"#(N) − !B⋅#(N) = %&'B"#(NOH) + )"(NOH) + *#(NOH) + +B"#(NOH) 
where 
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⎩⎪⎨
⎪⎧*#(NOH) ≡ 1‖.#‖? 1‖8"‖? *#(N)#∈@A"∈EF)"(NOH) ≡ − 1‖8"‖? *#(N)#∈@A 																																												(2)	
 
Assumption 1: Quasi-Balance 
For any two time periods s and t, there exists an individual who is observed in both 
periods. ∀Q, R	 ∈ {S, T,… , U}, ∃W		X. Z.		W ∈ [R	\]^	W ∈ [Q  
Assumption 1 restricts the extent of unbalance of a dataset, although it is in fact a 
relatively loose condition which could be commonly observed in most of the datasets. 
This assumption is saying that for any pair of time periods, we can always observe at 
least one individual who appears in both periods. In other words, it rules out the type of 
dataset in which there are two periods where the pools of individuals are completely 
different. When Assumption 1 fails, for the two periods in which the whole individual 
sample pools are different, time fixed effects cannot be identified because individual 
fixed effects are nested within these two-period time fixed effects. The time fixed effects 
for these two periods would then be equivalent to the sum of individual fixed effects for 
the corresponding two sample pools. 
Note that the way that Assumption 1 is stated depends on the order by which 
fixed effects are absorbed. In the current case, individual fixed effect is absorbed first and 
followed by time fixed effect, assuming that . ≥ 8. If the order of absorption is reversed 
because 8 ≥ ., then Assumption 1 would require that for any two individuals, there 
exists a time period that is observed for both individuals.  
			
86 
Theorem 1:  
For model (1), if the dataset satisfies Assumption 1, then starting from any initial 
value of _(`) ≡ _, the remaining fixed effects converge to a constant vector, i.e. *#(N) → b	∀7, as c → ∞. 
For detailed proof, see Appendix A. 
By Theorem 1, *#(N) → b	∀7 and we can easily derive from equation (2) that )"(N) → −b	∀,. So the remaining individual and time fixed effects will be cancelled out 
with each other upon convergence. In other words, by iterating the sequential absorption, 
fixed effects are eliminated asymptotically.  
Theorem 2: 
For model (1) under Assumption 1, the OLS estimator %e(N) from each iteration also 
converges, and converges to the LSDV estimator of %. 
For a detailed proof, see Appendix A. 
Corollary 1: 
If the OLS estimator %e(N) converges to the LSDV estimator, the remaining fixed 
effects converge to a constant vector. 
For a detailed proof, see Appendix A. 
Ideally, once the remaining fixed effects converge, we can then obtain an 
unbiased and consistent estimator. However, in practice, convergence of remaining fixed 
effects could not be observed explicitly. From corollary 1, we can instead check the 
convergence criterion on the estimates of the demeaned variables from each iteration {%e(H), %e(f), … , %e(N), … , %e(g)}. In practical implementation, we define convergence as 
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when the largest absolute percentage change between two consecutive iterations among 
parameters of interest is below 10-4. For a detailed description of the implementation, see 
Appendix B.  
Assumption 2: Strict Exogeneity 
The idiosyncratic error is strictly exogenous.  
1) hiZjklZ	m]^knm]miZo:	∀W, q	 ∈ {S, T, … ,[}, Q, R	 ∈{S, T,… , U}, rstqQuvWR, wW, _Rx = `. 
2) hiZj	m]^knm]miZo and instruments y:	∀W, q	 ∈ {S, T, … ,[}, Q, R	 ∈{S, T,… , U}, rstqQuzWR, wW, _Rx = `. 
Theorem 3: Under Assumption 2, the estimates from Step 3 are unbiased and 
consistent. 
For a detailed proof, please see Appendix A.  
The above algorithm applies to both models with and without endogeneity. With 
endogeneity, the same predictions are concluded for the 2SLS model, since 2SLS model 
could be rewritten equivalently as a reduced form where our algorithm applies. 
B. Clustering Standard Errors 
In many economic settings, standard errors are not necessarily independent but 
correlated within groups (e.g., schools, households, etc.), a phenomenon known as 
“clustered standard errors”. For example, student performance may be correlated within 
schools, and health spending is likely to be correlated within households. Suppose we 
allow errors to cluster at G level. Let g denote gth element in G. Following Cameron and 
Miller (2015), clustered errors can be expressed as: 
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{s+"#|+}~|&|'"#|, '}~|&x = 0 unless Å = Å′ 
Then the cluster-robust variance estimator (CRVE) can be written as: 
bÉÑ{ = (ÖÜ&ÖÜ)áH ?à|&à|â|äH (ÖÜ&ÖÜ)áH 
where ÖÜ is a (∑ 8"" ) × ç matrix of the demeaned Ös of the converged model, à| =∑ é"#'B"#"#∊|   and é"# = !B"# − %e&'B"#. 
In the empirical estimation, we calculate cluster-robust standard errors by 
applying the above formula to the converged model where ('B"#, !B"#) are the demeaned 
values. 
III. Monte Carlo Simulations 
A. Pseudo Data Generating Process 
We generate pseudo data sets according to model (1). In particular, we allow 
correlation between the fixed effects and the control variables x (see Moulton (1990) for a 
discussion of the importance of this type of correlation). We also allow the flexibility to 
include clustered errors that introduce correlation of errors within clusters.   
Denote . = number of individuals; 8 = number of time periods; êëíìH = 
correlation between control variable and individual fixed effects; êëíìf = correlation 
between control variable and time fixed effects; î = number of missing observations. 
We start by constructing a balanced panel, and then generate an unbalanced one by 
randomly dropping M observations. Details of data construction are as follows. 
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Step 1: Generate fixed effects, )"and *# from scaled uniform distribution, as follows: ïñó	, = 1, 2,… , ., )"~10 ∗ ö[0,1] ïñó	7 = 1, 2,… , 8, *#~10 ∗ ö[0,1] 
Step 2: For each observation, generate error terms +"# and à"# from a bivariate normal 
distribution. ïñó	, = 1, 2,… ,., 7 = 1,2,… , 8 
+"#, à"#~. ùûü†ü°¢ £ §†f ê†°§†§°ê†°§†§° §°f •¶ 
For which we can simplify to a standard bivariate normal distribution: 
+"#, à"#~. ùû00¢£ 1 ê†°ê†° 1 •¶ 
where ê†° is the correlation between +"# and à"# for , = 1, 2,… , ., 7 = 1, 2, … , 845. 
To operate this, we draw (+"#, à"#) pairs as the following: ïñó	, = 1, 2, … ,., 7 = 1, 2,… , 8 +"#~ö[0,1] and ©"#~ö[0,1] à"# = ê†°+"# + ™1 − ê†°f©"#46 
To build in clustering of standard errors, we alternatively construct errors {+"#}",# 
as the following assuming without loss of generality that errors are clustered within 
individuals over time: ïñó	, = 1, 2,… ,. 																																																								
45 Note that when variable '"# is exogenous, ê†° equals 0. 
46 Proof: Note that {+"# = {à"# = 0, Ñ¨ó(à"#) = Ñ¨ósê†°+"# + ™1 − ê†°f©"#x = ê†°fÑ¨ó(+"#) +(1 − ê†°f)Ñ¨ó(©"#) = 1 = Ñ¨ó(+"#), bñà(+"#, à"#) = bñàs+"#, ê†°+"# + ™1 − ê†°f©"#x =ê†°bñà(+"#, +"#) + ™1 − ê†°fbñà(+"#, ©"#) = ê†°. These elements together constitute a bivariate normal 
distribution. 
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+"~ö[0,1] bñ≠Æ7ó+Ø7	+"# = ∞#áH+", ∞ ≠ 0,1, ≤ñó	7 = 1, 2,… , 8 
where ∞ governs the serial correlation of errors within individuals and is fixed at 0.5 in all 
the simulations. Note that it is important that ∞ is not equal to 0 or 1, because otherwise 
there would be no variation in errors within individuals , and +"# would be completely 
absorbed in the same manner as the individual fixed effect )", in which case no random 
errors would be left in the model. 
For clustered standard errors, we focus on models without endogeneity only, i.e. ê†° = 0. Then by construction,  +"#, à"#~. ≥û00¢û∞#áH 00 1¢¥ 
 
Step 3: Generate instrumental variable µ"# from a uniform distribution, as follows: ïñó	, = 1, 2,… ,., 7 = 1, 2,… , 8, µ"#~10 ∗ ö[0,1] 
Step 4: Generate control variable '"# that is potentially endogenous ïñó	, = 1, 2, … ,., 7 = 1, 2,… , 8 '"# = µ"# + êëíìH ∗ )" + êëíìf ∗ *# + à"#	
where the control variable is a linear combination of instruments, two fixed effects and an 
error term, with êëíìH and êëíìf indicating the correlation between control variable and 
each of the two fixed effects.  
Step 5: Construct outcome variable !"#  according to the following process. !"# = 2 ∗ '"# + )" + *# + +"# 
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Note that '"# is endogenous if +"# (and thus '"#) and à"# are correlated. Otherwise, '"# is exogenous. In both cases, we construct unbalanced data by randomly selecting M 
observations to drop from the balanced data. 
B. Variations in Parameters 
Our simulation model according to (1) defines 7 random variables {!, ', µ, ), *, +, à} and 6 parameters {., 8, êëíìH, êëíìf, ê†°, î}. We estimate both OLS 
and 2SLS models with multiple fixed effects. We estimate each model using our iteration 
procedure and compare it with the LSDV estimate or equivalently estimate from the 
optimal Within transformation output by Stata.47 
We conduct simulations by varying one parameter at a time while keeping other 
parameters fixed at the baseline values, as shown in Table 2-2. The baseline is {., 8, êëíìH, êëíìf, ê†°,î} = {1000, 100, 0.2, 0.25, 0, 0} for OLS and {., 8, êëíìH, êëíìf, ê†°,î} = {1000, 100, 0.2, 0.25, 0.6, 0} for 2SLS models. We explore 
variations along (1) sample size 8(10, 100), (2) correlation between the control variable 
and fixed effects êëíìH(0.2, 0.6), and (3) number of missing observations î(0, 500, 
5000). For 2SLS models, we additionally simulate the correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the error term, ê†°, at 0.6 and 0.2. Finally, we examine OLS 
models with and without clustered standard errors. In this ceteris paribus analysis, we 
test on the robustness of our algorithm and the relationship between each parameter and 
the convergence speed. The relevant discussion and investigation on improving our 
algorithm will be presented in our future work. 																																																								
47 We use Stata’s built-in programs reghdfe to output results as our benchmark. 
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C. Results 
Table 2-3 shows the simulation results. Consistent with the analytical model, we 
find that for balanced data, convergence happens after the first iteration. The unbalanced 
model converges after the second or third iteration depending on the specific data 
structure. Furthermore, other things being equal, estimates using smaller samples are less 
precise as evident in bigger standard errors. In our specific data generating process, 
changing the correlation between control variable and fixed effects does not affect model 
estimation. Finally, the iterative results match well with the Stata default output, 
including standard errors that match with the Stata default outputs for all the variations of 
the model being examined here. 
IV. Empirical Example 
A. Health Plan Type Effects on Health Care Utilization 
We now illustrate the proposed method using US employer-sponsored health 
insurance market data to extend the analyses in Ellis and Zhu (2016).  
We use data from the Truven Health Analytics MarketScan® Research Databases 
from 2007 to 2011 that contain detailed claims information for individuals insured by 
large employers in the US. The analysis sample contains 1.4 million individuals, ages 21-
64, who are continuously insured from 2007 through 2011, with over 60 million 
treatment months for which we can assign an employer, a plan type, and a primary care 
physician (PCP). More details about construction of the analysis sample can be found in 
Ellis and Zhu (2016). The extension of their results in this paper is that we include 
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150,000 primary care physician (PCP) fixed effects in addition to the 1.4 million 
individual and 3,000 county fixed effects, so that plan effects control not only for 
individual and geographic variation, but also in the specific PCPs seen by each consumer.  
We estimate the health plan type effects on the monthly utilization of health care 
(more specifically, the probability of seeking care in a month) using the following linear 
specification. 
                    	∂"# = )∑∏π.∫ + %Ö",#áH + ü" + ªº + Ωæ + *# + ∞ìøí	 + 	¿"#	        (3) 
where	∂"# is the dependent variable for consumer i in month t. Five plan dummies, ∑∏π.∫, are included one for each plan type {EPO, HMO, POS, COMP, CDHP/HDHP}. 
The omitted plan type is PPO, and hence the estimated coefficients ) give the plan type 
effects as a difference from PPOs.48 We control for an enrollee’s health status49 Ö",#áH , 
enrollee fixed effects ü", primary care physician fixed effects ªº, employee county fixed 
effects Ωæ , and monthly time fixed effects *#. In addition, we include 
employer*year*family coverage fixed effects ∞ìøí , in the regression to control for the 
fact that the underlying employer characteristics may make them more or less likely to 
offer each plan type.  
To deal with endogeneity of plan type choice, we instrument observed individual 
plan type choice by the simulated probabilities of the plan type chosen by the individual’s 
household. We estimate household choice of health plans by applying a multinomial logit 
																																																								
48 Plan type acronyms are: EPO (Exclusive Provider Organization), HMO (Health Maintenance 
Organization), POS (Point of Service, non-capitated), COMP (Comprehensive), and CDHP/HDHP 
(Consumer-Driven/High-deductible Health Plan), and PPO (Preferred Provider Organization). 
49 We use prospective model risk score predicting total spending estimated from the prior twelve months of 
diagnoses to capture the patient’s overall health status. 
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model separately for each employer*year*family coverage type combination, each 
controlling for the head-of-household age and gender, family size, whether a spouse is 
present, whether the household added a new baby in the previous twelve months, and the 
prospective model risk scores summed up for adults in the household predicting total 
spending. The predicted values tell us why individual i1 in one household is more or less 
likely than individual i2 in another household to be in plan type p at employer E in year Y 
in family coverage type F. It relies on household level variation in choices made, not 
employer variation in plan types offered or their premiums and benefits.  
Finally, the random error term ¿"# captures unobserved terms. In the estimation, 
we cluster standard errors at the employer*year*family coverage level to account for the 
possibility that individuals are likely to have similar risk factors (and thus health care 
utilization) within each employer*year*family coverage cell (i.e., “cluster”). 
Using equation (3), we identify the effects of plan innovations by the change in coverage 
for continuously eligible households. Individuals who do not change plan types in our 
sample are uninformative about the effects of plan type on decisions. 
B. Results 
Due to the size of this data, it is impossible to estimate the model unless at least 
three dimensions of FE are absorbed because apart from individual (about 1.4 million 
levels) and provider (about 150,000 levels) fixed effects, county fixed effects are also 
considered high dimensional (about 3,000 levels). Pending a proof, we conjecture that 
our algorithm laid out in Section 2 can be generalized to models with more than two fixed 
effects and leads to unbiased estimates.  
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Choosing how many fixed effects to absorb reflects a tradeoff between number of 
iterations and runtime. Generally, the more fixed effects absorbed, the more iterations 
needed for convergence (as convergence is generally harder to attain) while the faster 
each iteration is (by reducing the number of dummies variables in the model).  
Table 2-4 shows that narrow network plans (exclusive provider organizations, 
health maintenance organizations and point-of-service plans) reduce the probabilities of 
monthly provider contacts (by 11.1%, 5.7%, 3.6%, respectively) relative to preferred 
provider organization plans, suggesting that narrow networks may be more effective than 
cost sharing in reducing health care utilization. 
Figure 2-1 shows the convergence of estimates of five plan type effects and risk 
scores from regressing model (3) iteratively, with each iteration sequentially absorbing all 
five fixed effects. Number of iterations needed for convergence is significantly larger 
than that in the pseudo data, suggesting the important role of data structure in 
determining the speed of convergence. Examining the speed of convergence is a natural 
extension to this paper for future research. 
V. Conclusion 
We have presented a new estimation algorithm programmed in SAS that is 
particularly designed for models with multiple high-dimensional fixed effects and can 
accommodate additional data challenges such as large sample sizes and unbalancedness, 
under which features none of the existing SAS commands can feasibly handle. The core 
of our algorithm is to absorb fixed effects sequentially until they are asymptotically 
eliminated, which is straightforward and easy to implement. Monte Carlo simulations 
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show that our approach exactly matches results from estimating with fixed effect 
dummies in all the models. Furthermore, using our algorithm, it is feasible to estimate a 
model of health care utilization that involves 63 million observations from which we 
remove fixed effects for 1.4 million individuals, 150,000 distinct primary care doctors, 
3,000 counties, 465 employer-year-single/family coverage dummies and 47 monthly 
dummies. 
Our next steps include proving that our analytical results can be generalized to 
models with more than two high-dimensional fixed effects that correspond to the 
structure of our real data. However, the same results may hold under some “mild” 
conditions, the implications of which can help better understand the convergence process 
in our real data. Finally, future work will be devoted to investigating the efficiency 
properties of our algorithm (speed, memory, etc.), particularly in the cases where other 
existing commands are also feasible.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2-1. Comparison of programs 
  Clustered s.e. IV 
One 
HDFE 
2+ 
HDFE 
Big 
Data 
Stata 
ivregress X X    
a2reg   X X  
reghdfe X X X X  
SAS 
PROC GLM   X X X 
PROC SYSLIN  X   X 
PROC 
SURVEYREG X    X 
TSLSFECLUS X X X X X 
 
Notes: Table summarizes the capability of various existing Stata (i.e., ivregress, a2reg, 
reghdfe) and SAS (i.e., PROC GLM, PROC SYSLIN, PROC SURVEYREG) commands, 
in comparison to our iterative algorithm (i.e., TSLSFECLUS), in handling models with 
the listed features. HDFE stands for high-dimensional fixed effect.
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Table 2-2. Simulation parameters for two-way fixed effects model 
  N T êëíìH êëíìf ê†° M 
OLS 
balanced 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0 0 
1000 10 0.2 0.25 0 0 
1000 100 0.6 0.25 0 0 
OLS 
unbalanced 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0 500 
1000 10 0.2 0.25 0 500 
1000 100 0.6 0.25 0 500 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0 5000 
2SLS 
balanced 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0.6 0 
1000 10 0.2 0.25 0.6 0 
1000 100 0.6 0.25 0.6 0 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0.2 0 
2SLS 
unbalanced 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0.6 500 
1000 10 0.2 0.25 0.6 500 
1000 100 0.6 0.25 0.6 500 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0.2 500 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0.6 5000 
OLS w/ 
clustered s.e. 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0 0 
1000 100 0.2 0.25 0 500 
 
Notes: Table shows the parameter inputs for simulating the two-way fixed effects models 
described in (1) in Section 2 of the text. Parameters are defined as: N (number of 
individuals), T (number of time periods), êëíìH(correlation between the control variable 
and individual fixed effect), êëíìf (correlation between the control variable and time 
fixed effect), ê†° (correlation between the endogenous variable and the error term), and 
M (number of observations randomly selected to be dropped from the sample).  Each row 
is a separate simulation. We group simulations into five categories, with the first row in 
each category (except for the last category) showing the baseline parameter values. In 
each simulation, we change one parameter value while fixing the others at their baseline 
values. The last category simulates clustered standard error corrections (at the level of i) 
on the OLS models where all the parameters are set at their baseline values.  
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Table 2-3. Simulation results 
parameters model TSLSFECLUS (tol=10-4) Stata reghdfe 
Coeff. s.e. iteration # Coeff. s.e. 
Baseline ols bal 1.9994 0.0010 1 1.9994 0.0010 
ols unbal 1.9993 0.0010 2 1.9993 0.0010 
2sls bal 1.9989 0.0011 1 1.9989 0.0011 
2sls unbal 1.9989 0.0011 2 1.9989 0.0011 
         
T=10  ols bal 2.0036 0.0034 1 2.0036 0.0034 
ols unbal 2.0036 0.0035 3 2.0036 0.0035 
2sls bal 2.0043 0.0036 1 2.0043 0.0034 
2sls unbal 2.0049 0.0037 2 2.0049 0.0037 
         êëíìH=0.6 ols bal 1.9994 0.0010 1 1.9994 0.0010 
ols unbal 1.9993 0.0010 2 1.9993 0.0010 
2sls bal 1.9989 0.0011 1 1.9989 0.0011 
2sls unbal 1.9989 0.0011 2 1.9989 0.0011 
         
M=5000 ols unbal 1.9993 0.0011 2 1.9993 0.0011 
2sls unbal 1.9989 0.0011 2 1.9989 0.0011 
         ê†°=0.2 2sls bal 1.9989 0.0011 1 1.9989 0.0011 
2sls unbal 1.9989 0.0011 2 1.9989 0.0011 
         
Clustered s.e. ols bal 2.00008 0.00011 1 2.00001 0.00012 
ols unbal 2.00008 0.00012 2 2.00001 0.00012 
 
Notes: Table shows the simulation results (including the coefficient and standard error 
estimates) on the 18 models described in Table 2-2, using both our iterative algorithm 
(i.e., TSLSFECLUS) and reghdfe. Baseline parameters are N=1000, T=100, êëíìH=0.2, êëíìf=0.25. Clustered standard error corrections, used in the last two rows, are at the 
level of i. 
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Table 2-4. Health plan type effects on health care utilization 
  Pr(any visit)   
EPO -0.111 ** 
 
(0.053) 
 HMO -0.057 *** 
 
(0.015) 
 POS -0.036 ***  
 
(0.009) 
 COMP 0.051 
 
 
(0.043) 
 CDHP/HDHP 0.005 
 
 
(0.021) 
 Prospective risk score 0.024 ***  
 
(0.001) 
    
Dep. Var. Mean 0.321 
 Observations 62,899,584 
 
 
  
Notes: Table shows the 2SLS estimates of health plan type effects on the probability of 
seeking care. Plan acronyms are defined as: EPO (Exclusive Provider Organization), 
HMO (Health Maintenance Organization), POS (Point of Service, non-capitated), COMP 
(Comprehensive), and CDHP/HDHP (Consumer-Driven/High-deductible Health Plan). 
PPO (Preferred Provider Organization) is the omitted plan type. The annual prospective 
risk score is the predicted total spending using the prior 12 months of diagnoses. 
Regression also controls for individual fixed effects, PCP fixed effects, employee county 
fixed effects, employer*year*family coverage fixed effects, and monthly time fixed 
effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of employer-year-
single/family coverage type. *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10.
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Figure 2-1. Convergence of estimates of health plan type effects on health care utilization 
Notes: Figure shows the convergence of 2SLS estimates of health plan type effects on the probability of seeking care. Each 
plan type estimate is normalized by its value at the last iteration (i.e., iteration 237). PPO (Preferred Provider Organization) is 
the omitted plan type. The underlying regression controls for individual fixed effects, PCP fixed effects, employee county 
fixed effects, employer*year*family coverage fixed effects, and monthly time fixed effects, a prospective model risk score 
predicting total spending using the prior 12 months of diagnoses. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorems and Corollary 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
Define the T-by-1 vector of remaining time fixed effects at k-th iteration as: 
!(#) = &!'(#)⋮!)(#)* ∀r = 1,2,… , T, from equation (2) 
!2(#3') ≡ 1‖62‖7 1‖89‖7 !:(#):∈)<9∈=>
= 1∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB' 71(C ∈ 62) ∙ E 1∑ 1(F ∈ 89))GB' 71(H ∈ 89)!:(#)):B' I=9B'
=77 1(C ∈ 62)1(H ∈ 89)∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB' ∑ 1(F ∈ 89))GB'=9B' !:(#)):B' =7J2:!:(#)):B'  
Then the linear system of the remaining fixed effect between adjacent iterations is as 
follow: !(#3') = Λ!(#) 
where the linear transformation T-by-T matrix Λ with (r,t) entry: 
J2: ≡7 1(C ∈ 62)1(H ∈ 89)∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB' ∑ 1(F ∈ 89))GB'=9B'  
In other word, the fixed effects at (k+1)th iteration are the weighted averages of fixed 
effects from k-th iteration and the weights satisfy the following two conditions. 
1. Summations within rows are 1, ∀r 
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7J2:):B' =77 1(C ∈ 62)1(H ∈ 89)∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB' ∑ 1(F ∈ 89))GB'=9B'):B' =7 1(C ∈ 62)∑ 1(H ∈ 89)):B'∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB' ∑ 1(F ∈ 89))GB'=9B'
=7 1(C ∈ 62)∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB'=9B' = 1 
2. 0 ≤ J2: ≤ 1, ∀N, H. Notice that under Assumption 1, this condition converts to 0 < J2: ≤ 1, ∀N, H. To see that J2: ≠ 0, use the relation 1(H ∈ 89) = 1(C ∈ 6:). 
J2: = 7 1(C ∈ 62)1(C ∈ 6:)∑ 1(@ ∈ 62)=AB' ∑ 1(F ∈ 89))GB'=9B' ≠ 0 
 
By assuming T finite, define Q# = max	{!'(#), … , !)(#)}X# = min	{!'(#), … , !)(#)} 		∀[ 
Then there exists N̅, a function of k, and 	N̅ ∈ {1,2,… , T}  s.t. 
Q#3' = !2̅(#3') =7J2̅:!:(#)):B' ≤7J2̅:Q#):B' = Q#  
Inequality holds by condition 2 and the last equality results from condition 1. 
Similarly we have X#3' ≥ X# ⇒ Q_ ≥ Q' ≥ ⋯ ≥ Q# ≥ Q#3' ≥ X#3' ≥ X# ≥ ⋯ ≥ X' ≥ X_ 
So {Q#}#B'a  and {X#}#B'a  are both monotonic and bounded. By Monotone Convergence 
Theorem, their limits exist and are finite. lim#→aQ# = Q	and	 lim#→aX# = X 
WTS: M = m, so fixed effects converge to constant. 
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Proof: 
By lim#→aQ# = Q	and	 lim#→aX# = X, ∀ε, ∃g'		F. H. ∀[ > g',			|Q# − Q| < l3 	∃gn		F. H. ∀[ > gn,			|X# −X| < l3 ∃go		F. H. ∀[', [n > go,			pQ#q − Q#rp < l6 J ∃gt		F. H. ∀[', [n > gt,			pX#q − X#rp < l6 J 
where λ ≡ min	{λ2:: λ2: ≠ 0}. By T being finite, λ > 0. Note that under Assumption 1, λ = min{λ2:} > 0. 
Let L = max{g', gn, go, gt} + 1, then ∀[', [n ≥ g 
⎩⎪⎪
⎨⎪
⎪⎧ pQ#q − Qp < l3pX#q −Xp < l3	pQ#q −Q#rp < l6 JpX#q − X#rp < l6 J
 
Without loss of generality, take [' = g, [n = g + 1. If at L-th iteration, time fixed effects 
are constant, it is trivial that this linear system is stabilized at this specific fixed point. 
Otherwise, there are two cases for !(}). 
(1) ∃H_	F. H.X} < !:~(}) < Q} 
(2) !:(#) = Q#X# 	∀H 
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In case (1), suppose N̅}	and	N}are such that Q}3' = ∑ J2̅Ä:!:(})):B'  and X}3' =∑ J2Ä:!:(})):B' . 
pQ#q −Q#rp = Q} −Q}3' = Q} −7J2̅Ä:!:(})):B' ≥ Q} − 7 J2̅Ä:Q}:Å:~ − J2̅Ä:~!:~(})= J2̅Ä:~(Q} − !:~(})) ≥ J(Q} − !:~(})) ⇒ Q} − !:~(}) < l6 
pX#q −X#rp = X}3' − X} =7J2Ä:!:(}) − X}):B' ≥ 7 J2Ä:X}:Å:~ + J2Ä:~!:~(}) − X}= J2Ä:~(!:~(}) − X}) ≥ J(!:~(}) − X}) ⇒ !:~(}) − X} < l6 
By these two inequalities: Q} −X} = Q} − !:~(}) + !:~(}) − X} < Ço 
In case (2), simply let H_ be such that !:~(}) = X} in either one of the inequalities, then Q} − X} < ÇÉ < Ço. |Q −X| ≤ |Q −Q}| + |Q} −X}| + |X} −X| < l3 + l3 + l3 = l 
So M = m.∎ 
 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
Model specification in matrix form: Ü = áà + âäã + âå! + ç 
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The estimator of à from this regression is the LSDV estimator, àé}èêë .  
In 1st iteration of our algorithm: 
1) Demean over i, the index of fixed effect ã QäÜ = Qäáà + Qäâå! +Qäç = Qäáà + âå! − íäâå! + Qäç= Qäáà + âå! + âäãì +Qäç 
where Q∙ denotes the annihilator matrix projecting the variables to the orthogonal space 
of some corresponding dummy variables, e.g. Qä = î − íä = î − âä(âäï âä)ñ'âäï . By 
Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) Theorem, the estimator from this regression model is 
identical to àé}èêë . 
2) Demean over t, the index of fixed effect ! QåQäÜ = QåQäáà +Qåâäãì +QåQäç = QåQäáà +QåQäâå! +QåQäç QåQäâå! = âäãì + âå!ó represents the remaining fixed effects after 1 iteration.  ãì = −(âäï âä)ñ'âäï âå! !ó = (âåïQäâå)ñ'âåï íäâå! 
Applying FWL Theorem once again on the above model, the estimator of à	remains 
identical to àé}èêë . Due to the remaining two-way fixed effects, we can apply FWL 
Theorem continuously for each demeaning in our iteration process. The estimator from 
each iteration with the correct specification of regression model should be the same as àé}èêë . 
 
In k-th iteration of our algorithm: 
The correct specification of model is 
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Üì(#) = áì(#)à + âòå(#)! + çì(#) 
where   áì(#) = (QåQä)#á Üì(#) = (QåQä)#Ü âòå(#) = (QåQä)#âå çì(#) = (QåQä)#ç 
Denote Qò(#) = î − âòå(#)(âòå(#)′âòå(#))ñ'âòå(#)′  and transform the model to  Qò(#)Üì(#) = Qò(#)áì(#)à +Qò(#)çì(#) 
and by FWL Theorem, the estimator with absorption of remaining fixed effects is  àéöõú(#) = ùáì(#)ïQò(#)áì(#)ûñ'áì(#)ïQò(#)Üì(#) ≡ àé}èêë, ∀k. 
 
However, under our regression specification without remaining fixed effects, the OLS 
estimator from this iteration is as following: àé(#) = ùáì(#)ïáì(#)ûñ'áì(#)ïÜì(#) 
 
We only need to show àé(#) → àéöõú(#) = àé}èêë , as k → ∞. 
Proof:  
The remaining fixed effects âòå(#)! = (QåQä)#âå! = âäãì(#) + âå!ó(#) → 0 for any 
arbitrary !, as a result of Theorem 1. It implies that âòå(#) → 0 as k → ∞. Hence Qò(#) → I 
and àé(#) → àéöõú(#) .	∎ 
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Proof of Corollary 1: 
When the OLS estimator from each iteration converges to the LSDV estimator, the 
regression model is correctly specified and the OLS estimator is unbiased. The bias of 
remaining fixed effects is 0, which indicates that the remaining fixed effects are 
eliminated or equivalently there is no longer omitted fixed effect variables in the 
regression error. As a result, the remaining fixed effects have converged to constant once 
the OLS estimator converges to LSDV estimator. This also shows that the convergence of 
remaining fixed effects is at least as fast as that of OLS estimator.	∎ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3: 
By Theorem 2, estimates from Step 3 are calculated as results of LSDV estimator, which 
are unbiased, consistent and efficient. ∎ 
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Appendix B: Practical Implementation of TSLSFECLUS Algorithm 
Our algorithm is programmed in SAS for ease of implementation. The main macro that 
performs the iterative procedure is TSLSFECLUS. This macro can accommodate a wide 
range of model features such as endogeneity, cluster standard error correction, and 
multiple high-dimensional fixed effects. In addition, it allows multiple specifications that 
differ only in their dependent variables to be estimated in a single call. Finally, the macro 
automatically outputs the number of iterations needed for model convergence together 
with the model estimates. The macro mainly contains the following four steps. 
1): Given model specification, identify multiple high-dimensional fixed effects to absorb. 
Set the values of maximum number of iteration Q¢áCH£N and the tolerance level H§•.  
2): Absorb fixed effects from all dependent and explanatory (including instrumental) 
variables, one by one until all the fixed effects are absorbed once. Save standardized data ¶', and the estimated parameters of interest from model ¶', labeled as {àé(')#}#B',n,…,ß . 
3): Repeat step 2) and record ¶n, and obtain {àé(n)#}#B',n,…,ß from estimating the model 
using ¶n. 
4): Calculate |∆n| = max	{| ©™(r)´ñ©™(q)´©™(q)´ |}#B',n,…,ß , the maximum absolute value of 
percentage difference between adjacent iterations among K estimated parameters of 
interest. If |∆n| < H§•, then stop here and report coefficient estimates {àé(n)#}#B',n,…,ß; 
otherwise, repeat step 2) until |∆9| = max	{| ©™(<)´ñ©™(<¨q)´©™(<¨q)´ |}#B',n,…,ß < H§• or the 
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maximum number of iterations have been reached. The reported number of iteration = min	{C = {C||∆9| < H§•}, Q¢áCH£N}. 
 
Below is a sample call of our two macros in SAS. The second macro can be called 
directly if only one iteration is desired, such as if there is only one high-dimensional fixed 
effect: 
Libname junk “directory for storing temporary data sets”; 
%auto_iter( 
indsn = in_data,                            /* input data */  
tol = 0.0001,                                 /* tolerance level for convergence */  
maxiter = 10,                                /* maximum number of iteration */  
betasefinal = out_data,                 /* output data for storing estimates from all iterations */  
fevarcount = 3,                             /* number of absorbed fixed effects */  
auto_tempdir = junk,                    /* directory for storing temporary data sets */  
auto_depvar = y,                           /* dependent variable */ 
auto_endog = x,                             /* endogenous variable */ 
auto_inst = z,                                 /* instrumental variable */ 
auto_exog = ,                                 /* exogenous variable */  
auto_fe = i c t,                                /* variables defining absorbed fixed effects */ 
auto_FE_iter = 1,                           /* incremental on iteration number */ 
auto_cluster = c,                             /* variable defining cluster level */  
auto_othervar = ,                            /* other variables to be carried along to final dataset           
                                                        for final analysis */  
auto_regtype = TSLS,                    /* TSLS or OLS */ 
auto_showmeans = no,                   /* yes or no to showing sample summary statistics */  
auto_showrf = no,                           /* yes or no to showing reduced form results of TSLS  
                                                        model */ 
auto_showols = no,                         /* yes or no to OLS without cluster correction */  
auto_dosurveyreg = no,                  /* yes or no to doing PROC SURVEYREG */ 
auto_wide = no                               /* yes or no to wide format table */ 
);  
 
*which calls the following core macro iteratively; 
%TSLSCLUS_iterFE( 
runtitle = "TSLS: one fixed effect",   /* running title */ 
indata = in_data,                                  /* input data for each iteration: &indsn. for the first  
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                                                        iteration, standardized data for subsequent iterations */ 
depvar = y,                                      /* dependent variable */ 
endog = x,                                       /* endogenous variable */ 
inst = z,                                           /* instrumental variable */ 
exog = ,                                           /* exogenous variable */  
fe = i c t,                                          /* variables defining absorbed fixed effects */ 
FE_iter = 1,                                     /* incremental on iteration number */ 
cluster = c,                                       /* variable defining cluster level */  
othervar = ,                                      /* other variables to be carried along to final dataset  
                                                         for final analysis */  
tempdir = junk,                                /* directory for storing temporary data sets */  
regtype = TSLS,                              /* TSLS or OLS */ 
showmeans = no,                             /* yes or no to showing sample summary statistics */  
showrf = no,                                    /* yes or no to showing reduced form results of TSLS  
                                                         model */ 
showols = no,                                   /* yes or no to OLS without cluster correction */  
dosurveyreg = no,                            /* yes or no to doing PROC SURVEYREG */ 
wide = no,                                        /* yes or no to wide format table */ 
estresult = out_data                          /* data set for outputting estimates */  
); 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: BREADTH OF PROVIDER NETWORKS AND HEALTH 
CARE COSTS 
Wenjia Zhu 
Department of Economics, Boston University 
Abstract 
Selective provider contracting is a popular strategy for cost containment by US 
health plans. Selective contracting means consumers have access to a subset of providers 
in the market or have to pay a higher-tiered cost of access to providers not included in 
their plan’s selected network. While having important implications for health care costs, 
the effects of restricted provider choice have been understudied in part due to the 
challenge of obtaining reliable measures of breadth of these provider networks. 
This paper first develops a statistical method for inferring plan-level breadth of 
provider networks using claims data without relying on fully enumerating in- and out-of-
network providers for each plan for each market. To overcome the difficulty that health 
care providers are not observed when their services are unused, I develop a new statistical 
methodology that prioritizes high enrollment/low provider density markets where a plan’s 
provider breadth can be more reliably inferred. Using an instrumental variable strategy, in 
which endogenous plan choice is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice 
probabilities of other individuals in the same plan, I find that narrow network plans 
redirect patients but only modestly lower expected costs. A one standard deviation 
reduction in in-network providers per 1,000 patients in a plan (about 12 providers) 
corresponds to a $167 cost savings per year in outpatient services (about 6.9% of the 
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mean), although the effect is not significant (95% CI: -$274 to $622). The corresponding 
cost savings in in-network outpatient services are $770 per year (about 35% of the mean), 
driven by an average of 23% lower probability of seeking in-network care. Cost savings 
from narrower networks mainly accrue to patients as opposed to insurers and are larger 
for females and among working ages. I find no evidence that narrower network plans 
have lower provider prices, whether for all services or just for services that are paid in-
network, suggesting that narrow network plans are not successful in keeping low-cost 
providers. There is no evidence that narrower networks save inpatient spending. This 
paper adds new evidence to the existing literature on health plan supply-side strategies 
and has important implications for network regulations, optimal insurance plan design, 
and consumer welfare. 
Keywords: narrow networks, provider network breadth, health care utilization and 
spending
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I. Introduction 
Recent innovations in US health insurance markets feature two strategies for 
controlling costs and utilization. One is a demand-side strategy which aims to impose 
high cost sharing on the consumer side but maintain a generous size of provider network. 
Plans using this strategy include “high deductible” and “consumer-driven” health plans 
(HDHPs/CDHPs) that give patients free choice of providers but at higher cost sharing. 
The other is a supply-side strategy, in which insurers selectively contract with providers 
to whom consumers have access but minimize cost sharing on the consumer side. Plans 
that rely on this strategy are termed “narrow network” health plans. For example, Health 
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Exclusive Provider Organizations (EPOs) 
typically use selective contracting with a subset of doctors and hospitals in an area, while 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Point of Service (POS) plans generally 
allow access to a wider panel of providers with higher cost sharing for using providers 
outside of the negotiated network. 
Many previous studies have examined demand-side strategy in explaining 
consumer demand for health care (Manning et al. 1987; Eichner 1998; Duarte 2012; 
Aron-Dine, Einav, and Finkelstein 2013; Aron-Dine et al. 2015; Brot-Goldberg et al. 
2015; Kowalski 2016) and health care spending (Ryu et al. 2013; Vistnes, Selden, and 
Zawacki 2015), while much less work has studied the impacts of supply-side strategies. 
One explanation for this is the relative lack of reliable measures of breadth of provider 
networks: collecting panel size from physician directories is time-consuming, provider 
panels can vary by employer and change over time, and panel membership cannot be 
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calculated retrospectively using this approach. Of further concern is that simply because a 
physician is included in a panel does not mean that she is readily available or taking new 
patients50: both the number of physicians in a network plan and the number of enrollees 
using those providers matter for access. Finally, Point of Service (POS) and other tiered 
health plans do not necessarily prohibit going out of network, but only make it more 
expensive; this form of selective contracting is particularly hard to quantify. 
Here I propose a statistical rather than directory-based framework for inferring 
health plan provider breadth using claims level data and then use this approach to assess 
how provider network breadth influences health spending among the privately insured. 
The paper makes two new contributions in this area, one methodological, and one policy 
relevant. My methodological contribution is that this paper is among the first to infer 
rather than calculate explicitly the plan-level breadth of provider networks. A statistical 
approach has many advantages over a directory-based approach: (1) It is empirically 
much more accurate than simply using qualitative measure derived by health plan type 
categories (e.g., HMOs, PPOs, CDHPs), as have been widely used to tier plans by their 
provider network breadth. (2) It generates a measure of provider network breadth that can 
be consistently and easily defined across employers, health plans, market areas and time. 
Therefore it can be done retroactively recreating what the provider network was in some 
earlier sample period, whereas online physician directories are often poorly archived and 
inconsistent across health plans, geographical areas and time. (3) This approach does not 
																																																								
50 This can happen even in a relatively mature market like Medicare Advantage (Resneck et al. 2014; 
Jacobson et al. 2016). Also see the Kaiser Family Foundation report on Medicare Advantage hospital 
networks: http://kff.org/medicare/report/medicare-advantage-hospital-networks-how-much-do-they-vary/. 
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rely on insurers’ reports of physician directories with records of questionable accuracy 
(Resneck et al. 2014; Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2016). Holstein and Paul (2012) in 
particular discusses the phenomenon of “phantom networks”. Using claims data with 
actual visits rather than directories allows me to focus on the actual provider choices that 
consumers have and examine how that choice set affects both enrollment and health care 
utilization decisions. (4) The approach proposed here is readily applicable to other 
markets (e.g., Medicare Advantage) where medical claims are relatively accessible and 
will be useful for many other studies trying to look at diverse consequences (e.g., health 
outcomes) of selective contracting. 
The policy contribution of this paper is that it adds new evidence to the existing 
literature on the cost consequences of health plan supply-side strategies. Besides echoing 
previous literature that overall narrow network plans modestly lower costs of outpatient 
care, my paper finds distributional effects of narrow network plans. Cost savings in in-
network services are offset by increased spending for out-of-network services as a result 
of redirecting patients from in-network to out-of-network services. These higher costs on 
out-of-network services are borne by insurance companies while consumers pay less out 
of pocket in narrower network plans. Additionally, narrow networks save money 
(insignificantly) for outpatient services while increasing inpatient spending 
(insignificantly). Moreover, cost savings (in in-network services) from narrower 
networks are larger for females and among working ages (18-50 years old). My paper 
also finds no evidence that narrower network plans have lower provider prices, whether 
for all services or just for services that are paid in-network, suggesting that narrow 
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network plans are not successful in keeping low-cost providers. 
Narrow networks have the potential to influence health care costs through several 
important channels. The first is through patient selection into health plans. Under full 
information, sicker or more risk averse people tend to choose more generous plans, or 
people choose plans that offer more generous coverage when they are sicker. By limiting 
choice of providers in exchange for a lower premium, narrower network plans may attract 
particularly healthy and lower-cost people. The opposite may be true (i.e., sicker and 
higher-cost patients are attracted to narrower network plans) if people are poorly 
informed about provider networks. Second, conditional on enrollment, narrow networks 
may deter patients from seeking care by limiting access to providers and/or imposing 
higher prices to providers outside of the plan’s network. This may include both voluntary 
cuts (e.g., cutting down unnecessary care) and involuntary reductions (e.g., forgoing 
necessary care) in care seeking depending on whether people are fully informed about the 
networks when making plan choice decisions. The overall effect on the probability of 
seeking care depends on how increased costs of finding the right provider are weighed 
against reduced search costs in narrower provider panels. Third, narrow network plans 
may negotiate low fees with providers and direct consumers to these low-cost providers. 
Whether or not this strategy works depends on (1) information transparency on fees 
received by providers and paid by consumers, (2) consumer demand elasticities, and (3) 
bargaining power between insurers and health care providers. Finally, narrow network 
plans may discourage intensive medical use by providing incentives for providers to 
control quantities of care in order to stay in the network (Ma and McGuire 2002). 
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While having important implications for patient access to care and the cost of 
care, restricted provider choice has been understudied (AcademyHealth 2015), in part due 
to the challenge of obtaining reliable measures of provider network breadth. The method 
developed in this paper provides an alternative tool to identifying provider network 
breadth, without reliance on plan type definitions or insurer-provided provider 
directories. This approach enables researchers to evaluate the cost implications of plan 
benefit features at a finer level than plan types (e.g., HMOs, PPOs, CDHPs) and better 
capture the level of information used by consumers. 
In this paper, I first use the Truven Analytic’s MarketScan® Commercial Claims 
and Encounters Database 2007-2014 to develop a framework for inferring the breadth of 
provider network at the plan level. In claims level data, health care providers are only 
observed when their services are used. This means that in plans operating in sparsely 
populated areas, too few patients may be observed to reveal the full size of covered 
providers. To correct for this bias, I develop a new statistical methodology that prioritizes 
high enrollment/low provider density markets where a plan’s provider breadth can be 
more reliably inferred. The idea is that without information on which providers are 
actually covered but not seen, among two plans with the same number of providers 
(patients) observed, the one with more patients (fewer providers) observed is less likely 
to miss additional providers. Using provider network breadth inferred by this method, I 
find that health plan type categories (e.g., HMOs, PPOs) do not fully capture variations in 
plan-level provider network breadth; provider breadth varies both within and across plan 
types.  
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In the second part, I study the impact of provider network breadth on health care 
costs using an instrumental variable strategy, in which each individual’s plan network 
breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other 
individuals in the same plan. Individual choice probabilities are estimated from 
multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. I find that narrow 
network plans redirect patients but only modestly lower expected costs. A one standard 
deviation reduction in in-network providers per 1,000 patients in a plan (about 12 
providers) corresponds to a $167 cost savings per year in outpatient services (about 
6.87% of the mean), although the effect is not significant (95% CI: -$274 to $622). The 
corresponding cost savings in in-network outpatient services are $770 per year (about 
36% of the mean), driven by an average of 23% lower probability of seeking in-network 
care. There is no evidence in the data that narrower network plans have lower provider 
prices, whether for all services or just for services that are paid in-network. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies. 
In Section 3, I provide more institutional background on narrow provider networks and 
the US employer-sponsored health insurance market. I then describe the data and study 
samples in Section 4, and propose a methodology to estimate the plan-level provider 
network breadth using these data in Section 5. Section 6 lays out the empirical framework 
linking provider network breadth to health care costs. Section 7 presents the main results 
and conducts additional analyses. Finally, Section 8 concludes and discusses the policy 
implications. 
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II. Prior Studies on Provider Networks and Empirical Challenges 
This paper is related to a broad literature on networks in health insurance markets. 
Ma and McGuire (2002) study the effect of network creation on the quantity of services 
supplied to patients.51 Their focus is on the network incentives that make providers prefer 
staying in the network to being excluded from the network. Ho (2006) and Ericson and 
Starc (2015) estimate consumer valuation of narrow hospital networks, while Ho (2009) 
and Nosal (2016) focus on the formation of provider-insurer networks.52 These studies do 
not explicitly measure network breadth. Ericson et al. (2016) study the provider 
concentration in primary care physician’s referral networks to evaluate coordination 
between physicians and its impact on health care costs. Different from my paper, the 
focus of this paper is networks of providers, not networks that are selected for coverage 
by health plans. 
A recent paper by Gruber and McKnight (2016) examines cost savings by using 
limited network plans. In 2012, the Massachusetts state employees were offered financial 
incentives (no employee contribution required for the first three months of the year) to 
enroll in newly created limited network plans while the municipal employees were not 
given the option. Leveraging this quasi-experiment, Gruber and McKnight (2016) find 																																																								
51 Specifically, they examine a regime change in the Massachusetts Group Insurance market in 1993 that 
required health plans to carve out the behavioral health benefit and form provider networks to implement 
this regime. They find that creation of a network is associated with reduced number of outpatient visits per 
episode of care. 
52 Ho (2006) estimates the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice from consumer demand for health 
plans. Ericson and Starc (2015) infer consumer valuation of narrow hospital networks from (1) consumer 
demand for hospital services, and (2) consumer choice among insurance plans that differ in their breadth of 
hospital networks. Nosal (2016) discusses the formation of narrow provider networks using a two-sided 
matching framework and finds that the insurer-physician bargaining dynamics result in a less than optimal 
provider network breadth. 
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that people who switched to narrow network plans (about 10% switchers) spent about 
40% less in total health spending. Ellis and Zhu (2016) and Atwood and Lo Sasso (2016) 
estimate the effects of narrow networks by comparing enrollee spending in narrow 
network plans with that in non-narrow network plans.53 What is common in these studies 
is that they use pre-determined health plan types whose definitions may vary across 
insurers and employers. Also, comparison between plan types is not always feasible. 
Indeed, 83% of firms in the private employer-sponsored health insurance market offer 
only one plan type and only about half (55%) of covered workers have choice of more 
than one plan type.54  
Looking at plans offered on the Health Insurance Marketplace, Polsky and Weiner 
(2015a) and Polsky and Weiner (2015b) note that “health plan type is not a sufficient 
proxy for network size”. Hence they use the publicly available physician directories to 
directly gauge the physician network sizes (measured by the fraction of providers in a 
rating area that participate in the plan’s network). Recognizing that these public 
directories may not reflect the true accessibility (e.g., accept the plan or not) and 
availability (e.g., appointment wait time) of providers in a plan, they adopt a detailed 
algorithm to cross-check validity of physician information and focus on physicians who 
have matched records in multiple places. A similar strategy of resorting to public 
documentations to measure provider (hospital or physician) network size has been 
employed by many other recent studies on the Health Insurance Marketplace (Dafny et al. 
																																																								
53 Both papers control for endogenous plan choice by employing an instrumental variable (IV) strategy in 
which whether the employer offers a narrow network plan is used as an IV for enrollment in the plan.  
54 Kaiser Family Foundation: http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2015-section-four-types-of-plans-offered/  
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2016; McCullough et al. 2016; Polsky and Cidav 2016).  
In this paper, I take a different approach and develop an explicit measure of the 
plan-level breadth of provider networks. My method does not rely on the definition of 
plan types or the information contained in physician directories. In this sense, my work is 
closely related to Wallace (2015) that also infers provider network breadth using claims 
level data. What we differ is that instead of making assumptions about consumer utility 
from selecting a plan, I infer network breadth directly from patient use of providers in 
high enrollment/low provider density markets where a plan’s provider breadth can be 
more reliably inferred. 
III. Institutional Background 
A. Narrow Provider Networks in the US 
The concept of limiting provider choice in the US dates back to the 1980s, when 
California allowed selectively contracting with providers for Medicaid and private 
insurance (Zwanziger, Melnick, and Bamezai 2000). Over the last ten years, “narrow 
networks” are increasingly popular in many of the US health plans offered. Narrow 
network plans range from allowing no coverage for “out-of-network” providers to the 
“tiered network” arrangements in which consumers are held accountable for additional 
cost sharing when going out-of-network. According to a Kaiser Family Foundation 
survey, in 2015 about 33% of the large US employers (1,000-4,999 workers) offering 
health benefits to employees and their families have a “tiered network” in their largest 
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offered plan and about 7% of all the employers offer a narrow network plan.55 Narrow 
networks have also been increasingly deployed by plans in marketplaces such as the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) Health Insurance Marketplace (Polsky and Weiner 2015a; 
Polsky and Weiner 2015b) and Medicare Advantage (AcademyHealth 2015), with the 
discretion to offer “narrow network” plans regulated at both the federal and state levels.  
Narrow networks are attractive to insurers for several reasons. First, narrow 
networks allow insurers to hold down premiums in exchange for increased consumer 
enrollment. They do so by negotiating lower prices with providers and including only 
low-cost, high-efficiency providers in their networks. Second, insurers can use narrow 
networks, threatening to exclude certain providers, to manage supply-side moral hazard 
that causes too many or too few services to be supplied (Newhouse 2002). Third, narrow 
networks provide a tool for insurers to control health care costs. By influencing the 
availability of specific types of providers, narrow networks allow insurers to attract 
healthy, low-cost enrollees and dump sicker, high-cost enrollees. Given enrollment, 
narrow networks can also potentially cut costs down by deterring people from seeking 
care, encouraging use of in-network providers with reduced fees, and by inducing less 
intensive use of medical care. 
For consumers, choosing narrow network plans likely introduces a tradeoff 
between price (premium) and coverage (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Corlette et al. 
2014; McGuire 2016). On the one hand, price-sensitive consumers may be attracted to 
narrow network plans because they value lower premiums over plan coverage features 
																																																								
55 Kaiser Family Foundation: http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2015-summary-of-findings/  
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(Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 2016; Determann et al. 201656). On the other hand, 
ex post consumers may find themselves exposed to increased financial risks from adverse 
events due to low network quality (Corlette et al. 2014; Jacobson et al. 201657). Increased 
uncertainty of costs on consumers would arise especially when patients have no control 
over the treating providers.58 Under substantial information frictions, restrictive networks 
can hurt consumer welfare (Handel and Kolstad 2015; Handel 2015) as consumers are 
unable to make informed decisions based on full calculation of benefits.  
B. The US Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Market and Potential Selection Issues  
The US employer-sponsored health insurance market, originated from employer-
based group disability insurance and expanded during World War II, now covers about 
149 million non-elderly people59 or 55.4 percent of the US insured population60. Each 
year an employer preselects one or a set of health plans offered to employees61; 
employees in turn are required to make their plan selection for January 1 the next year. 
																																																								
56 Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor (2016) find that people may choose dominated health plans as a 
result of treating one dollar of premium and one dollar from cost sharing differently, which may be 
mitigated by improving the understanding of insurance design features. Using a discrete choice experiment, 
Determann et al. (2016) show population heterogeneity in the trade-off between narrow networks and lower 
premiums. In particular, lower premiums serve as a main consideration in plan choice among younger, 
healthier and lower income people, whereas a broad provider network is most valued by older, sicker and 
richer people. 
57 Both Corlette et al. (2014) and Jacobson et al. (2016) assess network adequacy of plans on markets 
featuring managed competition. Corlette et al. (2014) focus on health plan provider networks on the Health 
Insurance Marketplaces, whereas Jacobson et al. (2016) examine hospital networks of Medicare Advantage 
plans. 
58 There are emerging anecdotes of insured patients receiving surprise bills for out-of-network providers 
that patients are unaware of at the time of care (Lawsky 2012; Hamel et al. 2015). See more examples at 
The Kaiser Family Foundation: http://kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills/. 
59 Kaiser Family Foundation: http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2014-summary-of-findings/ 
60 http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-253.pdf  
61 This type of designation in plan offering is in contrast with managed competition prominent in other 
health insurance sectors such as the state Marketplace created under the ACA in which plans compete for 
enrollees while being regulated on coverage and premium categories (McGuire 2016). 
126 	
	
Once a health plan is chosen, switches during the year are not generally allowed except in 
cases of births, marriage, divorces, sabbaticals, and relocation. Empirically, I do not find 
any plans in the data in which the majority of switches occurred at a month other than 
January 1. I drop all enrollees switching between plans or having less than 12 months of 
eligibility during a calendar year. 
In this particular market, two selection issues can arise. Both point to the 
possibility that choice of plans may be influenced by health care use of enrollees, the 
objective of interest. First, employers do not randomly choose what plans to offer but 
could base their plan offerings on employee characteristics that affect health spending, 
although the association is found to be quantitatively small (Bundorf 2002). Second, 
given the available health plans offered (and thus given plan characteristics), employees 
are not randomly assigned plans but choose specific plans reflecting their household’s 
demographics, preferences and health needs, which translate into variations in expected 
health care spending (Meer and Rosen 2004; Busch and Duchovny 2005; Deb and 
Trivedi 2006). In other words, plan choice can be endogenous both across employees and 
within employee over time in that sicker or more risk averse people tend to choose more 
generous plans, or people choose plans that offer more generous coverage when sicker.  
As will be detailed in Section 6, to address employer selection of plans to offer, I 
control for employer*year*family coverage type (EYF) fixed effects in the empirical 
model to capture factors that may make an employer more likely to offer one plan over 
another. To address selection into plans by employees, I employ an instrumental variable 
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strategy in which each individual’s plan network breadth is instrumented by the mean 
predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan. 
C. Health Plan Types: Differential Incentives to Include Providers  
One approach to understanding the US employer-based health insurance market is 
to look at the health plan types offered in this market. Health plan types are categories of 
insurance policies that differ in the design of both financial (e.g., deductible, coinsurance, 
copay, stop-losses) and non-financial features (e.g., provider networks). In particular, 
health plan types differ in their incentives to include certain providers making them 
encourage or discourage use of specific health care services by consumers (Ellis, Martins, 
and Zhu 2016).   
At earlier times in this market, almost all large employers offered a single health 
plan now known as comprehensive plans (COMPs) with low demand-side cost sharing 
and essentially no restrictions on patient choice of providers (Ellis, Martins, and Zhu 
2016). Partly in reaction to high health care costs, plan types that utilize selective 
contracting with providers to reduce unnecessary care and services (a.k.a., narrow 
network plans) started to emerge in the 1980s. Narrow network plans negotiate reduced 
fees with certain providers who in turn attract increased patient volume in the area. 
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are the first innovation of this type, followed 
by Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) and Point of Service (POS) plans. HMOs 
typically use selective contracting with a subset of doctors and hospitals in an area and do 
not generally cover costs incurred by providers outside of the negotiated network (except 
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in HMOs with a POS option62), while PPOs and POS plans typically allow access to a 
wider panel of providers with higher cost sharing for using out-of-network providers.  
Over the last ten years, new health plan innovations have continued to emerge that allow 
employers to offer insurance benefits with even greater discretion. One plan type is 
Exclusive Provider Organizations (EPOs) that typically contract with a narrow panel of 
providers to whom consumers have access, although the distinction between EPOs and 
HMOs without a POS option might be blurred (Ellis and Zhu 2016). Among two other 
conceptually related plan types are consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs) and high 
deductible health plans (HDHPs) that allow much wider choice of providers but impose 
high demand-side cost sharing as reflected by high deductibles and/or high coinsurance 
rates after deductibles are met. Both plan types offer the option to set aside tax-free 
money for consumers to use exclusively for healthcare spending, but the money cannot 
be rolled over across years for HDHPs (which uses a “flexible spending account”) while 
it can for CDHPs (which adopts a “health savings account”). 
Besides incentives to include providers, plan types may be differentiated along 
other dimensions. Importantly, plan types vary widely in their cost sharing features. For 
example, while being selective on choice of providers, EPOs place relatively little 
demand-side cost sharing. By contrast, CDHPs and HDHPs place little restrictions on 
provider panels but demand significant cost sharing on the consumer side. This reflects a 
more general trade-off observed in the data: Plans offering more generous provider 
																																																								
62 See Corlette et al. (2014) Table 1. 
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networks are in general more restrictive in cost sharing, and vice versa, reflecting a 
balancing of supply- and demand-side tools to manage care (Appendix Table 3-15).  
IV. Data and Study Samples 
I use eight years of Truven Analytic’s MarketScan® Commercial Claims and 
Encounters Database between 2007 and 2014. This dataset contains detailed diagnosis 
and service utilization information on a quarter of the US population insured through 
their employment.63 As detailed in the previous section, the US employer-based health 
insurance market is a well-established market with considerable product differentiation. 
A wide range of health plan types are offered on this market including comprehensive 
plans, exclusive provider organizations (EPOs), health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), non-capitated point-of-service (POS), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 
and consumer-driven/high deductible health plans (CDHPs/HDHPs).  
A key feature of this dataset is that for enrollees receiving services/procedures, we 
have some information about who performs the services/procedure, when and where the 
service/procedure is conducted, and how much it costs. Various forms of costs are 
documented in the MarketScan® database – the total cost of a service after applying fee 
schedules and discounts paid to providers, including out-of-pocket costs (deductible, 
copay and/or coinsurance) paid by consumers and those paid by insurers (Truven Health 
MarketScan® Research Database). This rich cost information allows me to parse the 
																																																								
63 Among the 149 million non-elderly people covered by employer-based health insurance 
(http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2014-summary-of-findings/) in 2013, MarketScan covers more than 40 
million people. This amounts to over a quarter of the population. 
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empirical effects of narrow network plans on health care spending into those driven by 
insurers versus those driven by consumers. 
I focus on outpatient services, services that are incurred in a doctor’s office, 
hospital outpatient facility, emergency room, or other outpatient facilities (Truven Health 
MarketScan® Research Database) so that hospitals performing inpatient services are 
excluded. Two types of samples are constructed, a “modeling sample” and an “analysis 
sample”. The modeling sample uses the outpatient claims data between 2008 and 2014 to 
construct the provider network measure. Starting with 400 million outpatient services 
records, I drop claims without identifiable plan keys or plan types, and those that are 
labeled as laboratory. The data are then aggregated to the plan-year-market area -provider 
specialty level. I use Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to define a market area. 
Specifically for metropolitan areas, I use the MarketScan originally assigned MSAs, and 
for rural areas, I assign values using state identifiers so that all rural areas in a state are 
coded as if they are separate MSAs. I use MSA for shorthand, but it does not restrict to 
only metropolitan areas. For provider specialty, I map 27 provider specialties from the 
detailed classification of provider types in the data, which closely follows Ellis and 
McGuire (2007) and Ellis, Jiang, and Kuo (2013). See a list of mapped provider 
specialties in Appendix Table 3-18. 
Importantly, the geographic information is associated with consumers but not 
health care providers. This distinction is important to make because a long-standing 
concern in the health care market competition literature is the determination of market 
boundaries in the competition measurement. For example, using physical boundaries such 
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as MSA and Hospital Referral Region (HRR) to describe the market structure of health 
care providers can be ad hoc, resulting in measures being very sensitive to how 
boundaries are defined (Dranove and Ody 2016). This introduces measurement errors in 
the competition measurement to bias the estimated effect of competition (Zwanziger, 
Melnick, and Bamezai 2000). 
Here since MSAs used in this paper are for consumers but not for providers, my 
analysis does not restrict the boundary of providers that consumers have access to. 
Rather, MSAs are used here to define a plan64; a plan serving two residential MSAs are 
considered as two different plans. Using patient geographic information to define plans, 
however, does have consequences on how well the size of provider network can be 
measured. In Section 4.2, I provide an example to further elaborate this point.  
Moreover, because provider IDs are frequently missing, I focus on plan-year-
MSA-provider specialty cells in which provider IDs are present for at least 70% of the 
claims and cells that have at least 10 identified providers and 2 identified in-network 
providers. Also excluded are cells in which total payment is negative. The final sample 
size is 70,547 plan-year-MSA-provider specialty cells, of which I select 3,672 plans for 
the “modeling sample” (Section 5.4).65 
To examine the impact of provider network breadth on health care utilization, I 
construct an “analysis sample” that pulls out all the individuals associated with the plans 
in the “modeling sample.” All types of claims including inpatient, outpatient, and 
																																																								
64 MSAs have the advantage of “extending beyond the limit of a central city thus better reflecting the 
medical referral base for covered population seeking services” (Resneck et al. 2014). 
65 Comprehensive plans are excluded due to its tiny market sizes in this sample. 
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prescription drug services between 2007 and 2014 are used to generate an annual 
prospective health risk score for each individual.66 Because risk scores are generated 
prospectively, the data in 2007 are dropped for the final analysis. Following Ellis, 
Martins, and Zhu (2016), I further restrict the sample to individuals (1) whose data are 
submitted by employers (as opposed to health plans), (2) who are enrolled for at least 
three years in the sample period, (3) who stay in the same plan throughout the year, (4) 
who are not enrolled in capitated plans or having capitated payments at any time in a 
year67, and (5) whose risk scores are non-missing (missing risk scores can occur for 
reasons such as invalid diagnosis codes). The final analysis sample has 1,929,016 
individual years.  
V. Inferring the Breadth of Provider Networks 
A. Definition, Goal and Implementation Challenges  
Denote p as plan, m as MSA, s as provider specialty.68 Using an asterisk to denote 
the true (unobserved) number of providers, I define plan p’s coverage for specialty s as J≠ÆG = ßØ∞±∗ 	ß∞±∗ , where ≥ÆG∗  is the number of providers of specialty s that are covered by 
any plan serving people who reside in m, among which ≥≠ÆG∗  providers are covered by 
plan p. In the claims data, both ≥≠ÆG∗  and ≥ÆG∗  are measured with error: providers are 
observed only when their services are used. Indeed, I find in my data that many providers 																																																								
66 The type of risk score used here is the annual prospective model relative risk score, predicting total 
spending estimated from individual demographics (age and gender) and the prior year of diagnoses to 
capture the individual’s overall health status. The score is a relative measure because it is scaled by the 
mean spending of all the individuals in the prediction year. 
67 I impose this restriction because capitation claims do not report the actual fees paid to providers. 
68 A plan is a plan-year combination. For parsimony, year is suppressed in all the notations henceforth. 
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are rarely accessed; it is common to have plans in which a substantial proportion of 
providers are seen by only one patient in a year (see Figure 3-1). 
Let ≥≠ÆG and ≥ÆG denote the observed values for ≥≠ÆG∗  and ≥ÆG∗ . Assume that ≥ÆG = ≥ÆG∗ , i.e., providers observed for all the plans serving area m constitute the 
universe of all the providers that consumers living in m have potential access to. Then the 
variation in ≥≠ÆG, the number of observed providers associated with plan p, is driven by 
(1) plan-level provider network breadth, (2) other plan characteristics (e.g., average 
health status of enrollees in plan, market structure of the area served by plan), and (3) 
observational bias coming from the fact that for plans operating in sparsely populated 
areas, too few patients may be observed to reveal the full size of covered providers. To 
infer the breadth of provider networks, the goal is to remove from ≥≠ÆG biases coming 
from (2) and (3). 
To remove the bias in (3), one strategy would be to use a maximum likelihood 
model to back out each plan’s true size of provider network including those who are 
covered but never seen in the sample period. The idea is that although not all the 
providers covered by a plan are observed, the distribution of patients among observed 
providers can be informative about how likely we miss providers who are actually 
covered but not seen. Under certain assumptions and given ≥ÆG∗ , the number of providers 
of specialty s that can be potentially covered, J≠ÆG is then chosen to maximize a 
likelihood model for each plan p that captures the probability of observing a particular 
distribution of patients among the universe of providers (with providers not observed 
assigned 0 in the distribution). 
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However, even if ≥ÆG = ≥ÆG∗  is assumed, it is infeasible to get a reliable value for ≥ÆG. The reason is that in the MarketScan data, providers are only uniquely identified 
within plans but not across plans. It means that distinct provider IDs identified in 
different plans can be associated with a single provider. Therefore, simply counting the 
distinct provider IDs in an MSA would overestimate the universe of providers in a way 
that is unknown to researchers.69  
B. Proposed Remedy 
Here I propose an alternative strategy to gauge the size of provider network at the 
plan level. I first make the following two assumptions. 
Assumption 1: All providers within a given specialty (e.g., primary care, cardiology, 
psychiatry or psychology) in a plan serving an area within the same in-network versus 
out-of-network status are equally likely to be chosen by patients. 
Assumption 2: Given a provider specialty, patients are independent in care seeking 
decisions (i.e., one patient seeing a doctor is independent of another patient seeing the 
same or a different doctor). In other words, observed distinct patients can be considered 
as independent draws of providers within provider specialty. 
Under Assumption 1 and 2, I propose the following three steps. 
																																																								
69 One remedy would be to draw additional information about area-provider specialty-specific provider size 
from a different data source. One candidate data set is the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) that carries 
information about the availability of providers broken into health professions up to 2014. Yet it is not clear 
how provider specializations are defined and aggregated and thus linking it to the current data set is tricky. 
An alternative data set, the Massachusetts All Payer Claims Database (MA APCD), has the advantage of 
having consistent provider IDs across carriers. The problem is that product IDs that defines the actual plan 
a person is inaccurate, and can change as the person receives services from different providers (e.g., 
hospitals). This is probably why in a random sample of 10,000 enrollees in MA APCD, there are about 
9,400 different products. 
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Step 1: Given a plan p in MSA m, for each observed provider specialty s, calculate a rank 
index describing the reliability of directly counting the number of providers, ≥≠ÆG, from 
the data. 
Step 2: Select a sample of plans that is restricted to where the rank index is above a pre-
specified threshold. 
Step 3: Estimate the breadth of provider network by running regressions that adjust for 
other aspects of the biases (e.g., geographic variations, enrollee selection into plans).  
Recall three factors driving the variation in ≥≠ÆG. Step 2 serves to minimize the bias 
coming from (3) and Step 3 aims to minimize that coming from (2). 
C. Understanding the Method: A Hypothetical Example 
Before describing the details of the above steps, I first illustrate my methodology 
by an example. In Table 3-1, B and M denote two plans serving residents in Boston-
Cambridge-Newton (Massachusetts, USA) MSA and Manchester-Nashua (New 
Hampshire, USA) MSA, respectively. Subscript numbers correspond to distinct patients 
observed in plans. W, X, Y and Z are four distinct doctors of a given specialty. Assume 
that both plans have doctors X, Y and Z included in their networks. In addition, Plan M 
covers a local doctor W who is not accessible to Plan B so that Plan M has a broader 
provider network than Plan B.  
The combinations of letters and numbers in cells represent observed patient-
provider interactions associated with plans. Hence Plan B has three patients observed 
who see doctors X, Y and Z, while Plan M has two patients observed which reveals doctor 
Z but not X or Y. If we use observed providers to measure network breadth, it would look 
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like that Plan B's network = {X, Y, Z} and Plan M's network = {W, Z}, i.e., this simple 
counting results in an underestimation of Plan M’s size of provider network. Since 
providers are not uniquely identified across plans in my data (i.e., providers get distinct 
provider IDs for each plan they are included), it is impossible to assess this possibility 
from the data.  
In practice, there may be several reasons why doctors X and Y are not observed in 
Plan M. One is that Plan M may be less generous compared to Plan B, inducing relatively 
healthier people to enroll in Plan M who do not seek care often. Another possibility is 
that doctor X or Y have more competitors in Manchester-Nashua than in Boston for 
his/her specialization. There can also be a pure statistical reason that Plan M is operating 
in a relatively sparsely populated area, so that too few patients are observed to reveal the 
universe of covered providers.70 
My methodology outlined in Section 5.2 attempts to address these possibilities in 
two stages. In the first stage, I select a sample of plans that are missing unobserved 
providers at a relatively low probability. The intuition behind the sampling strategy is that 
given a fixed number of providers observed, with sufficiently many patients observed, the 
statistical bias will be controlled to a minimum. Then the second stage uses a regression 
framework to predict size of provider network on the selected sample by further 
correcting for geographic variations in market competition (MSA fixed effects), 
differentiation across specializations (provider specialty fixed effects) and patient 																																																								
70 In 2014, Greater Boston has a population density of 12,900 people per square mile 
(http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/boston-population/), while Manchester–Nashua has a density 
of 458 people per square mile (http://www.bestplaces.net/people/metro/new_hampshire/manchester-
nashua). 
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selection into plans (health risk scores). The residuals from the regression are then used 
as the basis for gauging the size of provider networks at the plan level. 
D. Details on the Proposed Method 
Construct a Rank Index  
Recall that ≥≠ÆG∗ 	is the true number of distinct providers of specialty s covered in-
network by plan p serving MSA m. Denote 6≠ÆG as the total number of distinct patients 
observed in plan p. Consider the following thought experiment. 
Among a sample of ≥≠ÆG∗  providers, we draw providers one at a time, with 
replacement, for 6≠ÆG times, i.e., distinct patients are considered as a random draw of 
distinct providers. Then by Assumption 1, the probability that a specific in-network 
provider of specialty s in plan p in MSA m being chosen by a specific patient is ¥≠ÆG × 'ßØ∞±∗ , where ¥≠ÆG is the probability that patients see in-network providers of 
specialty s in plan p in MSA m. Empirically, I parameterize ¥≠ÆG using the proportion of 
claims that are paid in-network. 
Let ∂≠ÆG be the probability that a specific in-network provider of specialty s in 
plan p in MSA m being chosen at least once given that patients see in-network providers 
of that specialty. Then we have, ∂≠ÆG = 1 − ∑1 − ¥≠ÆG × 'ßØ∞±∗ ∏=Ø∞± , by Assumption 1 
and Assumption 2.  
Define a rank index, π(∙), as the probability that at most one provider of a given 
specialty who is covered in-network is never seen, which consists of two possible cases: 
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(1) all providers in the plan are observed at least once, and (2) exactly one provider in the 
plan is never seen. 
Given that ≥≠ÆG∗  providers in total are covered by plan and that we observe 6≠ÆG 
patients, then by Assumption 2, we can express the formula for the rank index as: π≠ÆG ≡ πù6≠ÆG|≥≠ÆG∗ û = ∂≠ÆGßØ∞±∗ 	 + ≥≠ÆG∗ × ∂≠ÆGùßØ∞±∗ ñ'û(1 − ∂≠ÆG). 
Select Plans Based On the Rank Index 
After calculating the rank index for each plan for each provider specialty s, I then 
select plans in which for any of the observed specialties, the rank index for that specialty 
exceeds a pre-determined threshold, and then keep all observed specialties in those plans. 
In other words, plan p in MSA m is selected if ∫X ∈ {∫X:	π≠ÆG ≥ ª, ∀F}. 
Since we do not observe ≥≠ÆG∗ , we replace ≥≠ÆG∗  with ≥≠ÆG in the rank index 
formula. Note that πù6≠ÆG|≥≠ÆGû is strictly increasing in 6≠ÆG, so that setting a lower 
bound for πù6≠ÆG|≥≠ÆGû would be analogous to bounding 6≠ÆG from below.71 
Similarly, π(6≠ÆG|≥≠ÆG) is strictly decreasing in ≥≠ÆG, thus among two plans with the 
same number of distinct patients observed, the one with fewer providers observed will 
more likely to be chosen.72 Applying a cutoff of 0.7, I obtain a sample of 3,672 
observations at the plan-MSA-provider specialty level. 
Predict Plan-Level Size of Provider Network 
The final step is to predict the plan-level size of provider networks by adjusting 
for other biases such as geographic variation and enrollee selection into plans. To do this, 																																																								
71 See proof in Appendix B. 
72 See proof in Appendix B. 
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I estimate the following model at the plan-MSA-provider specialty level. Assuming that 
patients are repeated random draws of providers, I model the ratio of total number of 
distinct providers to the total number of patients as depending on these various sources of 
biases, and the size of provider network is then estimated by the (exponential of) 
residuals from the model. I choose the specification to closely follow the framework for 
evaluating network adequacy adopted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS 2014), as shown in equation (1). Another reason for using log specification is that 
it ensures that the predicted residuals are positive.  •§º(íN§Ω∫¢HN¢HC§≠ÆG) = ã ∙ æ≠ÆG + øÆ + ¿G + l≠ÆG                                                 (1) 
where íN§Ω∫¢HN¢HC§≠ÆG = ßØ∞±=Ø∞± is the number of observed distinct in-network providers 
per patient (rescaled to per 1,000 patients to facilitate the presentation and interpretation 
of the coefficients); æ≠ÆG includes (1) the number of patient visits capturing the fact that 
as we observe more claims in data, we are less likely to observe more providers who are 
distinct from whom we have already observed, and (2) average consumer risk scores in 
plan to control for severity of illness that causes one plan to have more patients seen than 
the other; øÆ is MSA fixed effects that control for geographic differences resulting in one 
area having more providers (or being more competitive) than the other; ¿G is provider 
specialty fixed effects that control for provider differentiation; l≠ÆG is the error term. 
Model (1) is estimated using a ten-fold cross validation to reduce potential over-
fitting. The residuals, π£F¡ ≠ÆG, which is the exponential of residuals from estimating 
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model (1) are then aggregated across provider specialties to the plan level to get the 
predicted provider network breadth, i.e., ¶¬√£ƒ≠Æ = ∑ π£F¡ ≠ÆGG .  
VI. Linking Breadth of Provider Networks to Health Care Costs 
A. Narrow Networks, Cost Containment and Consumer Welfare 
To evaluate whether selective contracting is an effective tool for cost 
containment, it is useful to discuss why costs may be lower with narrow provider 
networks. 
First of all, narrow networks may potentially control costs by deterring consumers 
from seeking care. By restricting the technologies and services consumers can access 
either directly (Brot-Goldberg et al. 2015) or through higher prices, limited provider 
networks make consumers more sensitive and accountable for their health care 
decisions.73 But consumers may not necessarily do so voluntarily, but their behaviors can 
be a consequence of being poorly informed about the networks when shopping among 
health plans. At the stage of plan choice, consumers may have little information about the 
providers who are in their networks, thus have the tendency to choose plans with low 
premiums but ex post find it hard to get themselves the right providers who are covered 
in-network. Such consumers may be forced to forgo care that they otherwise would take 
advantage of if faced with no restriction, especially for services with relatively high 
consumer demand elasticities that have raised network adequacy concerns (Corlette et al. 																																																								
73 In the report “Controlling Health Care Costs – Framework for Reform” by Massachusetts Business 
Roundtable, it states that “larger employers across the country are … empowering employees to be 
consumers by implementing plan designs with tiered or limited networks that give employees more 
financial and decision-making responsibility for their health care selections”. 
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2014) such as primary care services, and mental health/substance abuse services.74 Yet 
the increased costs of finding the right provider could be compensated by reduced search 
costs in narrower provider panels, so overall consumers may not necessarily cut down 
their care seeking. 
Conditional on medical use, narrow provider networks can help direct consumers 
to low-cost providers (Resneck et al. 2014). The success of achieving this goal hinges on 
(1) the extent of information transparency on networks and prices, (2) consumer price 
elasticity of demand for services, and (3) the bargaining power that insurers have over 
health care providers. First, even if consumers get to control who they go to when 
seeking care, they may have less control over who actually does the services at the time 
of care. As evident in many recent news surrounding “surprise bills” (Lawsky 2012; 
Hamel et al. 2015)75, people seeking in-network care may end up paying a lot for 
providers or services that are not part of the insurance network.76 Second, services such 
as maternity and emergency care may witness little effect in cost control due to relatively 
low demand responses to prices. Third, insurers may fail to negotiate low prices for 
consumers if consolidation causes providers to achieve greater bargaining power 
(Berenson et al. 2012). Insurers who possess sufficiently higher bargaining power can 
threaten to exclude providers from the network if they are too costly.77 Conversely, when 
																																																								
74 One consequence may be that only the healthiest people would want to join low-premium narrow 
network plans, leaving other plans to face worse risks, worsening adverse selection in the long run (a.k.a. 
adverse selection). 
75 The Kaiser Family Foundation: http://kff.org/private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills/ 
76 In situations where consumers receive services from an out-of-network provider, they may be charged a 
“balance billing”, the provider’s charge after deducting what the insurer has obliged to pay (Corlette et al. 
2014) up to a limit that depends on state laws on balance billing. 
77 The extent to which insurers have the ability to exclude providers from their networks is also key to 
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providers have strong bargaining power, one will expect networks to be large, and 
ineffective at reducing costs. Moreover, provider groups who face insurers with higher 
willingness to pay are more likely to be included in insurers’ networks and induce higher 
revenue payments and price high (Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite 2003; Dranove and 
Ody 2016).78 For insurer-provider bargaining to control service costs, it is necessary to 
have a “thick market” of providers for insurers to bargain with (Handel 2015). However, 
simply because some providers are less expensive does not mean that they are more 
efficient in delivering care (e.g., reducing wasteful resources) – they may just be better at 
selecting the healthiest patients (a.k.a., adverse selection). 
Finally, given the type of patients enrolled and given that patients seek care, 
narrow network plans may discourage intensive medical use (a.k.a., moral hazard) driven 
by health care providers favored for inclusion in the narrow network who have an 
incentive to reduce unnecessary care and improve quality of care (Corlette et al. 2014). 
On the other hand, patients may take better care of themselves and demand less medical 
use as they try hard to schedule appointments with in-network providers. 
In the next four sections, I describe the empirical model and the estimation 
strategy that allow me to examine these potential mechanisms in a uniform framework. 
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
controlling the market power of Accountable Care Organization (ACO) and achieving efficiencies in 
medical care (Handel 2015). 
78 Although the original bargaining model translates willingness to pay to revenues, Capps, Dranove, and 
Satterthwaite (2003) demonstrate a similar relation between willingness to pay and prices. 
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B. Outcomes of Interest 
The MarketScan® database keeps track of all the claims by enrollees who obtain 
services from a doctor’s office, a hospital or an emergency room, from which we can 
summarize an individual’s health care utilization and spending for a specific period of 
time, and prices of the services provided. Three categories of outcomes pertinent to 
individual health care use are considered here: (1) an unconditional measure, (2) an 
extensive margin measure, and (3) intensive margin measures. Specifically, the 
unconditional measure is gauged by outpatient spending including zero spending when 
no service is sought. The extensive margin is captured by the probability of seeking 
outpatient care. Finally, the intensive measures include outpatient spending conditional 
on seeking care, and provider prices per service. For each type of outcome, I examine 
overall use including that of out-of-network services, and use of in-network services only. 
All types of spending and prices are adjusted to 2014 dollars, and annual spending is top-
coded at $250,000. 
C. Empirical Strategy 
The primary goal of the empirical strategy is to address the two selection issues 
laid out in Section 3.2. Regarding employers’ endogenous plan offerings, I find evidence 
in my data that employers’ offering of each of the plan types and the total number of plan 
types offered are correlated with characteristics of employees such as age, gender, and 
health risk status (Appendix Table 3-16).79 To account for the potential endogeneity of 																																																								
79 Specifically, Appendix Table 3-16 shows that within MSAs, the probability of offering EPO plans is 
higher among male employees; sicker people are less likely to be offered HMO and POS plans; PPO plans 
tend to be offered to older female employees; sicker employees on average are offered fewer plan types. 
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employee choice of where to work based on the expected health insurance offerings of 
prospective employers, I control for employer*year*family coverage type (EYF) fixed 
effects in the empirical model to capture factors that may make an employer more likely 
to offer one plan over another. To address selection into plans by employees, I employ an 
instrumental variable strategy in which each individual’s plan network breadth is 
instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in 
the same plan. Following Ellis and Zhu (2016), I assume that health plan choice is 
determined at the beginning of each year, and is fixed throughout the year. 
D. Empirical Specification 
I estimate a model at the individual-year level. The right-hand-side variable of 
interest is the provider network breadth, ¶¬√£ƒ≠Æ, estimated from Section 5. To test the 
hypothesis that narrower network plans discourage care seeking, I examine the effect on 
the probability of seeking any care (extensive margin). I also examine the impact on 
dollar spending conditional on seeking care (intensive margin) which captures the impact 
on both the intensity of using care (determined jointly by consumers and providers) and 
provider fees. To investigate whether narrower network plans manage to recruit low-cost 
providers, I run an additional regression associating provider network breadth with prices 
paid per service for people receiving care. Finally, I check whether results are robust to 
using spending that is paid in-network. Specifically, I estimate the following model. 																																																																																																																																																																					
Family size, whether spouse is enrolled in the same insurance contract of employee, or whether a new baby 
is born to the family in the last 12 months is not statistically significantly correlated with employers’ 
likelihood to offer each of the plan types and the number of plan types offered, suggesting either that 
employers do not observe this information or that employers do not use these pieces of information when 
making their plan offer decisions.  
145 	
	
≈9∆ = à ∙ ¶¬√£ƒ≠Æ + ã ∙ æ9∆ + ø ∙ «¶¡≠Æ + !∆ + »ú…õ +  ≠Æ + l9∆                                (2)  
where ≈9∆  is one of the dependent variables representing (unconditional and conditional) 
spending/probability of seeking care/prices associated with person i in year y; ¶¬√£ƒ≠Æ is 
the predicted provider breadth at the plan level across all provider types, which comes 
from the residuals from plan-level regressions for plan p serving consumers residing in 
area m (in a specific year); æ9∆  is individual relative risk score in year y predicted using 
demographics (i.e., age and gender) and diagnoses from prior year, controlled for to rule 
out people anticipating rising health needs switch to more generous plans; «¶¡≠Æ is the 
average annual cost share in plan p in MSA m (in a specific year); !∆ , »ú…õ ,  ≠Æ 
correspond to year fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage type fixed effects and 
plan type-MSA fixed effects, respectfully; l9∆  is the error term adjusted for clustering at 
the plan-year-MSA level. 
E. The Instrumental Variable Strategy 
As briefly mentioned in Section 3, employees are not randomly assigned health 
plans but actively choose plans that likely reflect their health care needs and preferences 
that contribute to their health care utilization and spending. Hence, the estimates of 
responses to insurance plans in model (2) that do not control for this endogeneity can be 
seriously biased. I control for this endogeneity by using an instrumental variable strategy. 
There are two major steps. The first step is to construct the instrument. Specifically, I 
estimate multinomial logit models of plan choice at the household level to generate 
predicted plan choice probabilities for each household in each year. Then I assign the 
146 	
	
same choice probabilities to all individuals in the same household. Finally, I construct the 
instrument for each individual in a plan as the mean predicted choice probabilities of 
other individuals in the same plan. In the second step, I estimate model (2) by two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) in which the average choice probabilities from the first step are used 
as instruments for individual plan network breadth. 
Construction of Instruments 
I assume that a household choice of plan for year t depends on whether the head-
of-household’s employer offers the plan in year t, as well as demographic information 
about the household by the time plan choice is made. Specifically, for each particular 
employer in year t who offers family or single coverage plan(s), we have 
âÀ≠:(ÃÀ:ñ') = 1	CÕ	Hℎ£	ℎ§çF£ℎ§•œ	ℎ	–ℎ§§F£F	∫•¢—	∫	Õ§N		Ü£¢N	H	                       (3)80 “ℎ£N£	ÃÀ:ñ' ={£X∫•§Ü££	¢º£À:ñ',X¢•£À:ñ', Õ¢XC•Ü	FC√£À:ñ', F∫§çF£À:ñ', —£“	”¢”Ü	Õ•¢ºÀ:ñ'}	  
where all the covariates are household-level variables, including the head-of-household 
age (£X∫•§Ü££	¢º£), whether the household head is a male (X¢•£), family size 
(Õ¢XC•Ü	FC√£), whether a spouse is present in the household (F∫§çF£), and whether the 
household added a new baby in the year (—£“	”¢”Ü	Õ•¢º). In addition, all the covariates 
are one-year lagged since households choose plans at the end of year for the entire next 
																																																								
80 The model here does not constrain all household members to enroll in the same health plan, although 
large employers generally require all members of a household to be in the same plan (Eichner 1998). The 
model, however, does stipulate that if family members are insured by the same employer as the employee, 
then the household (specifically, the employee) makes a single decision of plan choice. On the other hand, 
if family members choose to get insured elsewhere (e.g., through employers of their own), then I model 
these people as separate decision makers distinct from their household head. 
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year and I assume that they use only information in the year prior to the point choice is 
made.  
Estimating equation (3) generates âÀ≠:ƒ(ÃÀ:ñ'), the predicted probability of 
choosing plan ∫ for household ℎ in year H, which I then assign to all individuals within 
the same household, i.e., â‘≠:¡ (ÃÀ:ñ') = âÀ≠:ƒ(ÃÀ:ñ'), ∀C ∈ ℎ. Finally, I construct î’9≠:(ÃÀ:ñ'), the instrument for individual C enrolling in plan ∫ in year H, as the mean 
predicted choice probabilities of other individuals who enroll in the same plan, i.e., î’9≠:(ÃÀ:ñ') = ∑ ê÷Ø◊ƒ(ÿŸ◊¨q)⁄∈Ø\<=Ø◊ñ' , where 6≠: is the total enrollment in plan ∫ in year H.  
Practical Issues Surrounding Construction of Instruments 
In the implementation, three practical issues arise. First, there are no plan 
identifiers that are consistent across employers or years in the data, so I focus on 
modeling the choice of plan types rather than the choice of specific plans recognizing that 
the within-plan type choice of plans also reflects meaningful distinctions in contractual 
arrangement across plans (Dranove 2000).  
Second, ideally the plan choice model would build in additional plan-level 
features such as premiums, cost sharing and other plan features. However, such 
information is not available in the data. As an alternative to relying on plan-specific 
features, I estimate a multinomial logit model for each employer*year*family coverage 
type combination. Plans with only one insured enrollee were modeled as single plans, and 
those with multiple enrollees were modeled as family plans. In the empirical 
specification, I interact each plan type dummy, if offered, with a set of household 
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demographics so that the coefficient estimate on each of these plan types indicates the 
importance of each demographics element in a plan type in predicting household choice 
of that particular plan type. Hence, the fitted probabilities of health plan type choice 
capture why individual i1 in household h1 is more or less likely than individual i2 in 
household h2 to be in plan type p of family/single coverage type at an employer in a 
specific year. In other words, the empirical model relies on household level variation in 
choices made, not variation in plan types offered or their premiums and benefits so plan-
level features are not useful for identification. Although these fitted choice probabilities 
are not unbiased estimates of demand functions, for instruments we only need exogeneity 
and correlation with actual plan choices (and the associated plan network breadth), so 
missing plan feature information will not bias my 2SLS estimates.  
Third, in order to implement a multinomial logit model, choice set needs to be 
determined. Given employers’ sets of plan offerings, I estimate the model by 
employer*year*family coverage type, each denoting a distinct category of choice set 
faced by households. Specifically, the choice set is the universe of all plan types offered 
within each employer*year*family coverage type combination. The predicted estimates 
are each consumer’s choice of specific plan type among alternatives in the choice set, and 
predicted choices are set to zero for plan types not offered. By construction, plan type 
choices cannot be predicted for households with single plan type choice sets, in which 
case the predicted choice for the household is imputed by using the actual choice.  
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IV Estimation 
In the second step, I estimate model (2) by 2SLS using the array of plan types, {î’9≠:(ÃÀ:ñ')}≠∈{‹›fi,fl‡fi,›fi·,››fi,‚„fl›/fl„fl›}, as instruments for each individual’s plan 
network breadth. Two identifying assumptions are necessary for the instruments to be 
valid. First, the propensity to choose each of the plan types by other individuals in the 
same plan is correlated with individual’s own actual plan type choice (and hence the 
realized plan network breadth). This assumption is expected because people in the same 
plan are employed by the same firm that offers a same choice set of plans. Second, I 
assume that the predicted plan choice of other people has no direct impact on individual’s 
own health care utilization and spending, except through affecting individual’s plan 
choice. In other words, given enrollment in a particular plan, individuals do not use more 
services or spend more on health care simply because their co-workers or family 
members do so. 
VII. Results 
A. Summary Statistics 
Table 3-2 compares the modeling sample with the full sample. Conceptually as 
described above, the modeling sample consists of plans in which the probability of 
missing more than one provider who is actually included in-network is relatively low for 
any provider specialty observed in the plan. As a result, plans of more popular types such 
as POS and PPO are more likely to be selected. Yet this sampling does not select on the 
basis of individual health status, which is crucial because it is one of the key factors 
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influencing health care spending at the individual level. Appendix Table 3-17 and Table 
3-18 show summary statistics by plan type and by provider specialty. 
B. Predictors of Breadth of Provider Network 
Table 3-3 shows the regression results from estimating equation (1) using 
logarithm of the number of in-network providers per 1,000 patients as the dependent 
variable. By gradually adding variables into the model, we see that geographic variation 
greatly improves the predictive power (measured by adjusted R-squared) of the 
regression. The last column is the preferred specification in which provider specialty 
fixed effects control for the intrinsic difference in provider size across specialties. We can 
see that the number of distinct in-network providers per 1,000 patients is negatively 
correlated with the number of patient claims, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the extra number of distinct providers observed or inferred from an extra claim decreases 
as we continue to observe more claims. In addition, patients’ average health status does 
not statistically significantly correlate with the number of in-network providers per 1,000 
patients once variations in geography and provider specialty are controlled for.81 In the 
Appendix Table 3-19, I show that these results are robust to using logarithm of the total 
number of providers (including out-of-network providers) per 1,000 patients as the 
dependent variable. 
Figure 3-2A shows the distribution of the (exponential of) residuals π£F¡ ≠ÆG from 
estimating model (1), with summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, coefficient 
																																																								
81 To put it differently, dropping the risk score variable from the regression does not meaningfully affect 
estimates on the other variables and the resulting estimated provider network breadth. 
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variation) shown in the box. It shows the variation in the number of in-network providers 
per 1,000 patients within plan type and provider specialty that are not driven by 
geographic variation and the number of patient visits observed. Figure 3-2B shows the 
distribution of the (exponential of) residuals aggregated to the plan level, which forms the 
basis for my new metric of the provider network breadth used in the individual-level 
analyses, i.e., ¶¬√£ƒ≠Æ = ∑ π£F¡ ≠ÆGG . The inside box shows the mean, standard deviation, 
and coefficient variation of the aggregated sample. 
C. Plan Type Categories Do Not Fully Capture Plan-Level Provider Network Breadth 
Figure 3-3 plots the predicted size of provider network breadth across plans by 
health plan type categories. We see that a wide range of provider network breadth is 
observed in all of the plan types from EPOs that feature restrictive provider panels to 
PPOs that are considered fairly generous in provider networks. In other words, health 
plan type categories are not sufficient to tell whether one plan has a broader provider 
network than the other. To make this point in a more formal way, I run a regression in the 
form of model (1)’, which is model (1) with additional controls for health plan type 
dummies. •§º(íN§Ω∫¢HN¢HC§≠ÆG) = àÀ ∙ ∑ 1(∫•¢—HÜ∫£ = ℎ)À∈Â + ã ∙ æ≠ÆG + øÆ + ¿G + Ω≠ÆG            
 (1)’ 
where H={EPO, HMO, POS, PPO, CDHP/HDHP} is an array of plan type dummies and 
the rest of the terms are defined in the same way as model (1).82 The coefficients of 
interest, {àÀ}À∈Â, capture the average health plan type effects on the provider network 																																																								
82 PPO is omitted to prevent multicollinearity. 
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breadth.83 I examine both the average plan type effects across all plans and across the 
distribution of provider network breadth (i.e., a quantile regression). 
Table 3-4 shows the average and quantile-specific effects of plan types (relative to 
PPOs) on provider network breadth from estimating model (1)’. Overall, EPOs and 
HMOs predict the narrowest choice of providers while CDHP/HDHPs predict the largest 
choice. These results are robust to using logarithm of the total number of providers 
(including out-of-network providers) per 1,000 patients as the dependent variable (see 
Appendix Table 3-20, column 1). Figure 3-4 plots column 2 to 10 of Table 3-4. Among 
the highest choice of providers, CDHP/HDHPs predict the highest provider choice, while 
POS plans predict the lowest. In the lowest distribution of provider choice, POS plans 
become the most generous while HMOs are the least generous. Although the specific 
rankings are sensitive to using logarithm of the number of all types of providers per 1,000 
patients as the dependent variable (see Appendix Figure 3-584), these results show that 
health plan type categories do not fully capture the variation in provider network breadth 
across plans.  
Note that these results also rely on the specific definition of plan types in the data 
set, which means that using a different data set collected by different employers (or 
health plans) may provide a different conclusion. Hence, it is useful to get an alternative 
standardized measure that can be used consistently across plans and employers. 
																																																								
83 Equating model (1)’ with model (1), we obtain that l≠ÆG = àÀ ∙ ∑ 1(∫•¢—HÜ∫£ = ℎ)À∈Â + Ω≠ÆG. 
84 Coefficients for this regression model are shown in Appendix Table 3-20, column 2 to 10. 
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D. Health Care Utilization and Spending 
OLS Results 
Table 3-5 shows the OLS estimates of model (2). We see that higher cost shares 
are associated with overall lower in-network spending and a lower probability of seeking 
in-network care, even after supply-side features are controlled for. Furthermore, higher 
risk scores predict higher health care utilization, spending, and provider prices in all these 
models. 
Results on the network breadth measure show that plans with 12 fewer in-network 
providers per 1,000 patients (about one standard deviation of the mean85) on average have 
$542 (or about 25% of the mean) less outpatient spending per year that is paid in-
network, driven by an average of 17% lower probability of seeking in-network care in 
these plans. Conditional on seeking care, plans with one standard deviation (about 12) 
fewer in-network providers per 1,000 patients on average spend $157 (or about 5.9% of 
the mean) less on in-network outpatient services. Yet there is no statistically significant 
effect of provider network breadth on overall spending or overall probability of seeking 
care. Finally, narrower network plans are associated with overall lower provider prices, 
but the association is not statistically significant for services that are paid in-network. 
2SLS Results 
As mentioned earlier, the provider network breadth measure in model (2) is likely 
subject to endogenous patient selection into health plans, even after provider specialty 																																																								
85 Define ∆æ ≡ æ' − æn, a one standard deviation of the mean change in æ, where æ' and æn are values of æ before and after the change. Then by definition, ÊqBÁË − ÊrBÁË = 1, where » and È are the mean and 
standard deviation of æ, respectively. Rearranging the equation gives us ∆æ = È. 
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and health status are controlled for. Failing to account for this endogeneity would bias the 
estimated responses to network breadth. For example, if people expected to spend less in 
health care or those who care a lot about low service prices tend to join narrower network 
plans, then OLS estimates would overestimate the potential savings from narrower 
networks or overstate the capability of narrower network plans to negotiate low provider 
prices, and vice versa. 
Appendix Table 3-21 shows the first stage results of the 2SLS models. Sicker 
people tend to choose narrower network plans, which is the opposite of what adverse 
selection would predict. Also, a higher predicted probability of choosing HMO plans is 
associated with narrower networks. The weak instrument test generates a relatively small 
value of F-statistic. But since there is no consensus in the literature as to what critical 
values to use for evaluating weak instrument with clustered standard error corrections, I 
report two additional tests. The underidentification test shows whether the instrument is 
relevant, and the overidentification test show s whether the exclusion restriction is 
satisfied. The p-values on these tests suggest that both these conditions are met. 
Table 3-6 reports the 2SLS results from estimating model (2) using the 
instrumental variable strategy described in Section 6.4. Similar to the OLS estimates, 
overall spending and probability of seeking care, in-network spending conditional on 
seeking care, and prices for in-network services are all lower among people in plans with 
higher average cost shares. In addition, risk scores consistently contribute to higher health 
care use and higher prices in all the models. 
Regarding the effects of provider network breadth, a one standard deviation 
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reduction in in-network providers per 1,000 patients in a plan (about 12 providers) 
corresponds to a $167 cost savings per year in outpatient services (about 6.9% of the 
mean), although the effect is not significant (95% CI: -$274 to $622). The corresponding 
cost savings in in-network outpatient services are $770 per year (about 35% of the mean), 
driven by an average of 23% lower probability of seeking in-network care. One possible 
explanation is that narrower provider panels increase the difficulty of finding the right 
network provider for care, the costs of which dominates possible reduction in search costs 
due to smaller provider panels. Note that the 2SLS effect of narrow network plans on in-
network spending is larger than the OLS effect. Since observable health status is 
controlled for, this is an indication of advantageous selection into narrow network plans 
with respect to unobserved preferences (e.g., taste for brand name hospitals in narrow 
network plans) in this market.86 
Moreover, a one standard deviation decrease in network breadth reduces the 
probability of seeking in-network care by 23% while having no statistically significant 
effect on the overall probability of seeking care, suggesting that narrower network plans 
may increase the use of out-of-network services. 
Furthermore, conditional on consumers seeking care, a one standard deviation 
decrease in in-network providers per 1,000 patients in a plan (about 12 providers) 
corresponds to a $152 overall cost savings (about 5.4% of the mean) and a $215 savings 
in in-network services (about 8.1% of the mean), but the effects are not significant. While 
network providers may have the incentive to cut costs down to be included in the plan’s 																																																								
86 There is also advantageous selection into narrow network plans with respect to observed health status, as 
is evident by the first stage results showing that people in narrower network plans are on average sicker. 
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network, an unstable provider-patient relationship due to narrower networks could 
introduce additional costs in coordination between the patient and the provider. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the data that narrower network plans have lower 
provider prices, whether for all services or just for services that are paid in-network, 
suggesting that narrower network plans are not successful in keeping lower-cost 
providers. A comparison with the OLS estimates implies that narrower network plans 
may be particularly attractive to enrollees desiring low provider prices. 
E. Additional Analyses 
Costs Borne by Patients and by Insurers 
Table 3-7 shows the effects of provider network breadth on outpatient costs paid 
by patients and by insurers. Conditional on consumers seeking care, a one standard 
deviation reduction in in-network providers per 1,000 patients in a plan (about 12 
providers) corresponds to a $57 cost savings for patients and a $99 cost savings for 
insurers (insignificantly). Among those who spend any money on out-of-network 
services, narrower networks have distributional effects among the patient and the insurer: 
A one standard deviation reduction in in-network providers per 1,000 patients 
corresponds to a $130 cost savings in out-of network services for patients; a same 
magnitude of reduction in provider network breadth corresponds to $891 increased 
payments by insurers for out-of-network services. 
Heterogeneity by Health Status, Gender, and Age Group  
I next analyze the effects of narrow network plans among various subgroups of 
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the full sample. I find these subgroups interesting because they form the basis for 
understanding efficiencies and welfare of health plan design. Also, understanding what 
distributional effects that plan benefit designs may have on various demographics groups 
helps better design policies to eliminate health care disparities. 
Table 3-8 shows summary statistics of the outcomes of interest for the full sample 
and across subgroups of interest, namely by health status, gender, and age group. Not 
surprisingly, sicker people use more health care than relatively healthy people, captured 
by much larger overall spending, higher probabilities of medical use, and higher spending 
conditional on use. Sicker people also use more expensive services given use. 
Additionally, overall outpatient spending (including that paid for in-network 
services) is higher for females than for males, which is a result of both higher 
probabilities of seeking care, and higher spending conditional on use among females. 
Finally, as people grow old, they tend to spend more on outpatient services conditional on 
medical use, hence incurring more overall spending than their younger cohorts.  
Table 3-9 shows that in relative terms, narrow network plans save almost the 
same (effects relative to mean: 30.9% vs. 30.9%) in in-network services between the 
relatively healthy and sick people whose risk scores fall above the 75th percentile, 
although the reduction in seeking in-network care is slightly larger for the healthy (effects 
relative to mean: 26.6% vs. 25.0%). Cost savings (of in-network spending) from narrower 
networks are larger for females than for males (effects relative to mean: 37.4% vs. 
30.8%), but the reduction (relative to mean) in seeking in-network care is slightly larger 
for males (28.3%) than for females (28.0%). Young adults aged 18-50 enjoy the most 
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savings (43.8%) from narrower networks, which is larger than children younger than 18 
(36.1%) and people older than 50 (30.27%). This ranking is consistent with that of 
reductions in the probability of seeking in-network care (effects relative to mean: 32.8%, 
28.9%, and 28.0%). In particular, narrower networks achieve cost savings for young 
adults aged 18-50 in outpatient services overall, not just for services that are paid in-
network. This last result is driven by a statistically significantly lower level of spending 
conditional on medical use, which is partly due to significantly lower prices of services 
used by this group of people. 
Utilization of Different Types of Services 
There are potential heterogeneous effects of limited provider networks on 
different types of care due to substituting “high-value” for “low-value” services (or vice 
versa) or reducing more expensive care relative to less expensive care (or vice versa) 
(Curto et al. 2016). 
Using classifications of provider specialty in Appendix Table 3-18, I look at 
health care utilization associated with three provider specialty types – primary care, 
radiology, and ambulance, representing high-value, low-value, and emergency care, 
respectively.  
Table 3-10 shows that narrower networks correspond to lower annual in-network 
spending in all types of services studied here. For primary care, narrow networks are 
associated with a lower probability of seeking in-network care, but have no statistically 
significant effect on in-network spending conditional on seeking care. Also, primary care 
provider prices are higher for services that are paid in-network in narrower networks. For 
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radiology, narrower networks do not significantly reduce the probability of seeking care, 
but conditional on medical use, both spending and provider prices are lower in narrower 
network plans. Focusing on ambulance services, we see evidence that narrower networks 
correspond to a higher probability of using ambulance services, while not significantly 
affecting use of in-network services. Since ambulance use is largely unpredictable, 
limiting provider networks may boost utilization of out-of-network services. Conditional 
on using ambulance services, however, spending is significantly lower in narrower 
network plans. Finally, utilization of primary care and radiology is more responsive to 
cost sharing than that of largely unpredictable ambulance services. 
Prices of Professional vs. Facility Services 
I also separately examine prices of professional services (i.e., services provided 
by physicians such as primary care doctors and radiologists) and prices of facilities (e.g., 
outpatient clinics and ambulatory surgery centers). Table 3-11 shows that neither 
professional nor facility prices are statistically significantly lower in narrower network 
plans. 
Effects on Inpatient Spending and Utilization 
There is concern that narrow networks may direct patients from outpatient to 
inpatient, saving money for outpatient services while increasing inpatient spending. Table 
3-12 shows that this might be partially the case. A one standard deviation reduction in in-
network providers per 1,000 patients in a plan (about 12 providers) corresponds to a $107 
increase in inpatient spending per year (about 11.4% of the mean), although the effect is 
not significant (95% CI: -$357 to $144). This result, however, appears to be driven by a 
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higher inpatient spending conditional on visit, rather than a higher probability of seeking 
inpatient care. Conditional on seeking inpatient care, narrower networks have offsetting 
effects: While narrower network plans do not save inpatient spending overall, they save 
out-of-pocket payments for patients while costing more for insurers.   
Table 3-13 further shows that the effects of provider network breadth vary across 
health status, gender and age group. It shows that narrower network plans incur 
(insignificantly) higher inpatient costs, particularly for the sicker and people older than 
50. By contrast, narrower network plans (insignificantly) lower inpatient spending for 
younger cohorts. Across all the subgroups being studied here, inpatient spending is only 
modestly responsive to health plan cost sharing. 
Provider Market Concentration 
Other than influencing the average number of providers to whom patients have 
access, provider network breadth may also affect how patients are distributed among 
providers. On the one hand, a broader network increases competition among providers, 
encourages patients to spread out across more providers, and thus reduces provider 
market concentration. On the other hand, having a wide choice of providers may increase 
the chance of patients concentrating in certain providers. Here I examine Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), a widely used measure of market concentration, in relation to 
provider network breadth. 
I calculate the HHI of provider market concentration at two “market” levels. 
Specifically, denote ÍÍî≠ÆG   as the provider concentration in plan p in MSA m for 
provider specialty s. Then by definition, ÍÍî≠ÆG = ∑ (¶A≠ÆG × 100)nßØ∞±AB' , where ¶A≠ÆG  
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is the market share of provider j in plan-MSA-provider specialty (pms) cell, and ≥≠ÆG is 
the total number of observed providers in the cell. I calculate ¶A≠ÆG  in two ways, one as 
the share in number of claims, and another as the share in dollar payments. Besides ÍÍî≠ÆG , I also calculate ÍÍî≠Æ by aggregating ÍÍî≠ÆG  to the plan-MSA level, i.e., ÍÍî≠Æ = ∑ ÍÍî≠ÆGG . At both levels, I denote ÍÍî' and ÍÍîn as quantity-based and 
dollar-based HHI, respectively. 
Table 3-14A and 3-14B show that the two measures of HHI are highly correlated 
with each other at both “market” levels. At the plan-MSA-provider specialty level, a 
broader network is correlated with lower provider concentration. At the plan-MSA level, 
however, a broader provider network breadth is associated with higher concentration of 
provider markets; the correlations are 0.85 for quantity-based HHI, and 0.86 for dollar-
based HHI. 
VIII. Conclusions and Discussion 
Narrow network plans have received growing attention in recent years because of 
its potential to control health care costs as an alternative to demand-side strategies. I 
show that narrow network plans modestly lower outpatient spending, mainly through 
affecting the probability of consumer seeking care with less effects on costs conditional 
on care or provider prices. This is consistent with findings in the RAND Experiment and 
other more recent studies such as Ellis and Zhu (2016). In addition, narrower networks 
may boost out-of-network spending by increasing the use of out-of-network services, and 
that narrow network plans are not successful in keeping low-cost providers. I also find 
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that cost savings (if any) from narrower networks mainly accrue to patients as opposed to 
insurers and cost savings are larger for females and among working ages. Moreover, 
narrower networks do not save inpatient spending. In essence, my methodology used to 
infer provider network breadth is an ex-post approach, so it will be most useful for 
regulations than guiding plan choice by consumers. 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, this paper studies only outpatient 
providers, and excludes providers providing inpatient services such as hospitals. While 
inpatient providers constitute another major part of plan-level provider networks and 
have been the focus of many existing studies (e.g., Ericson and Starc 2015; Dafny et al. 
2016; Shepard 201687), the focus of this paper is to develop a new methodology for 
inferring plan-level breadth of provider networks and to apply the method on a sample of 
interest. In focusing on physician networks, my paper is closer to Polsky and Weiner 
(2015a) and Polsky and Weiner (2015b), and serves as a complement to the existing 
literature.  
Another limitation is that this paper addresses only one dimension of provider 
choice, namely the specialty-specific provider patient ratio, and ignores other dimensions 
of potential interest. For example, the ability to stay with desired primary care doctors, 
whether or not doctors accept new patients, having health care providers spanning a wide 
variety of specialists, an adequate choice of doctors in high-volume specialty services 																																																								
87 Dafny et al. (2016) focus on the ACA Health Insurance Marketplace of eight states in 2014 and 2015, 
while both Ericson and Starc (2015) and Shepard (2016) examine hospital networks in the Massachusetts 
Health Insurance Exchange created before the ACA. Dafny et al. (2016) study factors that determine 
hospital inclusion in plans’ networks and the effect of hospital networks on health plan pricing. Ericson and 
Starc (2015) estimate consumer valuation of narrow hospital networks. Shepard (2016) shows that plans 
covering expensive and prestigious hospitals attract individuals who value high-price providers and 
expensive care. 
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who work on weekends, etc, may also enter the consumer evaluation of provider 
networks. Nonetheless, using information available in the data, my methodology takes 
into account the variations in plan-level provider choice driven by provider specialty, 
geographic area, and plan type.  
Finally, an alternative measure of plan-level provider network breadth would 
make use of patient distributions among providers observed in plans. Intuitively, among 
two plans with the same number of total providers observed, the one with more low-
frequency providers observed has a higher probability of missing providers who are 
actually covered.88 Future studies will test the robustness of my methodology to 
alternative datasets and to alternative measures of provider network breadth. 
Despite these limitations, this paper has several important policy implications. 
First, this paper speaks to network regulations. Regulations should take into account the 
distributional effects of limited provider networks that are pertinent to consumer welfare. 
For example, policymakers should consider the consequences of broadening provider 
networks such as reallocations of resources (1) between in-network and out-of-network 
services, (2) between inpatient and outpatient services, (3) between consumers and 
insurers, and (4) across demographic groups. 
Second, this paper sheds light on optimal insurance plan design, particularly the 
trade-off between lowering premiums through narrow networks and preserving consumer 
choice of providers. Over time, the extent to which insurers have the ability to lower 
premiums through narrow networks depends on the health care cost savings achieved by 																																																								
88 In cases where the patient distributions are the same across two plans, it remains a challenge to infer the 
number of missing providers without further assumptions. 
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restricting provider networks. This paper suggests that overall health care cost savings in 
narrower network plans are limited, making premium control hard for these plans. In this 
sense, “tiered network” plans may be more attractive in which consumers are allowed to 
pay higher cost sharing to see certain out-of-network providers (Howard 2014). 
Third, my analysis suggests that sicker people tend to enroll in narrower network 
plans. Over time, with greater transparency of network quality and better information on 
other aspects of choice architecture (premium, cost sharing, and insurer custom services, 
etc.), consumers may be able to make more sensible insurance choices reflecting their 
true willingness to pay for each plan benefit feature (Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor 
2016). This will likely introduce new pressure on the adverse selection into the market, 
and regulations are needed to ensure an optimal balance between incentive (which may 
worsen adverse selection) and efficiency (which requires reallocations of resources). 
165 	
	
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to my advisors Randall P. Ellis, Thomas G. McGuire, and Keith M. 
Ericson for guidance and support. I am indebted to Angela R. Bazzi, Samuel Bazzi, 
Randall P. Ellis, Keith M. Ericson, Emily Gee, and Thomas G. McGuire for comments on 
previous versions. I have also greatly benefited from conversations with many other 
faculty and graduate students including Mingli Chen, Iván Fernández-Val, Sebastian 
Fleitas, Geir Godager, Yeseul Hyun, Olena Izhak, Hiroaki Kaido, Jonathan Levin, 
Mengyun Lin, Shuheng Lin, Siyi Luo, Calvin Luscombe, Michael Manove, Emily Oster, 
Tomas J. Philipson, Marc S. Rysman, Frank A. Sloan, Johannes Spinnewijn, Pietro 
Tebaldi and Ye Wang. I would also like to thank all the participants at 2016 Emerging 
Scholars Roundtable at The University of Chicago, 2016 Biennial Conference of the 
American Society of Health Economists, and seminars at Boston University for useful 
comments and insights.  
I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the National Institute of Mental 
Health (R01 MH094290) and the Becker Friedman Institute Health Economics 
Fellowship at The University of Chicago. The contents of this paper are solely the 
responsibility of the author and do not represent the official views of the NIMH or The 
University of Chicago. All errors and omissions are mine.
166 	
	
References 
AcademyHealth Research Insights. 2015. “Health Plan Features: Implications of Narrow 
Networks and the Trade-Off between Price and Choice.” Accessed November 22, 
2015. http://academyhealth.org/files/HCFO/RIBrief0315.pdf.  
Aron-Dine, Aviva, Liran Einav, and Amy Finkelstein. 2013. “The RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment, Three Decades Later.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 
(1): 197-222. 
Aron-Dine, Aviva, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Mark R. Cullen. 2015. “Moral 
Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter?” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 97 (4): 725-741. 
Atwood, Alicia and Anthony T. Lo Sasso. 2016. “The Effect of Narrow Provider 
Networks on Health Care Use.” Journal of Health Economics 50: 86–98.  
Berenson, Robert A., Paul B. Ginsburg, Jon B. Christianson, and Tracy Yee. 2012. “The 
Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases From Insurers 
Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed” Health Affairs 31 (5): 973–981. 
Bhargava, Saurabh, George Loewenstein, and Justin Sydnor. 2016. “Do Individuals 
Make Sensible Health Insurance Decisions?” Working Paper. 
Brot-Goldberg, Zarek C., Amitabh Chandra, Benjamin R. Handel, and Jonathan T. 
Kolstad. November 2, 2015. “What Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-
Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and Spending Dynamics.” Working Paper. 
Bundorf, M. Kate. 2002. “Employee Demand for Health Insurance and Employer Health 
Plan Choices.” Journal of Health Economics 21 (1): 65–88. 
Busch, Susan H. and Noelia Duchovny. 2005. “Family Coverage Expansions: Impact on 
Insurance Coverage and Health Care Utilization of Parents.” Journal of Health 
Economics 24 (5): 876-890. 
Capps, Cory, David Dranove, and Mark Satterthwaite. 2003. “Competition and Market 
Power in Option Demand Markets.” RAND Journal of Economics 34 (4):737–763.  
Corlette, Sabrina, JoAnn Volk, Robert Berenson, and Judy Feder. May 2014. “Narrow 
Provider Networks in New Health Plans: Balancing Affordability with Access to 
Quality Care.” The Center on Health Insurance Reforms (Georgetown University) 
and the Urban Institute. 
167 	
	
Curto, Vilsa, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Jonathan Levin, and Jay Bhattacharya. 2016. 
“Healthcare Spending and Utilization in Public and Private Medicare.” Work in 
progress. 
CY2015 MAHSD 2014. “Provider and Facility Specialties and Network Adequacy 
Criteria Guidance.” Baltimore, MD: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
Accessed May 30, 2016. http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-
Advantage/MedicareAdvantageApps/Downloads/CY2015_MA_HSD_Network_Crite
ria_Guidance.pdf.  
Dafny, Leemore, Kate Ho, and Mauricio Varela. 2013. “Let Them Have Choice: Gains 
from Shifting Away from Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and toward an 
Individual Exchange.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (1): 32-58. 
Dafny, Leemore, Christopher Ody, Nathan E. Wilson, and Igal Hendel. 2016. “Narrow 
Networks on the Health Insurance Marketplaces: What Hospitals are In or Out and 
How Does it Affect Premiums and Consumer Choices?” Work in progress.  
Deb, Partha and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2006. “Specification and Simulated Likelihood 
Estimation of a Non-normal Treatment-Outcome Model with Selection: Application 
to Health Care Utilization.” Econometrics Journal 9 (2): 307-331. 
Determann, Domino, Mattijs S. Lambooij, Esther W. de Bekker-Grob, Arthur P. Hayen, 
Marco Varkevisser, Frederik T. Schut, G. Ardine de Wit. 2016. “What Health Plans 
Do People Prefer? The Trade-Off between Premium and Provider Choice.” Social 
Science & Medicine 165: 10-18. 
Dranove, David. 2000. “The Economic Evolution of American Health Care: From 
Marcus Welby to Managed Care.” Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Dranove, David and Christopher Ody. 2016. “Evolving Measures of Provider Market 
Power.” American Journal of Health Economics 2 (2): 145–160. 
Duarte, Fabian. 2012. “Price Elasticity of Expenditure across Health Care Services.” 
Journal of Health Economics 31 (6): 824-841. 
Eichner, Matthew J. 1998. “The Demand for Medical Care: What People Pay Does 
Matter.” American Economic Review 88 (2): 117-121. 
Ellis, Randall P., and Thomas G. McGuire. 2007. “Predictability and Predictiveness in 
Health Care Spending.” Journal of Health Economics 26: 25-48. 
Ellis, Randall P., Shenyi Jiang, and Tzu-Chun Kuo. 2013. “Does Service-Level Spending 
Show Evidence of Selection across Health Plan Types?” Applied Economics 45 (13): 
1701-1712. 
168 	
	
Ellis, Randall P. and Wenjia Zhu. 2016. “Health Plan Type Variations on Spells of 
Health-Care Treatment.” American Journal of Health Economics 2 (4): 399-430. 
Ellis, Randall P., Bruno Martins, and Wenjia Zhu. 2016. “Health Care Demand 
Elasticities by Type of Service.” Boston University Working Paper. 
Ericson, Keith M., Leila Agha, Kimberley Geissler, Benjamin Lubin, and Jim Rebitzer. 
2016. “Coordination within Teams and the Cost of Health Care.” Work in progress. 
Ericson, Keith M. and Amanda Starc. 2015. “Measuring Consumer Valuation of Limited 
Provider Networks.” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 105 
(5):115-119. 
Gruber, Jonathan and Robin McKnight. 2016. “Controlling Health Care Costs through 
Limited Network Insurance Plans: Evidence from Massachusetts State Employees.” 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8 (2): 219–250. 
Haeder, Simon F., David L. Weimer, and Dana B. Mukamel. 2016. “Secret Shoppers 
Find Access to Providers and Network Accuracy Lacking for Those in Marketplace 
and Commercial Plans.” Health Affairs 35 (7): 1160-1166. 
Hamel, Liz, Mira Norton, Karen Pollitz, Larry Levitt, Gary Claxton, and Mollyann 
Brodie, January 2016. “The Burden of Medical Debt: Results from the Kaiser Family 
Foundation/New York Times Medical Bills Survey.” Kaiser Family Foundation. 
Handel, Benjamin. 2015. “Commentary – Accountable Care Organizations and Narrow 
Network Insurance Plans.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 40 (4): 705-
710. 
Handel, Benjamin and Jonathan Kolstad. 2015. “Health Insurance for ‘Humans’: 
Information Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare.” American Economic 
Review 105 (8): 2449–2500. 
Ho, Katherine. 2006. “The Welfare Effects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the US 
Medical Care Market.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 21 (7):1039-1079. 
Ho, Katherine. 2009. “Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market.” American 
Economic Review 99 (1): 393-430. 
Holstein, Russell and David P. Paul. 2012. “‘Phantom Networks’ of Managed Behavioral 
Health Providers: An Empirical Study of Their Existence and Effect on Patients in 
Two New Jersey Counties.” Hospital Topics 90 (3): 65-73. 
Howard, David H. 2014. “Adverse Effects of Prohibiting Narrow Provider Networks.” 
New England Journal of Medicine 371 (7): 591-593. 
169 	
	
Jacobson, Gretchen, Ariel Trilling, Tricia Neuman, Anthony Damico, and Marsha Gold. 
June 2016. “Medicare Advantage Hospital Networks: How Much Do They Vary?” 
Kaiser Family Foundation. Accessed August 10, 2016. 
http://kff.org/medicare/report/medicare-advantage-hospital-networks-how-much-do-
they-vary/.  
Kowalski, Amanda. 2016. “Censored Quantile Instrumental Variable Estimates of the 
Price Elasticity of Expenditure on Medical Care.” Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics 34 (1): 107-117. 
Lawsky, Benjamin (superintendent). March 7, 2012. “An Unwelcome Surprise: How 
New Yorkers Are Getting Stuck with Unexpected Medical Bills from Out-of-
Network Providers.” New York State Department of Financial Services. 
Ma, Ching-To Albert and Thomas G. McGuire. 2002. “Network Incentives in Managed 
Health Care.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 11 (1): 1-35. 
Majerol, Melissa, Vann Newkirk, and Rachel Garfield. 2014. “The Uninsured: A 
Primer—Key Facts about Health Insurance on the Eve of Coverage Expansions.” 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. Supplementary Table 1 
Accessed May 30, 2016. http://files.kff.org/attachment/supplemental-tables-the-
uninsured-a-primer-key-facts-about-health-insurance-and-the-uninsured-in-the-era-
of-health-reform.  
Manning, Willard G, Joseph P. Newhouse, Naihua Duan, Emmett B. Keeler, and Arleen 
Leibowitz. 1987. “Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence 
from A Randomized Experiment.” American Economic Review 77 (3): 251-277. 
Massachusetts Business Roundtable. “Controlling Health Care Costs – Framework for 
Reform.” Accessed March 22, 2016. 
http://www.maroundtable.com/doc_MBR/MBR_ControllingHealthCareCosts.pdf. 
McCullough, Jeffrey S., Jean Abraham, Coleman Drake, and Kosali Simon. 2016. 
“Insurance Pricing and Narrow Networks on the Federally Facilitated Marketplace.” 
Work in progress.  
McGuire, Thomas G. 2016. “Achieving Mental Health Care Parity Might Require 
Changes In Payments And Competition.” Health Affairs 35 (6): 1029-1035. 
Meer, Jonathan and Harvey S. Rosen. 2004. “Insurance and the Utilization of Medical 
Services.” Social Science & Medicine 58 (9): 1623-1632. 
Newhouse, Joseph P. 2002. “Pricing the Priceless: A Health Care Conundrum.” MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA. 
170 	
	
Nosal, Kathleen. 2016. “Two-Sided Matching in Physician-Insurer Networks: Evidence 
from Medicare Advantage”. Accessed March 22, 2016. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727272. 
Polsky, Daniel and Zuleyha Cidav. 2016. “Provider Network Size and Marketplace Plan 
Premiums.” Work in progress.  
Polsky, Daniel and Janet Weiner. 2015a. “The Skinny on Narrow Networks in Health 
Insurance Marketplace Plans.” Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics.  
Polsky, Daniel and Janet Weiner. 2015b. “State Variation in Narrow Networks on the 
ACA Marketplaces.” Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics. 
Resneck, Jack S., Aaron Quiggle, Michael Liu, and David W. Brewster. 2014. “The 
Accuracy of Dermatology Network Physician Directories Posted by Medicare 
Advantage Health Plans in an Era of Narrow Networks.” JAMA Dermatology 150 
(12):1290-1297. 
Rothschild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay On the Economics of Imperfect Information.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 90 (4): 629-649. 
Ryu, Alexander J., Teresa B. Gibson, M. Richard McKellar, and Michael E. Chernew. 
2013. “The Slowdown In Health Care Spending In 2009–11 Reflected Factors Other 
Than The Weak Economy And Thus May Persist.” Health Affairs 32 (5):5835-5840. 
Shepard, Mark. 2016. “Hospital Network Competition and Adverse Selection: Evidence 
from the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange.” Working Paper. 
Truven Health MarketScan® Research Databases. Commercial Claims and Encounters 
Medicare Supplemental User Guide, Data Year 2014 Edition. 
Vistnes, Jessica, Thomas M. Selden, and Alice Zawacki. 2015. “Several Factors 
Responsible For the Recent Slowdown In Premium Growth In Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance.” Health Affairs 34 (12):122036-122043. 
Wallace, Jacob. 2015. “How Do Provider Networks Impact Health and Health Care? 
Evidence from Random Assignment to Medicaid HMOs.” (Job market paper). 
Harvard University. 
Zwanziger, Jack, Glenn A. Melnick, and Anil Bamezai. 2000. “The Effect of Selective 
Contracting on Hospital Costs and Revenues.” Health Services Research 35 (4): 849–
867. 
171 	
	
Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3-1. Distribution of percentage of providers with single patient observation 
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of percentage of providers (among observed 
provider IDs) with single patient observation across 1,605 plan years (i.e., plan-year-
MSA observations), fitted with the normal density. Note that plan keys are not 
identifiable across years so tracking plans over years is not possible here.
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2A 
 
2B 
 
Figure 3-2. Distribution of predicted provider network breadth 
Notes: Figure 3-2A shows the distribution of the predicted provider network breadth for 
the 3,672 plan-year-MSA-provider specialty observations. The predicted network breadth 
is the exponential of the residual from estimating model (1) using log of number of in-
network providers of a given specialty per 1,000 patients as the dependent variable. 
Estimation uses a ten-fold cross validation to prevent over-fitting. Figure 3-2B shows the 
distribution of the corresponding predicted provider network breadth for the 1,605 plan-
year-MSA observations. In both figures, a box shows the sample size, mean, standard 
deviation, and coefficient of variation.
N 3,672 
Mean  1.22 
Std. Dev. 0.99 
CV 0.81 	
N 1,605 
Mean  2.79 
Std. Dev. 5.04 
CV 1.81 	
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Figure 3-3. Scatter plot of estimated provider network breadth (based on number of 
in-network providers per 1,000 patients) by health plan type categories 
Notes: This figure shows the predicted provider network breadth of the 1,605 plans (plan-
year-MSA) in the analysis sample by health plan type categories. Refer to text for details 
on the sample selection criteria. The five plan types studied here include exclusive 
provider organizations (EPO), health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service 
(POS), preferred provider organization (PPO), and consumer-driven health plans/high 
deductible health plans (CDHP/HDHP). The predicted network breadth is the exponential 
of the residuals from estimating model (1) using log of number of in-network providers 
per 1,000 patients as the dependent variable, aggregated to the plan (plan-year-MSA) 
level. 
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Figure 3-4. Plan type effects (relative to PPO) on log(number of in-network 
providers per 1,000 patients) across quantiles 
Notes: This figure shows the plan type effects on the log of number of in-network 
providers per 1,000 patients across quantiles of provider network breadth (quantiles run 
from 10 to 90 incremented by 10). Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-provider 
specialty. Sample size is 3,672 and the sample selection criteria are discussed in the text. 
The regression controls for five plan type dummies including exclusive provider 
organizations (EPO), health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service (POS), 
and consumer-driven health plans/high deductible health plans (CDHP/HDHP) (with 
preferred provider organization (PPO) being the omitted plan type), metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) (rural areas as separate MSAs) fixed effects, number of claims 
(10,000's), a prospective risk score averaged over individuals in plan-year-MSA-provider 
specialty, and provider specialty fixed effects. Coefficients for this regression model are 
shown in Table 3-4, column 2 to 10.
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Table 3-1. Illustration of true vs. observed provider networks 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton 
(B) 
 
Manchester-Nashua 
(M) 
B1 – X 
 M1 – W 
M2 – Z B2 – Y  B3 – Z 
 Notes: This table illustrates the biases from using observed providers in a plan to 
measure provider network breadth. B and M denote two plans serving residents in 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton MSA and Manchester-Nashua MSA, respectively. Subscript 
numbers correspond to distinct patients observed in plans. W, X, Y and Z are four distinct 
doctors of a given specialty. The combinations of letters and numbers in cells represent 
observed patient-provider interactions associated with plans. Assume that both plans 
have doctors X, Y and Z included in their networks, but Plan M additionally covers 
doctor W. But by observation, Plan B has three patients seeing doctors X, Y and Z, while 
Plan M has two patients observed which reveals doctor W and Z, so that Plan B’s 
observed network = {X, Y, Z} and Plan M’s observed network = {W, Z}. 
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Table 3-2. Characteristics of health plans in full sample vs. modeling sample 
  Full sample 
 
Modeling sample 
 
(N=70,547) 
 
(N=3,672) 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.)   Mean (Std. Dev.) 
# providers 42 (89)   62 (136) 
# in-network providers 37 (69) 
 
50 (101) 
% in-network claims  93.8% (0.2) 
 
96.0% (0.1) 
# patients 221 (1101) 
 
936 (2918) 
# in-network providers per patient 0.5 (0.4) 
 
0.2 (0.1) 
Prospective risk score 1.7 (1.0)   1.7 (0.9) 
EPO 4.8% (0.2)   3.3% (0.2) 
HMO 8.9% (0.3) 
 
9.4% (0.3) 
POS 12.7% (0.3) 
 
20.1% (0.4) 
PPO 56.0% (0.5) 
 
57.5% (0.5) 
CDHP/HDHP 17.6% (0.4)   9.8% (0.3) 
Notes: The table shows the means and standard errors of the key variables in the 
modeling sample compared with the full sample. Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-
provider specialty. Samples are constructed from the MarketScan outpatient claims 
database from 2008 to 2014. Sample selection criteria are detailed in the text. Plan type 
acronyms are exclusive provider organizations (EPO), health maintenance organizations 
(HMO), point-of-service (POS), preferred provider organization (PPO), and consumer-
driven health plans/high deductible health plans (CDHP/HDHP). Prospective risk score 
is the annual predicted spending using diagnoses from the prior year.  
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Table 3-3. Predictors of number of in-network providers per 1,000 patients 
  Log(number of in-network providers per 1,000 patients) 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
         # claims (10,000's) -0.082 *** -0.083 *** -0.047 *** -0.048 *** 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 Mean risk score 
  
-0.121 *** 0.065 *** -0.022 
 
   
(0.015) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.021) 
 
         MSA fixed effects 
    
X 
 
X 
 Provider specialty fixed effects 
      
X 
 Observations 3,672 
 
3,672 
 
3,672 
 
3,672 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.078   0.093   0.357   0.429   
Notes: This table shows the regression results from estimating model (1) in the text, with each column gradually adding 
controls. The dependent variable is log of number of in-network providers per 1,000 patients. Unit of observation is plan-
year-MSA-provider specialty. Sample size is 3,672 and the sample selection criteria are discussed in the text. Column (1) 
number of claims (10,000's) to capture the nonlinear relationship between number of claims and provider counts. Column (2) 
adds a prospective risk score averaged over individuals in plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. Column (3) additionally 
controls for metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects. For metropolitan areas, we used the MarketScan originally 
assigned MSAs, and for rural areas, we assigned values using state identifiers. Column (4) further controls for provider 
specialty fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-4. Average and quantile-specific effects of plan types on provider network breadth 
 Average Quantiles (Log of number of in-network providers per 1,000 patients) 
 Effect 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
EPO -0.221** -0.327** -0.268 -0.383** -0.355* -0.223 -0.191 -0.101 -0.202 -0.178 
 
(0.106) (0.157) (0.178) (0.174) (0.185) (0.214) (0.228) (0.249) (0.228) (0.164) 
HMO -0.482*** -0.502** -0.671*** -0.536*** -0.437*** -0.418*** -0.442*** -0.365*** -0.323*** -0.169* 
 
(0.065) (0.205) (0.158) (0.170) (0.135) (0.117) (0.096) (0.085) (0.103) (0.091) 
POS 0.030 0.405*** 0.108* -0.004 -0.050 -0.079* -0.110** -0.123** -0.152*** -0.184*** 
 
(0.041) (0.097) (0.063) (0.056) (0.050) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) 
CDHP/HDHP 0.265*** 0.354*** 0.269*** 0.245*** 0.196*** 0.172*** 0.134*** 0.112*** 0.073 0.052 
 
(0.046) (0.089) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.049) (0.051) 
Prospective 
RRS -0.008 0.001 0.017 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.012 0.001 0.004 
 
(0.021) (0.040) (0.035) (0.032) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.039) 
           Observations 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.447                   
Notes: This table shows both the average and quantile-specific plan type effects on the log of number of in-network providers per 1,000 patients. Each 
column is a different regression. Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. Sample size is 3,672 and the sample selection criteria are 
discussed in the text. The first column replicates column (5) of Table 3-3, and the rest of the columns show results for the quantiles of log of number of 
in-network providers per 1,000 patients from 10 to 90 incremented by 10. All regressions control for five plan type dummies including exclusive 
provider organizations (EPO), health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service (POS), and consumer-driven health plans/high deductible 
health plans (CDHP/HDHP) (with preferred provider organization (PPO) being the omitted plan type), metropolitan statistical area (MSA) (rural areas 
as separate MSAs) fixed effects, number of claims (10,000's), a prospective risk score averaged over individuals in plan-year-MSA-provider specialty, 
and provider specialty fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-5. OLS estimates of the effects of provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs 
  
Spending 
  
Pr(Spending>0) 
  
Spending | spending>0 
  
Provider price | 
spending>0 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
            Size of provider 
network 29.27 542.39*** 0.002 0.17*** 
 
28.49 156.86** 
 
2.36*** 0.16 
 
(27.46) (79.30) 
 
(0.002) (0.03) 
 
(29.17) (70.19) 
 
(0.85) (1.50) 
Average cost share -199.49*** -441.18*** -0.02*** -0.07*** 
 
-189.35*** -324.23*** -5.06*** -3.15*** 
 
(30.52) (83.59) 
 
(0.003) (0.02) 
 
(34.59) (54.15) 
 
(1.40) (1.02) 
Risk score 3,269.69*** 2,846.00*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 
3253.08*** 2965.05*** 12.53*** 13.23*** 
 
(59.90) (74.03) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(59.72) (61.42) 
 
(0.51) (1.07) 
            Observations 1,929,016 1,929,016 
 
1,929,016 1,929,016 
 
1,680,486 1,605,348 
 
1,680,485 1,605,346 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.18 
 
0.04 0.15 
 
0.19 0.18 
 
0.03 0.03 
Dep. Var. mean 2430 2201 
 
0.87 0.83 
 
2789 2645 
 
92.52 92.67 
Notes: This table shows the OLS effects of provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs. Observations are individual years. The four 
outcomes of interest are (1) unconditional spending, (2) the probability of positive spending, (3) the amount of spending conditional on positive 
spending, and (4) the price paid per service conditional on positive spending. Within each outcome, spending and spending paid in-network are 
examined separately. Spending and prices are adjusted to 2014 dollars. Coefficients shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects 
that correspond to one standard deviation of increase in the variables. All regressions also control for (results not shown) year fixed effects, employer-
year-family coverage type fixed effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-6. 2SLS estimates of the effects of provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs 
  Spending   Pr(Spending>0)   Spending | spending>0   
Provider price | 
spending>0 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
            Size of provider 
network 167.06 769.77*** 0.02 0.23*** 
 
151.69 214.81  4.93 5.94 
 
(228.15) (290.65) 
 
(0.02) (0.06) 
 
(240.87) (420.21)  (5.73) (9.51) 
Average cost share -172.00*** -395.90*** -0.02*** -0.06*** 
 
-164.47*** -324.83***  -4.54*** -3.23*** 
 
(57.63) (78.65) 
 
(0.005) (0.02) 
 
(62.25) (53.28)  (1.62) (0.98) 
Risk score 3,270.32*** 2,847.03*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 
3,253.67*** 2,965.26***  12.54*** 13.25*** 
 
(59.89) (73.83) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(59.72) (61.42)  (0.51) (1.07) 
         
  
 Observations 1,929,012 1,929,012 
 
1,929,012 1,929,012 
 
1,680,482 1,605,344  1,680,481 1,605,342 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.18 
 
0.03 0.15 
 
0.19 0.18  0.03 0.03 
Dep. Var. mean 2430 2201 
 
0.87 0.83 
 
2789 2645  92.52 92.67 
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs, in which each individual’s plan network 
breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan. Individual choice probabilities are 
estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. Observations are individual years. The four outcomes of interest 
are (1) unconditional spending, (2) the probability of positive spending, (3) the amount of spending conditional on positive spending, and (4) the price 
paid per service conditional on positive spending. Within each outcome, spending and spending paid in-network are examined separately. Spending 
and prices are adjusted to 2014 dollars. Coefficients shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects that correspond to one standard 
deviation of increase in the variables. All regressions also control for (results not shown) year fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage type fixed 
effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-7. The effects of provider network breadth on costs paid by patients and by insurers 
  All spending | >0  In-network spending | >0  
Out-of-network spending 
| >0 
 
Patient-paid Insurer-paid  Patient-paid Insurer-paid  Patient-paid Insurer-paid 
         Size of provider network 57.14* 98.55 
 
-6.71 226.12 
 
129.78** -891.46*** 
 
(33.77) (217.75) 
 
(44.48) (395.18) 
 
(65.95) (223.31) 
Average cost share 128.37*** -291.30*** 
 
85.89*** -407.86*** 
 
109.76** -4.16 
 
(11.85) (56.12) 
 
(9.00) (49.82) 
 
(44.86) (124.05) 
Risk score 177.74*** 3091.21*** 
 
140.58*** 2,833.42*** 
 
94.26*** 1354.31*** 
 
(7.82) (59.41) 
 
(7.51) (61.01) 
 
(13.12) (143.37) 
         Observations 1,680,482 1,680,482 
 
1,605,344 1,605,344 
 
218,011 218,011 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.19 
 
0.11 0.17 
 
0.04 0.10 
Dep. Var. mean 401 2389 
 
359 2286 
 
448 1606 
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on outpatient costs borne by patients and by insurers. 
Individual plan network breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in 
the same plan, in which choice probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan 
types. Observations are individual years. The three outcomes of interest are (1) overall spending conditional on positive 
spending, (2) spending paid for in-network services conditional on positive in-network spending, and (3) spending paid for 
out-of-network services conditional on positive out-of-network spending. Within each outcome, out-of-pocket spending by 
consumers and costs borne by insurers are examined separately. All types of spending are adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
Coefficients shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects that correspond to one standard deviation of 
increase in the variables. All regressions also control for (results not shown) year fixed effects, employer-year-family 
coverage type fixed effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-8. Means (standard deviations) of outcomes of interest on the full sample, and by subgroups 
  N  Spending  Pr(Spending>0)  Spending | spending>0  Provider price | 
spending>0 
  All In-network  All In-
network 
 All In-network  All In-
network 
Full Sample 1,929,016  2,430.01 2,200.82  0.871 0.83  2,789.39 2,644.54  92.52 92.67 
   (7407.09) (6821.73)  (0.34) (0.37)  (7872.53) (7398.99)  (102.53) (111.22) 
By health status              
    Risk scores below  1,447,023  1,443.46 1,324.95  0.84 0.80  1,727.17 1,656.26  87.74 87.86 
75th percentile   (3816.48) (3568.01)  (0.37) (0.40)  (4115.62) (3919.86)  (95.80) (95.41) 
    Risk scores above  481,993  5,391.81 4,830.32  0.98 0.93  5,515.84 5,199.41  104.77 105.12 
75th percentile   (12812.37) (11781.67)  (0.15) (0.26)  (12932.48) (12144.76)  (117.17) (143.53) 
By gender              
    Male 879,911  2,047.73 1,847.30  0.82 0.79  2,485.45 2,349.29  94.68 94.93 
   (7162.41) (6543.13)  (0.38) (0.41)  (7821.65) (7298.44)  (116.18) (135.03) 
    Female 1,049,105  2,750.64 2,497.32  0.91 0.87  3,019.98 2,868.18  90.87 90.96 
   (7591.42) (7033.22)  (0.29) (0.34)  (7903.12) (7466.49)  (90.78) (89.01) 
By age group              
    Age < 18 506,399  1,275.66 1,186.06  0.88 0.85  1,453.68 1,400.47  81.33 81.37 
   (3924.93) (3675.81)  (0.33) (0.36)  (4158.86) (3956.51)  (80.74) (80.97) 
    Age >=18 & <50 950,181  2,292.14 2,093.88  0.85 0.81  2,710.26 2,577.47  94.98 95.11 
   (6839.63) (6285.36)  (0.36) (0.39)  (7360.76) (6883.55)  (103.63) (120.66) 
    Age >= 50 472,436  3,944.64 3,503.59  0.92 0.86  4,308.79 4,091.30  99.44 100.00 
   (10471.93) (9656.61)  (0.28) (0.35)  (10872.70) (10319.29)  (118.35) (118.99) 
Notes: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of outcomes of interest on the full sample (N=1,929,016) and by health 
status, gender, and age group. The four outcomes of interest are (1) unconditional spending, (2) the probability of positive spending, (3) the amount of 
spending conditional on positive spending, and (4) the price paid per service conditional on positive spending. Within each outcome, I separately 
examine spending and spending paid in-network. Spending and prices are adjusted to 2014 dollars.  
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Table 3-9. The heterogeneity effects of provider network breadth by health status, by gender, and by age group 
 Obs  Spending  Pr(Spending>0)  Spending | spending>0  Price | spending>0 
  All In-network  All In-network  All In-network  All In-network 
By health status              
    Risk scores 
below  
1,447,022  125.81 409.91*** 0.003 0.21***  136.51 70.81  4.68 7.08 
75th percentile   (126.91) (153.78)  (0.02) (0.06)  (124.90) (239.77)  (4.57) (8.35) 
    Risk scores 
above  
481,990  491.11 1494.29*** 0.01* 0.23***  454.31 791.17  5.52 2.75 
75th percentile   (478.80) (565.08)  (0.01) (0.06)  (480.43) (869.00)  (8.00) (13.03) 
By gender              
    Male 879,910  125.85 568.02**  0.03 0.22***  99.76 0.28  2.72 0.92 
   (242.33) (281.58)  (0.02) (0.06)  (269.53) (400.77)  (6.42) (9.84) 
    Female 1,049,102  207.27 933.17*** 0.02 0.24***  192.68 431.3  6.26 9.28 
   (237.15) (312.07)  (0.02) (0.06)  (238.14) (470.23)  (5.30) (9.63) 
By age group              
    Age < 18 506,399  124.66 427.54*** -0.004 0.24***  136.95 271.99  7.20** 9.41 
   (135.62) (118.01)  (0.02) (0.06)  (144.82) (287.40)  (3.60) (8.88) 
    Age >=18 & <50 950,180  362.21** 917.20*** 0.02 0.27***  376.86** 664.7  9.89** 12.5 
   (181.31) (197.61)  (0.02) (0.05)  (190.62) (527.50)  (4.22) (10.69) 
    Age >= 50 472,433  145.74 1,060.37*** 0.01 0.24***  120.26 133.24  3.37 -3.17 
   (302.95) (358.89)  (0.01) (0.05)  (318.34) (572.08)  (6.87) (12.42) 
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs by health status, gender, and age. Individual 
plan network breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan, in which choice 
probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. Observations are individual years (sample sizes 
used for unconditional models are shown in the first column). The four outcomes of interest are (1) unconditional spending, (2) the probability of 
positive spending, (3) the amount of spending conditional on positive spending, and (4) the price paid per service conditional on positive spending. 
Within each outcome, spending and spending paid in-network are examined separately. Spending and prices are adjusted to 2014 dollars. Coefficients 
shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects that correspond to one standard deviation of increase in the variables. All regressions 
also control for (results not shown) average cost share in plan-year-MSA, individual risk score, year fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage type 
fixed effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-10. The effects of provider network breadth for three types of provider specialty 
  Spending  Pr(Spending>0)  Spending | spending>0  
Provider price | 
spending>0 
 All In-network  All In-network  All In-network  All In-network 
            
Primary care            
Size of provider network 51.53 134.39*** 0.01 0.19***  58.09 -103.26  -4.39 -16.14* 
 (36.17) (38.06)  (0.02) (0.06)  (43.85) (90.28)  (4.20) (9.28) 
Average cost share -40.03*** -58.28***  -0.02** -0.06***  -40.87*** -57.91***  -4.23*** -1.95*** 
 (12.27) (14.23)  (0.01) (0.02)  (14.75) (14.84)  (1.26) (1.26) 
Risk score 224.55*** 208.10*** 0.05*** 0.05***  224.78*** 219.95*** 3.28*** 3.47*** 
 (28.76) (28.21)  (0.001) (0.001)  (30.01) (31.04)  (0.94) (1.13) 
            
Observations 1,929,012 1,929,012  1,929,012 1,929,012  1,457,065 1,386,084  1,457,059 1,386,079 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.06  0.04 0.1  0.06 0.06  0.01 0.01 
Dep. Var. mean 416.4 388.5  0.755 0.719  551.3 540.7  64.7 64.99 
            
Radiology            
Size of provider network 22.97 50.06**  -0.05 0.06  82.74** 70.83  24.29** 14.91 
 (25.20) (25.38)  (0.04) (0.04)  (41.17) (118.78)  (10.62) (32.83) 
Average cost share -1.67 -9.76  -0.004 -0.03**  -9.93 -47.20***  -9.09** -13.28*** 
 (6.56) (6.78)  (0.01) (0.01)  (14.85) (16.60)  (3.89) (4.30) 
Risk score 102.22*** 94.49***  0.10*** 0.09***  110.12*** 108.09*** 5.99*** 6.13*** 
 (5.66) (5.64)  (0.003) (0.004)  (6.24) (6.57)  (0.33) (0.35) 
            
Observations 1,929,012 1,929,012  1,929,012 1,929,012  568,774 532,160  568,774 532,160 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.02  0.09 0.1  0.02 0.02  0.1 0.1 
Dep. Var. mean 101.5 95.03  0.295 0.276  344.2 344.5  96.3 97.51 
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Ambulance            
Size of provider network 3.52 7.93*  -0.005* 0.0006  347.11** 85.48  8.66 11.01 
 (4.95) (4.46)  (0.003) (0.003)  (154.42) (398.39)  (5.63) (24.25) 
Average cost share 1.94 -0.84  -0.0001 -0.002***  140.58 55.29  2.54 -1.9 
 (1.56) (1.39)  (0.001) (0.001)  (96.59) (83.22)  (5.75) (8.46) 
Risk score 18.27*** 13.08***  0.01*** 0.01***  92.40*** 79.32***  -0.86 -0.53 
 (2.44) (2.01)  (0.001) (0.001)  (20.41) (20.75)  (0.75) (0.84) 
            
Observations 1,929,012 1,929,012  1,929,012 1,929,012  22,303 17,506  1,338 1,072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.003  0.01 0.01  0.03 0.03  0.02 0.04 
Dep. Var. mean 13 10  0.012 0.009  1146 1112  86.14 84.38 
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs for three provider specialty types - primary 
care, radiology, and ambulance. Individual plan network breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other 
individuals in the same plan, in which choice probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. 
Observations are individual years. The four outcomes of interest are (1) unconditional spending, (2) the probability of positive spending, (3) the 
amount of spending conditional on positive spending, and (4) the price paid per service conditional on positive spending. Within each outcome, 
spending and spending paid in-network are examined separately. Spending and prices are adjusted to 2014 dollars. Coefficients shown in the table are 
standardized ones interpreted as the effects that correspond to one standard deviation of increase in the variables. All regressions also control for 
(results not shown) year fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage type fixed effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-11. The effects of provider network breadth on professional vs. facility prices 
  Overall provider price 
 
Professional price 
 
Facility price 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
 
All In-network 
 
        
 
      
  
      
 Size of provider network 4.93 
 
5.94 
  
-2.00 
 
-9.61 
  
41.32 
 
132.42 
 
 
(5.73) 
 
(9.51) 
  
(3.93) 
 
(7.27) 
  
(38.94) 
 
(96.69) 
 Average cost share -4.54 *** -3.23 *** 
 
-4.61 *** -3.00 *** 
 
-28.98 ** -18.38 
 
 
(1.62) 
 
(0.98) 
  
(1.10) 
 
(0.91) 
  
(14.58) 
 
(12.84) 
 Risk score 12.54 *** 13.25 *** 
 
7.48 *** 7.60 *** 
 
8.46 *** 9.98 *** 
 
(0.51) 
 
(1.07) 
  
(0.70) 
 
(0.78) 
  
(1.12) 
 
(2.01) 
 
               Observations 1,680,481 
 
1,605,342 
  
1,674,427 
 
1,600,314 
  
740,196 
 
697,099 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.03 
 
0.03 
  
0.008 
 
0.007 
  
0.03 
 
0.02 
 Dep. Var. mean 92.52   92.67     77.85   78.08     288.7   284.0   
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on overall provider prices as well as professional and facility prices, in which 
each individual’s plan network breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan. 
Individual choice probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. Observations are individual 
years. Coefficients shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects that correspond to one standard deviation of increase in the 
variables. All regressions also control for (results not shown) year fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage type fixed effects, and plan type-MSA 
fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-12. The effects of provider network breadth on inpatient spending 
  Spending  Pr(Spending>0) 
  Spending | spending>0 
   
All Patient-paid Insurer-paid 
 
    
 
    
 
          
 Size of provider network -106.73 
  
0.003 
  
-2522.21 
 
674.49 ** -3196.03 * 
 
(127.72) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(1766.88) 
 
(272.76) 
 
(1871.40) 
 Average cost share -9.06 
  
-0.001 
  
405.71 
 
347.48 *** 54.89 
 
 
(35.58) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(677.04) 
 
(113.43) 
 
(722.41) 
 Risk score 1687.99 *** 
 
0.04 *** 
 
2734.67 *** -18.27 *** 2755.99 *** 
 
(47.89) 
  
(0.001) 
  
(115.77) 
 
(3.22) 
 
(115.08) 
 
             Observations 1,929,012 
  
1,929,012 
  
83,311 
 
83,311 
 
83,311 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.05 
  
0.05 
  
0.06 
 
0.12 
 
0.06 
 Dep. Var. mean 932.5     0.04     21591   1007   20594   
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on inpatient spending. Individual plan network breadth 
is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan, in which choice 
probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. Observations are 
individual years. The three outcomes of interest are (1) inpatient spending, (2) the probability of positive inpatient spending, 
and (3) inpatient spending conditional on positive spending. Conditional on positive inpatient spending, I examine all 
spending, out-of-pocket spending by consumers, and spending paid by insurers. All types of spending are adjusted to 2014 
dollars. Coefficients shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects that correspond to one standard 
deviation of increase in the variables. All regressions also control for (results not shown) year fixed effects, employer-year-
family coverage type fixed effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-
MSA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-13. The heterogeneity effects of provider network breadth on inpatient spending by health status, by gender, and by age 
group 
  By health status  By gender  By age group 
 
Risk scores 
below 75th 
percentile 
Risk scores 
above 75th 
percentile 
 
Male Female 
 
Age < 18 
Age >=18 & 
<50 Age >= 50 
          Size of provider network -9.84 -400.88 
 
-105.71 -116.51 
 
38.02 54.81 -258.12 
 
(57.93) (317.42) 
 
(136.76) (149.11) 
 
(91.84) (91.12) (208.95) 
Average cost share 11.02 -111.8 
 
1.5 -21.41 
 
2.3 26.05 -46.33 
 
(17.77) (122.68) 
 
(38.10) (44.37) 
 
(18.97) (27.55) (94.09) 
Risk score 1215.15*** 1707.86*** 
 
1618.87*** 1759.61*** 
 
2241.53*** 1677.85*** 1606.20*** 
 
(36.46) (56.94) 
 
(56.04) (54.12) 
 
(153.05) (72.17) (53.26) 
          Observations 1,447,022 481,990 
 
879,910 1,049,102 
 
506,399 950,180 472,433 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.05 
 
0.04 0.05 
 
0.06 0.05 0.04 
Dep. Var. mean 390.9 2558 
 
820.5 1026 
 
311.6 886.7 1690 
Notes: This table shows the 2SLS effects of provider network breadth on inpatient spending by health status, gender, and age. Individual 
plan network breadth is instrumented by the mean predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan, in which 
choice probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan types. Observations are individual 
years (sample sizes used for unconditional models are shown in the first column). For all subgroups, the outcome of interest is overall 
inpatient spending including zero spending. Coefficients shown in the table are standardized ones interpreted as the effects that 
correspond to one standard deviation of increase in the variables. All regressions also control for (results not shown) year fixed effects, 
employer-year-family coverage type fixed effects, and plan type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-
MSA. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-14. Provider network breadth and market concentration 
A. plan-MSA-provider specialty level (N=3,672) 
  HHI1 HHI2 Predicted network breadth 
HHI1 1 0.81 -0.10 
HHI2 
 
1 -0.05 
Predicted network breadth 
  
1 
    B. plan-MSA level (N=1,605) 
  HHI1 HHI2 Predicted network breadth 
HHI1 1 0.99 0.85 
HHI2 
 
1 0.86 
Predicted network breadth 
  
1 
    Notes: These two tables show the correlations between predicted provider 
network breadth and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of provider 
market concentration at two “market” levels. In both levels, HHI is calculated 
as the sum of squared market share across all observed providers in the market. 
I calculate market shares in two ways, one as the share in number of claims, 
and another as the share in dollar payments, denoted as HHI1 and HHI2, 
respectively. 
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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 3-5. Plan type effects (relative to PPO) on log(number of providers per 1,000 
patients) across quantiles 
Notes: This figure shows the plan type effects on the log of number of providers per 
1,000 patients across quantiles of provider network breadth (quantiles run from 10 to 90 
incremented by 10). Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. Sample 
size is 3,672 and the sample selection criteria are discussed in the text. The regression 
controls for five plan type dummies including exclusive provider organizations (EPO), 
health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service (POS), and consumer-driven 
health plans/high deductible health plans (CDHP/HDHP) (with preferred provider 
organization (PPO) being the omitted plan type), metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
(rural areas as separate MSAs) fixed effects, number of claims (10,000's), a prospective 
risk score averaged over individuals in plan-year-MSA-provider specialty, and provider 
specialty fixed effects. Coefficients for this regression model are shown in Appendix 
Table 3-20, column 2 to 10.
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Table 3-15. Health plan type definitions and degrees of cost sharing and provider network generosity 
Plan Type Acronym Description Provider Network Cost Share (%) 
Exclusive Provider 
Organization EPO 
Patients must get care from in-network 
providers; gatekeeper; no capitation 
Increasing choice of 
providers 18.6 
Health Maintenance 
Organization HMO 
Same as EPO, but at least some services 
are paid on capitated basis 
 
14.6 
Point-of-Service, 
noncapitated POS 
Patients have financial incentives to use 
in-network providers; gatekeeper 23.6 
Preferred Provider 
Organization PPO 
Patients have financial incentives to use 
in-network providers; no gatekeeper 30.2 
Consumer-Driven/High 
Deductible Health Plan CDHP/HDHP 
High deductible health plans with either a 
Health Reimbursement (CDHP) or Health 
Savings Account (HDHP); no gatekeeper 
40.6 
Notes: This table is replicated from Table 1 in Ellis and Zhu (2016) with the last column recalculated on the full sample of 
MarketScan enrollees in 2014 who incurred claims for outpatient services (N=33,370,613). Plan type descriptions (the first 
four columns) are based on 2014 Truven MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database User’s Guide Exhibit 12. 
Cost share (the last column) is calculated by taking the ratio of patient out-of-pocket payments (i.e., sum of copay, 
coinsurance, and deductible payments) to total spending that includes both patient out-of-pocket spending and plan payments. 
The cost share values here are higher than those in Ellis and Zhu (2016) largely because inpatient services, which typically 
involve much lower cost shares, are excluded here. 
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Table 3-16. Association between employer plan type offering and employee characteristics 
  =1 if employer offers the following Number of 
plan types 
offered 
  
  EPO 
 
HMO 
 
POS 
 
PPO 
 
CDHP/HDHP 
 
  
                          
Employee age (/100) 0.009 
 
0.104 
 
0.010 
 
0.072 ** -0.047 
 
0.165 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.190) 
 Employee is male 0.009 ** -0.018 
 
0.007 
 
-0.019 *** 0.010 
 
-0.013 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.014) 
 Family size 0.00003 
 
0.006 
 
0.001 
 
-0.001 
 
0.003 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.033) 
 Spouse is present in household 0.003 
 
-0.024 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.001 
 
0.003 
 
-0.028 
 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.078) 
 Baby born in previous 12 months -0.001 
 
0.014 
 
0.002 
 
0.005 
 
-0.005 
 
0.016 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.029) 
 Employee risk score -0.0001 
 
-0.004 ** -0.003 * -0.0001 
 
0.00006 
 
-0.007 ** 
 
(0.0002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.0005) 
 
(0.003) 
 
             Observations 945,086 
 
945,086 
 
945,086 
 
945,086 
 
945,086 
 
945,086 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.534 
 
0.445 
 
0.443 
 
0.644 
 
0.422 
 
0.342 
 Dep. Var. mean 0.01 
 
0.28 
 
0.29 
 
0.75 
 
0.15 
 
1.50 
 Notes: This table shows the association between employer offering of plan types during years 2008-2014 and characteristics of employees 
in the prior year. Each column is a different regression. The first five columns examine whether or not an employer offers each of the five 
plan types studied here, and the last column focuses on the total number of plan types offered. Sample size is 945,086 employee years 
(associated with the 1,929,016 individual years in the analysis sample). Plan type acronyms are described in Appendix Table 3-15. 
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the employer-year-family coverage type level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10 
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Table 3-17. Characteristics of health plans in the modeling sample by plan type 
  EPO (N=120) HMO (N=344) POS (N=738) PPO (N=2,110) 
CDHP/HDHP 
(N=360) 
Variable Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
           # providers 53.44 (95.20) 46.59 (89.60) 85.31 (206.32) 60.75 (117.62) 41.63 (85.29) 
# in-network providers 50.15 (91.54) 38.10 (81.54) 63.19 (49.94) 39.21 (90.58) 38.34 (78.68) 
% in-network claims  99.6% (0.02) 97.5% (0.09) 94.9% (0.12) 95.7% (0.13) 97.3% (0.06) 
# in-network providers per patient 0.13 (0.10) 0.13 (0.10) 0.13 (0.10) 0.16 (0.11) 0.21 (0.11) 
Prospective risk score 1.62 (0.46) 1.61 (0.66) 1.90 (1.44) 1.74 (0.79) 1.43 (0.79) 
Notes: This table shows the means and standard errors of the key variables by plan type in the modeling sample. Unit of observation is 
plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. The sample size is 3,672. Sample is constructed from the MarketScan outpatient claims database 
from 2008 to 2014. Sample selection criteria are detailed in the text. Plan type acronyms are exclusive provider organizations (EPO), 
health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service (POS), preferred provider organization (PPO), and consumer-driven health 
plans/high deductible health plans (CDHP/HDHP). Prospective risk score is the annual predicted spending using diagnoses from the 
prior year. 
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Table 3-18. Characteristics of health plans in the modeling sample by provider specialty 
Provider specialties Obs. 
# 
providers 
per MSA 
# in-
network 
providers 
% in-
network 
claims 
# in-
network 
providers 
per patient 
Prospective 
risk score 
Primary care 372 171.74 118.91 92.3% 0.20 1.09 
  
(339.70) (244.14) (0.22) (0.14) (0.37) 
General surgery 72 39.42 36.47 97.5% 0.14 2.29 
  
(41.84) (38.24) (0.07) (0.09) (0.53) 
Medical specialists 196 135.60 100.73 93.9% 0.16 1.58 
  
(188.58) (136.34) (0.16) (0.11) (0.49) 
Otolaryngology 68 29.68 27.94 99.4% 0.08 1.52 
  
(23.12) (20.81) (0.01) (0.06) (0.34) 
Cardiology 81 42.43 38.46 98.9% 0.09 2.58 
  
(39.60) (35.86) (0.02) (0.06) (0.43) 
Dermatology 84 38.88 36.11 99.2% 0.07 1.40 
  
(35.10) (32.66) (0.02) (0.07) (0.35) 
Neurology 82 32.74 29.90 98.2% 0.14 2.50 
  
(29.96) (25.78) (0.03) (0.09) (0.40) 
Ob/Gyn 120 62.77 58.16 97.6% 0.09 1.45 
  
(68.54) (63.66) (0.11) (0.07) (0.38) 
Ophtho & Optometry 109 55.01 50.07 97.3% 0.13 1.86 
  
(55.33) (49.36) (0.04) (0.08) (0.42) 
Surgical specialists 107 50.55 46.40 99.1% 0.12 1.90 
  
(50.58) (44.77) (0.02) (0.09) (0.43) 
Orthopedic surgery 52 26.54 21.81 93.1% 0.16 1.91 
  
(18.78) (14.34) (0.12) (0.08) (0.70) 
Psychiatry/psychology 151 52.03 32.36 84.3% 0.22 1.91 
  
(67.93) (52.86) (0.17) (0.12) (0.53) 
Pulmonary 47 23.30 21.51 97.9% 0.11 3.04 
  
(16.24) (14.24) (0.04) (0.08) (0.78) 
Radiology 150 65.09 56.95 98.2% 0.07 1.62 
  
(80.92) (71.73) (0.08) (0.07) (0.45) 
Urology 61 31.95 29.85 99.3% 0.09 2.60 
  
(25.34) (22.88) (0.01) (0.05) (0.62) 
Chiropractic 102 63.74 52.15 92.6% 0.15 1.47 
  
(68.68) (55.33) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) 
Podiatry 75 28.85 26.47 98.2% 0.10 2.00 
  
(23.48) (21.62) (0.04) (0.07) (0.38) 
Ambulance 45 35.13 17.00 84.4% 0.10 2.72 
  
(26.86) (25.25) (0.31) (0.09) (0.75) 
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Rheumatology 35 17.37 16.46 99.4% 0.08 3.15 
  
(7.75) (6.95) (0.02) (0.06) (0.44) 
Multispecialty clinic 
organization 31 38.45 29.00 89.2% 0.15 1.38 
  
(42.32) (35.65) (0.21) (0.10) (0.69) 
Oncology 35 22.17 20.63 99.2% 0.12 4.99 
  
(13.76) (12.37) (0.02) (0.09) (1.30) 
Emergency medicine 98 66.69 55.98 96.7% 0.09 1.52 
  
(73.31) (66.41) (0.10) (0.07) (0.45) 
Inpatient Facility, no SP 1297 43.21 39.60 98.4% 0.20 1.45 
  
(69.56) (62.89) (0.06) (0.11) (0.42) 
Office/clinic/amb center, no SP 131 38.76 32.40 93.5% 0.12 1.66 
  
(35.07) (29.98) (0.10) (0.09) (0.51) 
SNF/intermediate care, no SP 4 18.75 12.75 76.3% 0.24 10.71 
  
(10.05) (5.74) (0.24) (0.12) (11.04) 
Hospice, no SP 3 14.00 6.00 68.4% 0.25 13.75 
  
(3.00) (1.73) (0.35) (0.08) (2.97) 
Home/mobile clinic, no 
procedure 64 35.70 25.20 85.2% 0.12 3.34 
  
 
(39.91) (26.57) (0.15) (0.09) (1.61) 
Notes: This table shows the means and standard errors of the key variables by provider specialty in the 
modeling sample. Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. The sample size is 3,672. 
Sample is constructed from the MarketScan outpatient claims database from 2008 to 2014. Sample 
selection criteria are detailed in the text. Plan type acronyms are exclusive provider organizations (EPO), 
health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service (POS), preferred provider organization (PPO), 
and consumer-driven health plans/high deductible health plans (CDHP/HDHP). Prospective risk score is 
the annual predicted spending using diagnoses from the prior year.  
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Table 3-19. Robustness check: Predictors of number of providers per 1,000 patients 
  Log(number of providers per 1,000 patients) 
  (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
         # claims (10,000's) -0.068 *** -0.069 *** -0.041 *** -0.049 *** 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 Mean risk score 
  
-0.090 *** 0.063 *** 0.019 
 
   
(0.013) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.017) 
 
         MSA fixed effects 
    
X 
 
X 
 Provider specialty fixed effects 
      
X 
 Observations 3,672 
 
3,672 
 
3,672 
 
3,672 
 Adjusted R-squared 0.070   0.081   0.342   0.509   
Notes: This table checks the robustness of Table 3-3 by replacing the dependent variable with 
log of number of total providers (including in-network and out-of-network providers) per 1,000 
patients. Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. Sample size is 3,672 and the 
sample selection criteria are discussed in the text. Column (1) number of claims (10,000's) to 
capture the nonlinear relationship between number of claims and provider counts. Column (2) 
adds a prospective risk score averaged over individuals in plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. 
Column (3) additionally controls for metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects. For 
metropolitan areas, we used the MarketScan originally assigned MSAs, and for rural areas, we 
assigned values using state identifiers. Column (4) further controls for provider specialty fixed 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-20. Robustness check: Average and quantile-specific effects of plan types on provider network breadth 
  Average 
Effect 
Quantiles (Log of number of providers per 1,000 patients) 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
 
  
         EPO -0.323*** -0.335*** -0.298*** -0.410*** -0.378*** -0.272* -0.301* -0.259 -0.266 -0.344** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.15) 
HMO -0.375*** -0.482** -0.456*** -0.326** -0.364*** -0.344*** -0.331*** -0.269*** -0.227*** -0.223*** 
 
(0.05) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
POS -0.146*** -0.001 -0.042 -0.080* -0.101* -0.103** -0.134*** -0.159*** -0.192*** -0.197*** 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
CDHP/HDHP 0.174*** 0.208*** 0.193*** 0.178*** 0.140*** 0.111*** 0.077* 0.08 0.033 -0.008 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Prospective 
RRS 0.024 0.03 0.041 0.007 0.004 -0.012 -0.021 0.005 0.003 0.016 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
  
         Observations 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 3,672 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.431                   
Notes: This table shows both the average and quantile-specific plan type effects on the log of number of providers per 1,000 patients. Each column is a 
different regression. Unit of observation is plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. Sample size is 3,672 and the sample selection criteria are discussed in 
the text. The first column replicates column (5) of Appendix Table 3-19, and the rest of the columns show results for the quantiles of log of number of 
providers per 1,000 patients from 10 to 90 incremented by 10. All regressions control for five plan type dummies including exclusive provider 
organizations (EPO), health maintenance organizations (HMO), point-of-service (POS), and consumer-driven health plans/high deductible health plans 
(CDHP/HDHP) (with preferred provider organization (PPO) being the omitted plan type), metropolitan statistical area (MSA) (rural areas as separate 
MSAs) fixed effects, number of claims (10,000's), a prospective risk score averaged over individuals in plan-year-MSA-provider specialty, and 
provider specialty fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 3-21. First stage results of the 2SLS models showing the effects of provider network 
breadth on health care utilization and costs 
  
Predicted size of provider 
network 
 
    
 
Coef 
 
 
(Std Err) 
 
   Average cost share -0.16 
 
 
(0.12) 
 Health status (risk score) -0.005 ** 
 
(0.002) 
 Mean EPO prob -22.67 
 
 
(23.03) 
 Mean HMO prob -38.08 * 
 
(21.15) 
 Mean POS prob -1.41 
 
 
(14.77) 
 Mean PPO prob -6.65 
 
 
(13.42) 
 Mean CDHP prob -14.31 
 
 
(17.27) 
 Mean HDHP prob -4.91 
 
 
(14.87) 
 
   Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) 13.58 (P-val = 0.0347) 
Overridentification test (Hansen J statistic) 5.984 (P-val = 0.3078) 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) 0.99   
Notes: This table reports the first stage results of the 2SLS models showing the effects of 
provider network breadth on health care utilization and costs. The predicted size of provider 
network is the exponential of the residual from estimating model (1) using log of number of in-
network providers per 1,000 patients as the dependent variable. The instruments are mean 
predicted plan type choice probabilities of other individuals in the same plan. Individual choice 
probabilities are estimated from multinomial logit models capturing household choice of plan 
types. The probabilities of two consumer-driven health plan types – consumer-driven health plan 
(CDHP) and high-deductible health plan (HDHP) – were predicted separately in multinomial 
logit models, and thus both were used as instruments. Other exogenous control variables include 
a prospective model risk score capturing individual health status, average annual cost share in 
plan-year-MSA, year fixed effects, employer-year-family coverage type fixed effects, and plan 
type-MSA fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at plan-year-MSA. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Appendix B: Proof of Monotonicity Properties of the Rank Index 
Without loss of generality, I suppress all the subscripts in the notations. 
Let ! and " be the number of distinct patient visits and the number of distinct observed 
providers in a plan-year-MSA-provider specialty. 
We want to show: #(!|") is strictly increasing/decreasing in !/". 
Denote ( ≡ *(!) = 1 − (1 − ./)0 and note that *′(!) = −21 − ./30 45 21 − ./3 > 0. 
Then we have: #(!|") = *(!)8	 + "*(!)8;<	(1 − *(!))  
è =>(0|/)=0 = "*(!)/;<*′(!) + "(" − 1)*(!)/;?*′(!)@1 − *(!)A −"*(!)8;<	*′(!)  
è =>(0|/)=0 = "(" − 1)*(!)/;?*′(!)@1 − *(!)A > 0 as long as " > 1 
Therefore, #(!|") is strictly increasing in N. ■  
 
Denote  ( ≡ B("), then we can write #(") as: #(") = B(")8	 + "B(")8;<	(1 − B("))  
Let C< = B(")8	, C? = B(")8;<	, then =>(/)=/ = =DE=/ + B(")8;<	@1 − B(")A + "(1 − B(")) =DF=/ − "B(")8;<	B′(")  
To calculate =>(/)=/ , the key is to calculate  =DE=/  and =DF=/  
Note that 45C<(") = "45B(") 
è <DE × =DE=/ = 45B(") + /H(/) B′(") 
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è =DE=/ = [45B(") + /H(/) B′(")] × B(")8	 
è =DE=/ = B(")8	45B(") + "B′(")B(")8;<	 
Similarly, 45C?(") = (" − 1)45B(") 
è <DF × =DF=/ = 45B(") + /;<H(/) B′(") 
è =DF=/ = [45B(") + /;<H(/) B′(")] × B(")8;<	 
è =DF=/ = B(")8;<	45B(") + (" − 1)B′(")B(")8;?	 
Hence, we have: 
=>(8)=/ = B(")8	45B(") + "B′(")B(")8;<	 + B(")8;<	@1 − B(")A − "B(")8;<	B′(") +"(1 − B("))[B(")8;<	45B(") + (" − 1)B′(")B(")8;?	]  
è =>(8)=/ = B(")8;<@B(")45B(") + "B′(")A + B(")8;<	@1 − B(")A −"B(")8;<	B′(") + "(1 − B("))B(")8;?	(B(")45B(") + (" − 1)B′(")) 
è =>(8)=/ = B(")845B(") + B(")8;<	@1 − B(")A + "@1 −B(")AB(")8;?	@B(")45B(") + (" − 1)BK(/)A < 0 
Therefore, #(") is strictly decreasing in K. ■  
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